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Rational Persuasion, Paternalism, and Respect

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Abstract

In ‘Rational Persuasion as Paternalism', George Tsai argues that providing another person with reasons or evidence (even good reasons or evidence) can be a morally objectionable form of paternalism. I believe Tsai’s thesis is importantly correct, denying the widely accepted identification of rational persuasion with respectful treatment. In this comment, I disagree about what is centrally wrong with objectionable rational persuasion. Contrary to Tsai, objectionable rational persuasion is not wrong because it undermines the value of an agent’s life. It is wrong because it is contrary to an agent’s will.

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Notes

  1. By ‘considered judgments', I have in mind Claire’s all-things-considered beliefs about whether it would be good for her to receive evidence relevant to her choice.

  2. This is why, as the first section argued, the subjective strategy could not vindicate the original complaint against Peter’s conduct.

  3. ‘Objective’ at least in the sense that they are independent of Claire’s will. They may depend on facts about conventions in the society inhabited by Peter and Claire, for instance, so I do not mean so suggest that they are more robust than might be reasonably supposed. In any case, the important point for my purposes will just be that they are independent of Claire’s own attitudes.

  4. Tsai (2014, p. 96). My thanks to a reviewer for pointing this explanation out to me.

  5. Thanks to a reviewer for this excellent example, as well as for the points that form the remainder of this paragraph.

  6. See Shiffrin (2000, p. 213), ctd. in Tsai (2014, p. 84). I believe that Tsai accepts this characterization, contesting only whether rational persuasion can decouple from showing respect for another’s control over their own agency.

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Acknowledgements

For helpful comments and discussion, I would like to thank Olivia Bailey, Eric Beerbohm, Christine Korsgaard, Kelly Patterson, T. M. Scanlon, an anonymous referee, and audiences at Brigham Young University and the Graduate Moral Philosophy Workshop at Harvard University.

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  1. Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA

    Ryan W. Davis

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  1. Ryan W. Davis
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Correspondence to Ryan W. Davis.

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Davis, R.W. Rational Persuasion, Paternalism, and Respect. Res Publica 23, 513–522 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9338-x

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