Skip to main content
Log in

Security price formation and informed trading with constrained short selling

  • Original Research
  • Published:
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Short sale orders account for a substantial portion of trading volume in recent years. This paper develops a sequential trade model with constrained short selling to derive the effect on prices when the market maker can observe short selling in the order flow. The model predicts that market quotes will adjust differently to short sales and regular sales. Furthermore, the model shows that the probability of informed trading is impacted both by the level of short sale constraints and the intensity of actual short sale trades. Simulation evidence confirms that estimates of the probability of informed trade are improved when accounting for past short selling activity. The results demonstrate the information benefits of short selling transparency.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See, for example, Boehmer et al. (2008), Diether et al. (2009), Karpoff and Lou (2010), Christophe et al. (2010), Boehmer and Wu (2013).

  2. Diether et al. (2009) report shore sales comprise 24% of NYSE share volume and 31% of Nasdaq share volume in 2005. Jain et al. (2012) show the number to be as high as 40% in more recent periods. Boehmer et al. (2008) report 13% of NYSE SuperDOT order flow from 2000 to 2004 represents short sale orders.

  3. Senchack and Starks (1993), Figlewski and Webb (1993), Desai et al. (2002), and Asquith et al. (2005) provide some of the earliest empirical evidence that some short sellers are informed.

  4. For example, Boehmer et al. (2008) point out that the specialist is always aware that a particular system sell order is a short sale, since these orders are flagged as short at the specialist’s trading post.

  5. Despite references in the literature that the specialist, for example, is aware of short selling in the order flow (Senchack and Starks 1993; Boehmer et al. 2008), no sequential trade models have incorporated this feature of the market structure.

  6. They specify three levels of short selling costs, and examine the implications for informational efficiency of each of these three costs individually when the other two are set to zero. In essence, they are looking at the polar case for each of the three costs. This paper, on the other hand, restricts all of these costs to be nonzero and avoids polar case scenarios.

  7. Anecdotally, conversations with securities lenders who loan shares to short sellers support the notion that industry practitioners view short sellers as likely to possess value-relevant information.

  8. This assumption is consistent with Easley et al. (1997). In Easley and O’Hara (1992), this probability is not restricted to ½, and is denoted by \(\gamma\). The implications derived henceforth are unaffected by this assumption.

  9. \(c_{2}\) may be interpreted as any type of restrictive, but not prohibitive, cost such as the unavailability of short sale proceeds for reinvestment. Uninformed traders transacting for liquidity reasons would not short sell when subject to such a cost. \(c_{3}\) may be interpreted as a prohibition for either legal reasons (institutional traders prohibited form short selling) or economic reasons (the absence of shares available for borrowing or prohibitively high borrowing costs that eliminate profit opportunities).

  10. There are no inventory or order processing costs in this model, and the bid-ask spread exists solely as a consequence of asymmetric information. The concept of a spread due solely to asymmetric information costs was proposed by Bagehot (1971) and Copeland and Galai (1983). As pointed out by Gervais (1995), a risk-neutral, competitive market maker has no inventory concerns and cannot, in equilibrium, charge order costs as part of the spread.

  11. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) point out that the market maker has a good estimate about the cost of shorting. It is likely that a market maker would have knowledge concerning the ease or difficulty with which investors can borrow shares in the stock for which he oversees trading, especially if the stock is on the hard-to-borrow list.

  12. By the same argument, the opposite relations also hold. The conditional probability of a high state given a short sale is less than the conditional probability given a regular sale; \(\Pr \{ V = \overline{V} |SS\} < \Pr \{ V = \overline{V} |RS\}\). Likewise, the probability that a trader is uninformed conditional on a short sale is less than conditional on a regular sale; \(\Pr \{ U|SS\} < \Pr \{ U|RS\}\), where U denotes an uninformed trader.

  13. Several papers in the literature explicitly reference the fact that the specialist, or market maker, has real time awareness that a placed order is a short sale, and that such information should immediately be incorporated into the quotes. For examples, see Hasbrouck et al. (1993), Senchack and Starks (1993), Angel (1997) and Boehmer et al. (2008).

  14. Using the model setup of Easley et al. (1997), these quotes are given as:

    $$\begin{aligned} a_{t + 1} = \frac{{\varPhi_{L} [(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ] \cdot \underline{V} + \varPhi_{H} [\mu + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ] \cdot \overline{V} + \varPhi_{0} [\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ] \cdot V^{*} }}{{\varPhi_{L} [(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ] + \varPhi_{H} [\mu + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ] + \varPhi_{0} [\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ]}} \hfill \\ b_{t + 1} = \frac{{\varPhi_{L} [\mu + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ] \cdot \underline{V} + \varPhi_{H} [(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ] \cdot \overline{V} + \varPhi_{0} [\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ] \cdot V^{*} }}{{\varPhi_{L} [\mu + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ] + \varPhi_{H} [(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ] + \varPhi_{0} [\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon ]}} \hfill \\ \end{aligned}$$

    where

    $$\begin{aligned} \varPhi_{L} = \alpha \delta \left[ {(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon } \right]^{{B^{t} }} \left[ {\mu + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon } \right]^{{S^{t} }} \left[ {(1 - \mu )(1 - \varepsilon )} \right]^{{N^{t} }} \hfill \\ \varPhi_{H} = \alpha (1 - \delta )\left[ {\mu + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon } \right]^{{B^{t} }} \left[ {(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon } \right]^{{S^{t} }} \left[ {(1 - \mu )(1 - \varepsilon )} \right]^{{N^{t} }} \hfill \\ \varPhi_{0} \, = (1 - \alpha )\left[ {\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon } \right]^{{B^{t} }} \left[ {\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon } \right]^{{S^{t} }} \left[ {(1 - \varepsilon )} \right]^{{N^{t} }} \hfill \\ \end{aligned}$$
  15. See Easley et al. (1996), Easley et al. (1997) and Easley et al. (2002).

  16. For some examples, see Easley et al. (1997), Vega (2006), Chen et al. (2007), Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), Brockman and Yan (2009) and Kolasinski et al. (2013).

  17. In addition to the definition of PIN* changing due to the added short sale constraints, the actual estimation of PIN* will also incorporate the frequency of short selling, as shown below.

  18. Appendix 2” lists the conditional probabilities for each trade outcome given the realization of a certain state.

  19. For the restricted model, regular and short sales are pooled, and the likelihood function from Easley et al. (1997) is given by:

    $$\begin{aligned} \sum\limits_{d = 1}^{60} {\log } \left\{ {\alpha (1 - \delta )\left( {1 + \frac{\mu }{x}} \right)^{B} + \alpha \delta \left( {1 + \frac{\mu }{x}} \right)^{S} + (1 - \alpha )\left( {\frac{1}{1 - \mu }} \right)^{B + S + N} } \right\} + \sum\limits_{d = 1}^{60} {\log } \left\{ {x^{B + S} \left[ {(1 - \mu )(1 - \varepsilon )} \right]^{N} } \right\} \hfill \\ where \, x = \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - \mu ),{\text{ and }}S = (RS + SS) \hfill \\ \end{aligned}$$
  20. The other assigned parameter values for this simulation are: α = 0.5, μ = 0.35, ε = 0.5, h = 0.5, c1 = 0.1.

  21. The exact expressions for \(\varPhi_{L}^{*}\), \(\varPhi_{H}^{*}\), and \(\varPhi_{0}^{*}\) also include the combinatorial factor \(\frac{(B + RS + SS + N)!}{B!RS!SS!N!}\). This factor has no effect on the market maker’s estimates of the structural parameters of the model and cancels out in the calculation of the bid and ask quotes. Therefore, it is dropped for notational simplicity.

References

  • Akbas F, Boehmer E, Erturk B, Sorescu S (2017) Short interest, returns, and unfavorable information. Financ Manag 46:455–486

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anand A, Chakravarty S, Martell T (2005) Empirical evidence on the evolution of liquidity: choice of market versus limit orders by informed and uninformed traders. J Financ Mark 8:288–308

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Angel J (1997) Short selling on the NYSE. Working Paper, Georgetown University

  • Asquith P, Pathak P, Ritter J (2005) Short interest, institutional ownership, and stock returns. J Financ Econ 78(243):276

    Google Scholar 

  • Bagehot W (1971) The only game in town. Financ Anal J 27:12–14

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boehmer E, Wu J (2013) Short selling and the price discovery process. Rev Financ Stud 26:287–322

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boehmer E, Jones C, Zhang X (2008) Which shorts are informed? J Finance 63:491–527

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brent A, Morse D, Stice E (1990) Short interest—explanations and tests. J Financ Quant Anal 25:273–289

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brockman P, Yan X (2009) Block ownership and firm-specific information. J Bank Financ 33:308–316

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burdett K, O’Hara M (1987) Building blocks: an introduction to block trading. J Bank Financ 11:193–212

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen Q, Goldstein I, Jiang W (2007) Price informativeness and investment sensitivity to stock price. Rev Financ Stud 20:619–650

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Choy S, Zhang H (2018) Public news announcements, short-sale restriction and informational efficiency. Rev Quant Finance Acc. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-0707-8

    Google Scholar 

  • Christophe S, Ferri M, Hsieh J (2010) Informed trading before analyst downgrades: evidence from short sellers. J Financ Econ 95:85–106

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Collin-Dufresne P, Fos V (2015) Do prices reveal the presence of informed trading? J Finance 70:1555–1582

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Copeland T, Galai D (1983) Information effects on the bid-ask spread. J Finance 38:1457–1469

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cremers M, Weinbaum D (2010) Deviations from put-call parity and stock return predictability. J Financ Quant Anal 45:335–367

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D’Avolio G (2002) The market for borrowing stock. J Financ Econ 66:271–306

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Desai H, Ramesh K, Thiagarajan S, Balachandran B (2002) An investigation of the informational role of short interest in the Nasdaq market. J Finance 57:2263–2287

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dey M (2001) Order time, multiple shocks, and short selling in security price adjustment. Working Paper, University of Massachusetts

  • Dey M, Kazemi H (2008) Bid ask spread in a competitive market with institutions and order size. Rev Quant Finance Acc 30:433–453

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diamond D, Verrecchia R (1987) Constraints on short-selling and asset price adjustment to private information. J Financ Econ 18:277–311

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diether K, Lee K, Werner I (2009) Short-sale strategies and return predictability. Rev Financ Stud 22:575–607

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easley D, O’Hara M (1987) Price, trade size, and information in securities markets. J Financ Econ 19:69–90

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easley D, O’Hara M (1992) Time and the process of security price adjustment. J Finance 47:577–605

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easley D, Kiefer N, O’Hara M, Paperman J (1996) Liquidity, information, and infrequently traded stocks. J Finance 51:1405–1436

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easley D, Kiefer N, O’Hara M (1997) One day in the life of a very common stock. Rev Financ Stud 10:805–835

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easley D, Hvidkjaer S, O’Hara M (2002) Is information risk a determinant of asset returns? J Finance 57:2185–2221

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easley D, Engle R, O’Hara M, Wu L (2008) Time-varying arrival rates of informed and uninformed trades. J Financ Econom 6:171–207

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Figlewski S, Webb G (1993) Options, short sales, and market completeness. J Finance 48:761–777

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gervais S (1995) Market microstructure with uncertain information precision: a new framework. Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania

  • Glosten L, Milgrom P (1985) Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders. J Financ Econ 14:71–100

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gu A, Yang C (2007) Short sales constraints and return volatility: evidence from the Chinese A and H share markets. Rev Pac Basin Financ Mark Policies 10:469–478

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hackney J, Henry T, Koski J (2018) Arbitrage vs. informed short selling: evidence from convertible bond issuers. Working Paper, University of South Carolina

  • Harris L (2003) Trading and exchanges. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Hasbrouck J, Sofianos G, Sosebee D (1993) New York stock exchange systems and trading procedures. NYSE Working Paper #93-01

  • Huang R, Stoll H (1996) Dealer versus auction markets: a paired comparison of execution costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE. J Financ Econ 41:313–357

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jain C, Jain P, McInish T (2012) Short selling: the impact of SEC Rule 201 of 2010. Financ Rev 47:37–64

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jarrow R (1980) Heterogeneous expectations, restrictions on short sales, and equilibrium asset prices. J Finance 35:1105–1113

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaniel R, Liu H (2006) So what orders do informed traders use? J Bus 79:1867–1913

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Karpoff J, Lou X (2010) Short sellers and financial misconduct. J Finance 65:1879–1913

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kolasinski A, Reed A, Thornock J (2013) Can short restrictions actually increase informed short selling? Financ Manag 42:155–181

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merton R (1987) A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. J Financ 42:483–510

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller E (1977) Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. J Finance 32:1151–1168

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Senchack A, Starks L (1993) Short sale restrictions and market reaction to short-interest announcements. J Financ Quant Anal 28:177–194

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vega C (2006) Stock price reaction to public and private information. J Financ Econ 82:103–133

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wu C, Li Q, Wei K (1996) Incomplete-information capital market equilibrium with heterogeneous expectations and short sale restrictions. Rev Quant Financ Acc 7:119–136

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for financial support from the Frank H. Jellinek, Jr. Endowed Assistant Professor Chair in Finance.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Tyler R. Henry.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Proof of Proposition I

The decision tree of Fig. 2 gives the following conditional probabilities:

$$\Pr \{ V = \underline{V} |RS\} = \delta \left[ {\frac{{\alpha \mu h + (1 - \alpha \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h}}{{\alpha \delta \mu h + (1 - \alpha \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h}}} \right]$$
(9)
$$\Pr \{ V = \underline{V} |SS\} = \delta \left[ {\frac{{\alpha \mu (c_{1} + c_{2} ) + (1 - \alpha \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon c_{1} }}{{\alpha \delta \mu (c_{1} + c_{2} ) + (1 - \alpha \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon c_{1} }}} \right]$$
(10)

It can be shown that \(\Pr \{ V = \underline{V} |SS\} - \Pr \{ V = \underline{V} |RS\}\) is equivalent to \(\frac{{(1 - \delta )\alpha \mu \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h(1 - \alpha \mu )c_{2} }}{{\left( {\alpha \delta \mu (c_{1} + c_{2} ) + (1 - \alpha \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon c_{1} } \right)\left( {\alpha \delta \mu h + (1 - \alpha \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h} \right)}}\) which is strictly greater than zero.Additionally, the following probabilities hold:

$$\Pr \{ I|RS\} = \frac{\mu \alpha \delta }{{\mu \alpha \delta + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon }}$$
(11)
$$\Pr \{ I|SS\} = \frac{{\mu \alpha \delta (c_{1} + c_{2} )}}{{\mu \alpha \delta (c_{1} + c_{2} ) + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon c_{1} }}$$
(12)

Subtracting (11) from (12) gives \(\frac{{\alpha \delta \mu (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon c_{2} }}{{\left( {\alpha \delta \mu (c_{1} + c_{2} ) + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon c_{1} } \right)\left( {\alpha \delta \mu + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon } \right)}}\) which is also strictly greater than zero. \(\square\)

Proof of Corollary 1

$$\Pr \{ V = \underline{V} |S\} = \delta \left[ {\frac{{\alpha \mu [h + (1 - h)(c_{1} + c_{2} )] + (1 - \alpha \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon [h + (1 - h)c_{1} ]}}{{\alpha \delta \mu [h + (1 - h)(c_{1} + c_{2} )] + (1 - \alpha \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon [h + (1 - h)c_{1} ]}}} \right]$$
(13)

Computation shows that (10) > (13) > (9), which proves the relation. \(\square\)

Proof of Proposition 2

The conditional bid quotes at t + 1 are given by

$$b_{t + 1}^{SST} = \frac{{\varPhi_{L}^{*} [\mu (1 - h)(c_{1} + c_{2} ) + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} ] \cdot \underline{V} + \varPhi_{H}^{*} [(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} ] \cdot \overline{V} + \varPhi_{0}^{*} [\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} ] \cdot V^{*} }}{{\varPhi_{L}^{*} [\mu (1 - h)(c_{1} + c_{2} ) + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} ] + \varPhi_{H}^{*} [(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} ] + \varPhi_{0}^{*} [\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} ]}}$$
(14)
$$b_{t + 1}^{RS} = \frac{{\varPhi_{L}^{*} [\mu h + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h] \cdot \underline{V} + \varPhi_{H}^{*} [(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h] \cdot \overline{V} + \varPhi_{0}^{*} [\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h] \cdot V^{*} }}{{\varPhi_{L}^{*} [\mu h + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h] + \varPhi_{H}^{*} [(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h] + \varPhi_{0}^{*} [\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h]}}$$
(15)

whereFootnote 21

$$\begin{aligned} \varPhi_{L}^{*} & = \Pr \left\{ {\varPsi = L} \right\}\Pr \left\{ {Q^{t} |\varPsi = L} \right\} \\ & = \alpha \delta \left[ {(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon } \right]^{{B^{t} }} \left[ {\mu h + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h} \right]^{{RS^{t} }} \left[ {\mu (1 - h)(c_{1} + c_{2} ) + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} } \right]^{{SS^{t} }} \\ & \quad \cdot \,\left[ {\mu (1 - h)c_{3} + (1 - \mu )[(1 - \varepsilon ) + \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)(c_{2} + c_{3} )]} \right]^{{N^{t} }} \\ \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned} \varPhi_{H}^{*} & = \Pr \left\{ {\varPsi = H} \right\}\Pr \left\{ {Q^{t} |\varPsi = H} \right\} \\ & = \alpha (1 - \delta )\left[ {\mu + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon } \right]^{{B^{t} }} \left[ {(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h} \right]^{{RS^{t} }} \left[ {(1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} } \right]^{{SS^{t} }} \left[ {(1 - \mu )[(1 - \varepsilon ) + \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)(c_{2} + c_{3} )]} \right]^{{N^{t} }} \\ \end{aligned}$$
$$\begin{aligned} \varPhi_{0}^{*} & = \Pr \left\{ {\varPsi = 0} \right\}\Pr \left\{ {Q^{t} |\varPsi = 0} \right\} \\ & = (1 - \alpha )\left[ {\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon } \right]^{{B^{t} }} \left[ {\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h} \right]^{{RS^{t} }} \left[ {\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} } \right]^{{SS^{t} }} \left[ {(1 - \varepsilon ) + \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)(c_{2} + c_{3} )} \right]^{{N^{t} }} \\ \end{aligned}$$

Simplification shows that \(b_{t + 1}^{SS} - b_{t + 1}^{RS}\) is equal to

$$\frac{{\varPhi_{L}^{*} \left[ {\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon \mu (1 - h)hc_{2} } \right]\left[ {\varPhi_{0}^{*} \left( {\underline{V} - V^{*} } \right) + \varPhi_{H}^{*} (1 - \mu )\left( {\underline{V} - \overline{V} } \right)} \right]}}{{\left\{ {\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} \left[ {\varPhi_{0}^{*} + \varPhi_{H}^{*} (1 - \mu ) + \varPhi_{L}^{*} (1 - \mu )} \right] + \varPhi_{L}^{*} \mu (1 - h)(c_{1} + c_{2} )} \right\}\left\{ {\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h\left[ {\varPhi_{0}^{*} + \varPhi_{H}^{*} (1 - \mu ) + \varPhi_{L}^{*} (1 - \mu )} \right] + \varPhi_{L}^{*} \mu h} \right\}}}$$
(16)

Since \(\overline{V} > V^{*} > \underline{V}\), the numerator is negative and the denominator is positive, so the whole expression is strictly less than zero. \(\square\)

Proof of Corollary 2

Using the expression for \(b_{t + 1}^{*}\) and a similar simplification method as above, it is straightforward to prove that

$$b_{t + 1}^{SS} < b_{t + 1}^{*} < b_{t + 1}^{RS}.$$

\(\square\)

Appendix 2

Conditional Trade Probabilities by State

Low Signal State (\(\varPsi = L\))

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr (B|\varPsi = L) & = (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon \\ \Pr (RS|\varPsi = L) & = \mu h + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h \\ \Pr (SS|\varPsi = L) & = \mu (1 - h)(c_{1} + c_{2} ) + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} \\ \Pr (N|\varPsi = L) & = \mu (1 - h)c_{3} + (1 - \mu )[(1 - \varepsilon ) + \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)(c_{2} + c_{3} )] \\ \end{aligned}$$

High Signal State (\(\varPsi = H\))

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr (B|\varPsi = H) & = \mu + (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon \\ \Pr (RS|\varPsi = H) & = (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h \\ \Pr (SS|\varPsi = H) & = (1 - \mu )\tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} \\ \Pr (N|\varPsi = H) & = (1 - \mu )[(1 - \varepsilon ) + \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)(c_{2} + c_{3} )] \\ \end{aligned}$$

Zero Signal State (\(\varPsi = 0\))

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr (B|\varPsi = 0) & = \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon \\ \Pr (RS|\varPsi = 0) & = \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon h \\ \Pr (SS|\varPsi = 0) & = \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)c_{1} \\ \Pr (N|\varPsi = 0) & = (1 - \varepsilon ) + \tfrac{1}{2}\varepsilon (1 - h)(c_{2} + c_{3} ) \\ \end{aligned}$$

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Henry, T.R. Security price formation and informed trading with constrained short selling. Rev Quant Finan Acc 53, 123–151 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-0745-2

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-0745-2

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation