Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis

Lardon, Andy; Beuselinck, Christof; Deloof, Marc

doi:10.1007/s11156-018-0719-4

Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis

Original Research
Published: 09 March 2018

Volume 52, pages 573–642, (2019)
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Andy Lardon¹,
Christof Beuselinck² &
Marc Deloof^1,3

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Abstract

We investigate the value of stable ownership for a sample of European firms using the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock and pre-and post-crisis years as benchmark periods. Consistent with the argument that stable ownership allows managers to focus on the creation of long-term value, we find that stable ownership resulted in higher stock returns and a higher market-to-book ratio during the crisis. This positive effect of stable ownership was not reversed after the crisis. Stable institutional blockholdings were more valuable in countries with weaker investor protection. However, the positive effect does not apply to firms in which a family is the largest blockholder. Finally, we also find that ownership stability was associated with a higher level of investments, illustrating that stable ownership affects real corporate decisions.

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Ownership and the cyclicality of firms’ R&D investment

Article 28 May 2014

Evolution of Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance

Ownership structure, investors’ protection and corporate valuation: the effect of judicial system efficiency in family and non-family firms

Article 19 February 2018

Notes

For 82% of all shareholders, only direct ownership data are available. For 14% of all shareholders, only total ownership data are available. For 4% of all shareholders, data on both direct and total ownership are available.
When there is an unidentified overlap between total ownership and direct ownership, total ownership might exceed 100%. Suppose, for example, that firm A directly owns 100% of firm B, which directly owns 100% of firm C. If an information source also indicates that firm A holds total ownership (100%) of firm C, then the total ownership percentage in the database will be 200%.
Countries may also implement lower legal threshold notifications. The United Kingdom, for example, has set a minimal threshold of 3% for UK issuers. Germany, for example, has implemented a threshold of 3% for both German and non-German issuers.
As a robustness check, we also use other measures of ownership concentration. Following Lins et al. (2013), we distinguish between widely held and non-widely held firms, with non-widely held firms defined as those with a total blockholder ownership of at least 25%. Following Konijn et al. (2011), we also estimate our models using measures of blockholder dispersion other than the Herfindahl Index: a Gini coefficient and the number of blockholders. We also measure the Herfindahl Index based on the ownership percentages of all blockholders. Results reported in appendix are qualitatively very similar.
The log-transformation replaces a bounded dependent variable with an unbounded continuous variable.
Lesmond (2005) shows that the incidence of zero returns, or equivalently, the percentage of trading days better captures within-country liquidity than other liquidity measures (e.g., share turnover). However, controlling for the volume per share (log-transformed to deal with high skewness) yields similar results (reported in appendix).
Direct evidence on the relevance of minority shareholder protection during crises periods can be found in Kim et al. (2005) who show for a sample of Korean business groups that funds are transferred (tunneled) to the firms where the controlling shareholders have the highest cash flow rights.
We also use alternative event windows, defined by Lins et al. (2013) who study the influence of family control on stock returns during the global financial crisis for a worldwide sample. The mean and median stock return, reported by Lins et al. (2013) from the middle of August 2008 to the middle of March 2009 are − 40 and − 41%. The mean and median stock return for the firms in our sample over the same period are very similar: − 42 and − 45%, respectively.
To evaluate a potential multicollinearity problem, we calculate the variance inflation factors of all the independent variables. A variance inflation factor exceeding 10 is regarded as a sign of multicollinearity. However, the highest value in our analysis equals 2.26, which is far below this threshold.
The number of observations during the crisis is different from the number of observations in the pre-crisis and post-crisis sample. In light of this, we perform the analysis again using a constant sample of 1088 firms that are present in all periods considered. Results (reported in appendix) are very similar, except for the coefficient of Total Blockholder Ownership, which is no longer significant during the crisis.
28% of the blockholders are family blockholders and 34% are institutional investors (including banks: 6.26%; financial firms: 7.36%; insurance firms: 2.40%; mutual and pension funds: 16.91%; private equity firms: 0.81%). Since the ownership measures in our main analysis are based on direct shareholdings, our sample also includes a substantial percentage of corporate blockholders: 36%. Results (unreported) for the stability of corporate blockholders are insignificant. For corporate blockholders, it might be the stability of the ultimate shareholders that matters, rather than the stability of the direct corporate shareholders. The remaining 2% is comprised of governments, foundations/research institutes and employees/managers.
We use Hausman tests to investigate whether the fixed or random effects estimator is appropriate. Hausman tests reject the null hypotheses that random effects is appropriate, so we use the fixed effects estimator.
The insignificant negative relation between total blockholder ownership and firm value prior to the crisis may be a surprise; Thomsen et al. (2006) find a significantly negative relation in Europe during a non-crisis period. However, they doubt whether a systematic relation will persist in the long run, as this negative relation might be an out-of-equilibrium effect following corporate governance and finance restructurings in Europe during the 1990 s. Consistent with this view, we do not find such a relation in Europe in 2005 and 2006.
We use Hausman tests to investigate whether the fixed or random effects estimator is appropriate. Hausman tests reject the null hypotheses that random effects is appropriate, so we use the fixed effects estimator.
We exclude firm-years during which investments are larger than the book value of total assets, ensuring that results are not driven by merger investments.

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Acknowledgments

We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers, Christina Atanasova, Christophe Boone, Andriy Boytsun, Eric de Bodt, Corneel Defrancq, Marc Jegers, Ann Jorissen, Eddy Laveren, Sophie Manigart, Gianluca Mattarocci, Armin Schwienbacher, Tensie Steijvers, Christophe Van der Elst, and seminar participants at the Australasian Finance and Banking Conference in Sydney, the AIDEA conference in Lecce, the Corporate Finance Day in Ghent, the Skema Business School (Lille) and the Politecnico de Milano for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Christine Lippens for her help with data processing. Financial support from the Flemish Agency for Innovation by Science and Technology (IWT, Grant No. SBO 90061) is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are ours.

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Authors and Affiliations

University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, 2000, Antwerp, Belgium
Andy Lardon & Marc Deloof
IESEG School of Management and LEM, Lille, France
Christof Beuselinck
Antwerp Management School, Antwerp, Belgium
Marc Deloof

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Andy Lardon
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Christof Beuselinck
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marc Deloof.

Appendix: Robustness checks

1.1 Including total ownership (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.028**	0.029**
Non-zero-points duration	(0.026)	(0.020)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.043***	0.043***
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.002)	(0.001)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.111***		0.108***
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.002)		(0.003)
Herfindahl Index		0.079***		0.076***
Herfindahl Index		(0.003)		(0.004)
Total blockholder ownership		0.048		0.046
Total blockholder ownership		(0.119)		(0.131)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.005	− 0.005	− 0.004	− 0.004
Ln(total assets)	(0.375)	(0.330)	(0.474)	(0.418)
Leverage	− 0.162***	− 0.160***	− 0.164***	− 0.162***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.101	0.104	0.100	0.103
Cash holdings	(0.164)	(0.145)	(0.170)	(0.152)
Return on assets	− 0.054	− 0.055	− 0.057	− 0.059
Return on assets	(0.558)	(0.544)	(0.532)	(0.521)
Beta	− 0.022**	− 0.022**	− 0.021**	− 0.021**
Beta	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.073***	− 0.074***	− 0.071***	− 0.073***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	0.012	0.010	0.011	0.010
Synchronicity	(0.261)	(0.326)	(0.275)	(0.342)
Ln(market-to-book)	− 0.002	− 0.002	− 0.000	− 0.000
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.900)	(0.898)	(0.981)	(0.978)
Momentum	− 0.033**	− 0.032**	− 0.034***	− 0.033**
Momentum	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Stock liquidity	− 0.360***	− 0.364***	− 0.354***	− 0.359***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	0.065***	0.065***	0.068***	0.068***
Rule of law	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Financial development	0.032	0.031	0.028	0.028
Financial development	(0.237)	(0.257)	(0.288)	(0.312)
Disclosure Index	− 0.014***	− 0.014***	− 0.014***	− 0.014***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1517	1517	1517	1517
Adjusted R-squared	0.2173	0.2168	0.2205	0.2198

1.2 Including total ownership (2)

Ownership stability and market-to-book

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	− 0.009	− 0.009
Non-zero-points duration	(0.521)	(0.539)
Maintain-stake-points duration			− 0.022	− 0.022
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.164)	(0.172)
Year 2007	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.006
Year 2007	(0.681)	(0.729)	(0.706)	(0.755)
Year 2008	0.054***	0.052***	0.066***	0.065***
Year 2008	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2009	0.051***	0.052***	0.063***	0.064***
Year 2009	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Year 2010	0.001	0.001	0.016	0.016
Year 2010	(0.949)	(0.959)	(0.464)	(0.473)
Largest blockholder ownership	− 0.029		− 0.034
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.715)		(0.659)
Herfindahl Index		0.001		0.001
Herfindahl Index		(0.980)		(0.979)
Year 2007	0.034	0.017	0.037	0.017
Year 2007	(0.480)	(0.629)	(0.440)	(0.625)
Year 2008	0.199***	0.116***	0.195***	0.113***
Year 2008	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Year 2009	0.044	0.049	0.041	0.046
Year 2009	(0.398)	(0.183)	(0.426)	(0.211)
Year 2010	− 0.016	0.036	− 0.022	0.032
Year 2010	(0.790)	(0.392)	(0.707)	(0.438)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.014		− 0.017
Total blockholder ownership		(0.806)		(0.762)
Year 2007		0.024		0.027
Year 2007		(0.562)		(0.513)
Year 2008		0.136***		0.133***
Year 2008		(0.001)		(0.001)
Year 2009		0.003		0.001
Year 2009		(0.952)		(0.981)
Year 2010		− 0.045		− 0.050
Year 2010		(0.346)		(0.297)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.451***	− 0.451***	− 0.450***	− 0.451***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	0.186***	0.188***	0.188***	0.190***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.101	0.102	0.103	0.104
Cash holdings	(0.147)	(0.143)	(0.138)	(0.135)
Return on assets	0.298***	0.298***	0.299***	0.299***
Return on assets	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Asset tangibility	− 0.035	− 0.037	− 0.037	− 0.038
Asset tangibility	(0.653)	(0.638)	(0.642)	(0.626)
Beta	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001
Beta	(0.912)	(0.874)	(0.950)	(0.913)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.024**	− 0.024**	− 0.022*	− 0.023*
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.058)	(0.050)
Synchronicity	− 0.014***	− 0.014***	− 0.014***	− 0.014***
Synchronicity	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Stock liquidity	0.078*	0.077*	0.077*	0.076*
Stock liquidity	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.068)
Rule of law	− 0.142**	− 0.141**	− 0.136**	− 0.136**
Rule of law	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Financial development	− 0.055	− 0.050	− 0.053	− 0.048
Financial development	(0.107)	(0.146)	(0.123)	(0.168)
Disclosure Index	− 0.016	− 0.016	− 0.016	− 0.016
Disclosure Index	(0.310)	(0.321)	(0.322)	(0.332)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.290***	− 0.360***	− 0.232***	− 0.300***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	6783	6783	6783	6783
Number of firms	1930	1930	1930	1930
Adjusted R-squared	0.5239	0.5240	0.5244	0.5244

1.3 Including total ownership (3)

Ownership stability and investments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	− 0.002	− 0.003
Non-zero-points duration	(0.779)	(0.642)
Maintain-stake-points duration			− 0.001	− 0.002
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.917)	(0.807)
Year 2007	− 0.002	− 0.001	0.006	0.007
Year 2007	(0.864)	(0.965)	(0.640)	(0.556)
Year 2008	0.024**	0.025**	0.030**	0.032**
Year 2008	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Year 2009	− 0.004	− 0.004	0.007	0.007
Year 2009	(0.726)	(0.750)	(0.577)	(0.550)
Year 2010	− 0.001	− 0.000	0.008	0.008
Year 2010	(0.956)	(0.977)	(0.519)	(0.499)
Largest blockholder ownership	− 0.010		− 0.010
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.780)		(0.778)
Herfindahl Index		0.015		0.014
Herfindahl Index		(0.464)		(0.510)
Year 2007	0.040	0.024	0.033	0.022
Year 2007	(0.149)	(0.274)	(0.216)	(0.306)
Year 2008	0.092***	0.064***	0.086***	0.062***
Year 2008	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Year 2009	0.010	− 0.000	0.002	− 0.003
Year 2009	(0.689)	(0.999)	(0.953)	(0.900)
Year 2010	0.016	− 0.004	0.009	− 0.007
Year 2010	(0.558)	(0.843)	(0.742)	(0.756)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.023		− 0.021
Total blockholder ownership		(0.341)		(0.373)
Year 2007		0.011		0.005
Year 2007		(0.661)		(0.848)
Year 2008		0.044*		0.039
Year 2008		(0.070)		(0.114)
Year 2009		0.003		− 0.005
Year 2009		(0.895)		(0.817)
Year 2010		0.012		0.005
Year 2010		(0.628)		(0.834)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.127***	− 0.127***	− 0.126***	− 0.126***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	− 0.122***	− 0.122***	− 0.123***	− 0.123***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.212***	0.213***	0.213***	0.214***
Cash holdings	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Return on assets	0.085**	0.082**	0.084**	0.081**
Return on assets	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.057***	0.058***	0.057***	0.057***
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.012**	− 0.012**	− 0.012**	− 0.012**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Financial development	− 0.015	− 0.014	− 0.014	− 0.013
Financial development	(0.436)	(0.464)	(0.483)	(0.521)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.097***	− 0.127***	− 0.070***	− 0.097***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	6963	6963	6963	6963
Number of firms	1849	1849	1849	1849
Adjusted R-squared	0.1110	0.1115	0.1110	0.1114

1.4 Alternative crisis periods (1)

Period Lins et al. (2013): 3 months (middle August 2008–middle November 2008)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.027***	0.028***
Non-zero-points duration	(0.001)	(0.001)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.032***	0.032***
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.000)	(0.000)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.048**		0.050**
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.029)		(0.024)
Herfindahl Index		0.049***		0.049***
Herfindahl Index		(0.004)		(0.004)
Total blockholder ownership		0.006		0.007
Total blockholder ownership		(0.787)		(0.745)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.010***	− 0.011***	− 0.010***	− 0.011***
Ln(total assets)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Leverage	− 0.077***	− 0.076***	− 0.077***	− 0.077***
Leverage	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Cash holdings	0.067	0.065	0.065	0.062
Cash holdings	(0.147)	(0.158)	(0.162)	(0.173)
Return on assets	− 0.055	− 0.054	− 0.055	− 0.054
Return on assets	(0.227)	(0.224)	(0.228)	(0.227)
Beta	− 0.019***	− 0.018***	− 0.018***	− 0.018***
Beta	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.055***	− 0.055***	− 0.054***	− 0.055***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	− 0.010	− 0.012*	− 0.011	− 0.012*
Synchronicity	(0.121)	(0.080)	(0.105)	(0.070)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.746)	(0.717)	(0.684)	(0.656)
Momentum	− 0.002	− 0.001	− 0.002	− 0.001
Momentum	(0.839)	(0.884)	(0.829)	(0.876)
Stock liquidity	− 0.133***	− 0.136***	− 0.129***	− 0.132***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	− 0.002	− 0.004	0.000	− 0.002
Rule of law	(0.857)	(0.711)	(0.997)	(0.855)
Financial development	0.066***	0.069***	0.064***	0.067***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	− 0.004**	− 0.004**	− 0.004*	− 0.004**
Disclosure Index	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.035)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1736	1736	1736	1736
Adjusted R-squared	0.1402	0.1418	0.1415	0.1428

1.5 Alternative crisis periods (2)

Period Lins et al. (2013): 5 months (middle August 2008–middle January 2009)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.022**	0.024**
Non-zero-points duration	(0.021)	(0.013)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.027***	0.028***
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.007)	(0.006)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.072***		0.073***
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.006)		(0.005)
Herfindahl Index		0.070***		0.069***
Herfindahl Index		(0.000)		(0.000)
Total blockholder ownership		0.008		0.009
Total blockholder ownership		(0.739)		(0.717)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.009**	− 0.010***	− 0.009**	− 0.010**
Ln(total assets)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.026)	(0.011)
Leverage	− 0.135***	− 0.135***	− 0.135***	− 0.136***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.098*	0.094*	0.095*	0.092*
Cash holdings	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.061)
Return on assets	− 0.053	− 0.052	− 0.053	− 0.052
Return on assets	(0.276)	(0.275)	(0.274)	(0.277)
Beta	− 0.016**	− 0.016**	− 0.015**	− 0.015**
Beta	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.067***	− 0.068***	− 0.066***	− 0.068***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	− 0.001	− 0.004	− 0.002	− 0.004
Synchronicity	(0.859)	(0.665)	(0.824)	(0.634)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.005	0.006	0.006	0.006
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.647)	(0.620)	(0.601)	(0.577)
Momentum	− 0.014	− 0.013	− 0.014	− 0.013
Momentum	(0.212)	(0.241)	(0.206)	(0.236)
Stock liquidity	− 0.134***	− 0.138***	− 0.130***	− 0.135***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	− 0.005	− 0.008	− 0.003	− 0.006
Rule of law	(0.666)	(0.491)	(0.774)	(0.589)
Financial development	0.131***	0.134***	0.129***	0.132***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	− 0.009***	− 0.010***	− 0.009***	− 0.009***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1714	1714	1714	1714
Adjusted R-squared	0.1475	0.1497	0.1485	0.1504

1.6 Alternative crisis periods (3)

Period Lins et al. (2013): 7 months (middle August 2008–middle March 2009)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.020*	0.022**
Non-zero-points duration	(0.050)	(0.034)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.030***	0.031***
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.007)	(0.005)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.062**		0.061**
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.031)		(0.033)
Herfindahl Index		0.053**		0.052**
Herfindahl Index		(0.015)		(0.018)
Total blockholder ownership		0.001		0.001
Total blockholder ownership		(0.963)		(0.982)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.008*	− 0.009**	− 0.007*	− 0.008**
Ln(total assets)	(0.059)	(0.036)	(0.077)	(0.047)
Leverage	− 0.148***	− 0.148***	− 0.149***	− 0.149***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.107*	0.105*	0.105*	0.103*
Cash holdings	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.060)
Return on assets	− 0.019	− 0.019	− 0.021	− 0.020
Return on assets	(0.738)	(0.740)	(0.721)	(0.727)
Beta	− 0.017**	− 0.017**	− 0.017**	− 0.017**
Beta	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.056***	− 0.057***	− 0.055***	− 0.057***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Synchronicity	0.008	0.006	0.007	0.005
Synchronicity	(0.400)	(0.525)	(0.424)	(0.553)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.006
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.694)	(0.660)	(0.636)	(0.604)
Momentum	− 0.024**	− 0.024*	− 0.025**	− 0.024**
Momentum	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.049)
Stock liquidity	− 0.182***	− 0.189***	− 0.178***	− 0.185***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	0.030**	0.028**	0.032**	0.030**
Rule of law	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Financial development	0.083***	0.083***	0.080***	0.081***
Financial development	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Disclosure Index	− 0.010***	− 0.011***	− 0.010***	− 0.011***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1699	1699	1699	1699
Adjusted R-squared	0.1357	0.1360	0.1375	0.1377

1.7 Alternative crisis periods (4)

Period Lins et al. (2013): 9 months (middle August 2008–middle May 2009)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.014	0.015
Non-zero-points duration	(0.230)	(0.187)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.018	0.018
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.146)	(0.136)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.058*		0.058*
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.072)		(0.071)
Herfindahl Index		0.065***		0.064***
Herfindahl Index		(0.009)		(0.009)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.003		− 0.002
Total blockholder ownership		(0.933)		(0.938)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.010**	− 0.012**	− 0.010**	− 0.011**
Ln(total assets)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.018)
Leverage	− 0.166***	− 0.166***	− 0.166***	− 0.166***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.152**	0.149**	0.151**	0.148**
Cash holdings	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Return on assets	− 0.095	− 0.095	− 0.096	− 0.095
Return on assets	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.212)	(0.213)
Beta	− 0.015*	− 0.015*	− 0.015*	− 0.014*
Beta	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.099)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.036*	− 0.038**	− 0.036*	− 0.038**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.044)
Synchronicity	0.026***	0.024**	0.026**	0.023**
Synchronicity	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.019)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.738)	(0.717)	(0.714)	(0.694)
Momentum	− 0.021	− 0.020	− 0.021	− 0.020
Momentum	(0.133)	(0.153)	(0.129)	(0.149)
Stock liquidity	− 0.078**	− 0.082**	− 0.075**	− 0.080**
Stock liquidity	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.036)
Rule of law	0.018	0.015	0.019	0.016
Rule of law	(0.206)	(0.295)	(0.177)	(0.256)
Financial development	0.103***	0.106***	0.101***	0.104***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	− 0.004*	− 0.005*	− 0.004*	− 0.005*
Disclosure Index	(0.083)	(0.057)	(0.095)	(0.064)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1685	1685	1685	1685
Adjusted R-squared	0.0808	0.0827	0.0812	0.0829

1.8 Alternative pre-crisis periods (1)

Period: year 2005 (without Disclosure Index as control variable since not available for 2004)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	− 0.013	− 0.016
Non-zero-points duration	(0.529)	(0.432)
Maintain-stake-points duration			− 0.021	− 0.023
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.330)	(0.278)
Largest blockholder ownership	− 0.060		− 0.060
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.343)		(0.338)
Herfindahl Index		− 0.061		− 0.061
Herfindahl Index		(0.219)		(0.214)
Total blockholder ownership		0.035		0.035
Total blockholder ownership		(0.565)		(0.560)
Ln(total assets)	0.011	0.014	0.011	0.013
Ln(total assets)	(0.268)	(0.208)	(0.278)	(0.213)
Leverage	− 0.106	− 0.115	− 0.107	− 0.116
Leverage	(0.220)	(0.187)	(0.215)	(0.184)
Cash holdings	0.088	0.091	0.092	0.095
Cash holdings	(0.467)	(0.452)	(0.448)	(0.431)
Return on assets	0.160	0.158	0.159	0.157
Return on assets	(0.379)	(0.393)	(0.381)	(0.395)
Beta	0.058***	0.058***	0.057***	0.058***
Beta	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.002
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.986)	(0.959)	(0.994)	(0.964)
Synchronicity	0.021	0.021	0.020	0.020
Synchronicity	(0.277)	(0.270)	(0.292)	(0.287)
Ln(market-to-book)	− 0.115***	− 0.116***	− 0.117***	− 0.118***
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Momentum	0.090***	0.090***	0.090***	0.091***
Momentum	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Stock liquidity	− 0.144*	− 0.131	− 0.148*	− 0.136
Stock liquidity	(0.085)	(0.119)	(0.078)	(0.108)
Rule of law	0.087**	0.091**	0.085*	0.088**
Rule of law	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.047)
Financial development	− 0.154**	− 0.146**	− 0.149**	− 0.142**
Financial development	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.033)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1498	1498	1498	1498
Adjusted R-squared	0.0827	0.0829	0.0830	0.0833

1.9 Alternative pre-crisis periods (2)

Period: year from July 15, 2006 to July 15, 2007

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	− 0.038	− 0.035
Non-zero-points duration	(0.260)	(0.287)
Maintain-Stake-Points Duration			− 0.048	− 0.045
Maintain-Stake-Points Duration			(0.191)	(0.219)
Largest blockholder ownership	− 0.207**		− 0.206**
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.018)		(0.018)
Herfindahl Index		− 0.119*		− 0.117*
Herfindahl Index		(0.068)		(0.071)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.197***		− 0.196***
Total blockholder ownership		(0.009)		(0.009)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.005	− 0.005	− 0.005	− 0.005
Ln(total assets)	(0.708)	(0.697)	(0.688)	(0.678)
Leverage	0.180	0.182	0.181	0.182
Leverage	(0.183)	(0.179)	(0.180)	(0.176)
Cash holdings	0.028	0.026	0.031	0.028
Cash holdings	(0.867)	(0.878)	(0.853)	(0.865)
Return on assets	0.303	0.304	0.302	0.303
Return on assets	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.141)
Beta	0.045*	0.044*	0.044*	0.044*
Beta	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	0.077	0.079	0.077	0.078
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.130)	(0.123)	(0.134)	(0.127)
Synchronicity	0.036	0.034	0.036	0.034
Synchronicity	(0.123)	(0.142)	(0.123)	(0.142)
Ln(market-to-book)	− 0.138***	− 0.138***	− 0.139***	− 0.138***
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Momentum	0.038	0.039	0.038	0.039
Momentum	(0.371)	(0.358)	(0.363)	(0.350)
Stock liquidity	− 0.107	− 0.121	− 0.120	− 0.133
Stock liquidity	(0.393)	(0.339)	(0.353)	(0.308)
Rule of law	− 0.215***	− 0.219***	− 0.221***	− 0.224***
Rule of law	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Financial development	− 0.463***	− 0.464***	− 0.456***	− 0.458***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	− 0.013**	− 0.014**	− 0.013**	− 0.014**
Disclosure Index	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.023)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1606	1606	1606	1606
Adjusted R-squared	0.1583	0.1590	0.1587	0.1594

1.10 Alternative maintain-stake-points duration measurement (1)

Compare ownership percentage with ownership percentage in first year

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)
Maintain-stake-points duration	0.033***	0.034***
Maintain-stake-points duration	(0.004)	(0.004)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.118***
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.000)
Herfindahl Index		0.076***
Herfindahl Index		(0.002)
Total blockholder ownership		0.058*
Total blockholder ownership		(0.052)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.004	− 0.005
Ln(total assets)	(0.370)	(0.289)
Leverage	− 0.162***	− 0.162***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.125*	0.124*
Cash holdings	(0.065)	(0.063)
Return on assets	− 0.032	− 0.031
Return on assets	(0.699)	(0.712)
Beta	− 0.023**	− 0.022**
Beta	(0.012)	(0.013)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.093***	− 0.094***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	0.010	0.009
Synchronicity	(0.308)	(0.365)
Ln(market-to-book)	− 0.011	− 0.011
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.396)	(0.406)
Momentum	− 0.026**	− 0.026**
Momentum	(0.032)	(0.036)
Stock liquidity	− 0.331***	− 0.335***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	0.060***	0.059***
Rule of law	(0.000)	(0.000)
Financial development	0.019	0.018
Financial development	(0.436)	(0.461)
Disclosure Index	− 0.015***	− 0.015***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes
Observations	1700	1700
Adjusted R-squared	0.2235	0.2220

1.11 Alternative maintain-sake-points duration measurement (2)

Compare ownership percentage with ownership percentage in first year

Ownership stability and market-to-book

	(1)	(2)
Maintain-stake-points duration	− 0.016	− 0.016
Maintain-stake-points duration	(0.183)	(0.166)
Year 2007	0.011	0.010
Year 2007	(0.484)	(0.529)
Year 2008	0.047***	0.044***
Year 2008	(0.002)	(0.004)
Year 2009	0.051***	0.051***
Year 2009	(0.002)	(0.002)
Year 2010	0.021	0.022
Year 2010	(0.236)	(0.222)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.003
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.956)
Herfindahl Index		0.039
Herfindahl Index		(0.364)
Year 2007	0.035	0.007
Year 2007	(0.376)	(0.813)
Year 2008	0.187***	0.090***
Year 2008	(0.000)	(0.002)
Year 2009	0.046	0.061*
Year 2009	(0.274)	(0.052)
Year 2010	− 0.010	0.050
Year 2010	(0.837)	(0.169)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.005
Total blockholder ownership		(0.908)
Year 2007		0.035
Year 2007		(0.341)
Year 2008		0.163***
Year 2008		(0.000)
Year 2009		0.008
Year 2009		(0.830)
Year 2010		− 0.050
Year 2010		(0.261)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.453***	− 0.452***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	0.185***	0.187***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.087	0.090
Cash holdings	(0.145)	(0.130)
Return on assets	0.300***	0.301***
Return on assets	(0.000)	(0.000)
Asset tangibility	− 0.106	− 0.109*
Asset tangibility	(0.109)	(0.099)
Beta	0.001	0.001
Beta	(0.867)	(0.809)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.022**	− 0.023**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.029)	(0.023)
Synchronicity	− 0.015***	− 0.015***
Synchronicity	(0.001)	(0.000)
Stock liquidity	0.076**	0.071*
Stock liquidity	(0.037)	(0.051)
Rule of law	− 0.110*	− 0.105*
Rule of law	(0.052)	(0.064)
Financial development	− 0.129***	− 0.127***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	− 0.020	− 0.019
Disclosure Index	(0.175)	(0.193)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.206***	− 0.280***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	8207	8207
Number of firms	2143	2143
Adjusted R-squared	0.5316	0.5329

1.12 Alternative maintain-stake-points duration measurement (3)

Compare ownership percentage with ownership percentage in first year

Ownership stability and investments

	(1)	(2)
Maintain-stake-points duration	0.004	0.004
Maintain-stake-points duration	(0.410)	(0.425)
Year 2007	0.006	0.006
Year 2007	(0.534)	(0.519)
Year 2008	0.025**	0.025**
Year 2008	(0.011)	(0.012)
Year 2009	0.011	0.011
Year 2009	(0.230)	(0.251)
Year 2010	0.010	0.010
Year 2010	(0.284)	(0.298)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.012
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.637)
Herfindahl Index		0.012
Herfindahl Index		(0.542)
Year 2007	0.015	0.008
Year 2007	(0.504)	(0.666)
Year 2008	0.066***	0.059***
Year 2008	(0.003)	(0.001)
Year 2009	− 0.006	− 0.007
Year 2009	(0.787)	(0.704)
Year 2010	− 0.008	− 0.012
Year 2010	(0.742)	(0.501)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.008
Total blockholder ownership		(0.656)
Year 2007		0.005
Year 2007		(0.797)
Year 2008		0.037*
Year 2008		(0.087)
Year 2009		− 0.003
Year 2009		(0.898)
Year 2010		− 0.004
Year 2010		(0.873)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.128***	− 0.128***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	− 0.111***	-0.111***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.195***	0.194***
Cash holdings	(0.000)	(0.000)
Return on assets	0.064**	0.063**
Return on assets	(0.030)	(0.033)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.068***	0.068***
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.011**	− 0.011**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Financial development	− 0.003	− 0.003
Financial development	(0.852)	(0.865)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.062***	− 0.092***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	8576	8576
Number of firms	2047	2047
Adjusted R-squared	0.1131	0.1138

1.13 Alternative maintain-stake-points duration measurement (4)

Ownership percentage in prior period, less small ownership percentage: 2–3–4%

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	2%	2%	3%	3%	4%	4%
Maintain-stake-points duration	0.030***	0.032***	0.029**	0.031***	0.030***	0.031***
Maintain-stake-points duration	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.120***		0.120***		0.119***
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Herfindahl Index		0.079***		0.079***		0.079***
Herfindahl Index		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Total blockholder ownership		0.058*		0.058*		0.058*
Total blockholder ownership		(0.055)		(0.055)		(0.056)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.004	− 0.005	− 0.004	− 0.005	− 0.004	− 0.005
Ln(total assets)	(0.416)	(0.325)	(0.412)	(0.324)	(0.420)	(0.330)
Leverage	− 0.162***	− 0.162***	− 0.162***	− 0.162***	− 0.162***	− 0.162***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.125*	0.124*	0.126*	0.125*	0.127*	0.126*
Cash holdings	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Return on assets	− 0.033	− 0.032	− 0.033	− 0.032	− 0.032	− 0.031
Return on assets	(0.691)	(0.701)	(0.694)	(0.704)	(0.697)	(0.708)
Beta	− 0.023**	− 0.022**	− 0.023**	− 0.023**	− 0.023**	− 0.023**
Beta	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.092***	− 0.094***	− 0.092***	− 0.094***	− 0.092***	− 0.094***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.009
Synchronicity	(0.294)	(0.355)	(0.300)	(0.362)	(0.296)	(0.356)
Ln(market-to-book)	− 0.011	− 0.011	− 0.011	− 0.011	− 0.011	− 0.011
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.416)	(0.429)	(0.404)	(0.416)	(0.405)	(0.418)
Momentum	− 0.027**	− 0.026**	− 0.027**	− 0.026**	− 0.027**	− 0.026**
Momentum	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.035)
Stock liquidity	− 0.333***	− 0.337***	− 0.333***	− 0.337***	− 0.334***	− 0.338***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	0.059***	0.058***	0.059***	0.058***	0.059***	0.058***
Rule of law	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Financial development	0.021	0.020	0.021	0.020	0.021	0.020
Financial development	(0.397)	(0.414)	(0.399)	(0.416)	(0.400)	(0.417)
Disclosure Index	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1700	1700	1700	1700	1700	1700
Adjusted R-squared	0.2226	0.2214	0.2224	0.2212	0.2226	0.2214

1.14 Alternative maintain-stake-points duration measurement (5)

Ownership percentage in prior period, less small ownership percentage: 2–3–4%

Ownership stability and market-to-book

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	2%	2%	3%	3%	4%	4%
Maintain-stake-points duration	− 0.012	− 0.013	− 0.012	− 0.013	− 0.010	− 0.012
Maintain-stake-points duration	(0.385)	(0.347)	(0.383)	(0.344)	(0.430)	(0.391)
Year 2007	0.013	0.011	0.013	0.012	0.014	0.012
Year 2007	(0.420)	(0.490)	(0.396)	(0.460)	(0.378)	(0.440)
Year 2008	0.046***	0.043***	0.044***	0.041***	0.045***	0.042***
Year 2008	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Year 2009	0.045***	0.045***	0.044***	0.044***	0.045***	0.045***
Year 2009	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Year 2010	0.009	0.011	0.009	0.011	0.009	0.011
Year 2010	(0.623)	(0.542)	(0.629)	(0.559)	(0.618)	(0.555)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.004		0.004		0.005
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.949)		(0.949)		(0.933)
Herfindahl Index		0.036		0.036		0.035
Herfindahl Index		(0.407)		(0.405)		(0.412)
Year 2007	0.032	0.007	0.032	0.007	0.031	0.007
Year 2007	(0.420)	(0.811)	(0.419)	(0.809)	(0.429)	(0.811)
Year 2008	0.188***	0.095***	0.189***	0.095***	0.188***	0.094***
Year 2008	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Year 2009	0.050	0.067**	0.051	0.067**	0.050	0.067**
Year 2009	(0.235)	(0.032)	(0.228)	(0.033)	(0.238)	(0.034)
Year 2010	− 0.005	0.053	− 0.005	0.053	− 0.005	0.053
Year 2010	(0.915)	(0.150)	(0.925)	(0.147)	(0.919)	(0.147)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.003		− 0.004		− 0.003
Total blockholder ownership		(0.939)		(0.933)		(0.951)
Year 2007		0.032		0.032		0.031
Year 2007		(0.382)		(0.382)		(0.392)
Year 2008		0.162***		0.163***		0.162***
Year 2008		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Year 2009		0.009		0.010		0.009
Year 2009		(0.823)		(0.799)		(0.812)
Year 2010		− 0.045		− 0.045		− 0.045
Year 2010		(0.307)		(0.311)		(0.309)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.453***	− 0.452***	− 0.453***	− 0.452***	− 0.453***	− 0.452***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	0.185***	0.186***	0.184***	0.186***	0.184***	0.186***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.085	0.088	0.084	0.088	0.084	0.088
Cash holdings	(0.155)	(0.138)	(0.156)	(0.139)	(0.157)	(0.140)
Return on assets	0.299***	0.300***	0.299***	0.300***	0.298***	0.299***
Return on assets	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Asset tangibility	− 0.107	− 0.110*	− 0.107	− 0.110*	− 0.107	− 0.110*
Asset tangibility	(0.106)	(0.096)	(0.106)	(0.097)	(0.107)	(0.097)
Beta	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Beta	(0.866)	(0.808)	(0.867)	(0.808)	(0.868)	(0.808)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.022**	− 0.023**	− 0.022**	− 0.023**	− 0.022**	− 0.023**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Synchronicity	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Stock liquidity	0.077**	0.072**	0.076**	0.072**	0.077**	0.072**
Stock liquidity	(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.047)
Rule of law	− 0.116**	− 0.111*	− 0.116**	− 0.111*	− 0.116**	− 0.111*
Rule of law	(0.041)	(0.052)	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.052)
Financial development	− 0.129***	− 0.127***	− 0.130***	− 0.127***	− 0.129***	− 0.127***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	− 0.020	− 0.019	− 0.020	− 0.019	− 0.020	− 0.019
Disclosure Index	(0.171)	(0.188)	(0.171)	(0.188)	(0.170)	(0.187)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.217***	− 0.292***	− 0.216***	− 0.291***	− 0.218***	− 0.292***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	8207	8207	8207	8207	8207	8207
Number of firms	2143	2143	2143	2143	2143	2143
Adjusted R-squared	0.5315	0.5328	0.5313	0.5327	0.5314	0.5328

1.15 Alternative maintain-stake-points duration measurement (6)

Ownership percentage in prior period, less small ownership percentage: 2–3–4%

Ownership stability and investments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	2%	2%	3%	3%	4%	4%
Maintain-stake-points duration	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Maintain-stake-points duration	(0.728)	(0.729)	(0.888)	(0.893)	(0.927)	(0.930)
Year 2007	0.007	0.007	0.005	0.006	0.006	0.006
Year 2007	(0.473)	(0.464)	(0.570)	(0.564)	(0.565)	(0.563)
Year 2008	0.026**	0.026**	0.027***	0.027***	0.027***	0.027***
Year 2008	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Year 2009	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.010
Year 2009	(0.201)	(0.227)	(0.249)	(0.279)	(0.274)	(0.308)
Year 2010	0.014	0.013	0.016	0.015	0.015	0.014
Year 2010	(0.150)	(0.167)	(0.111)	(0.124)	(0.135)	(0.151)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.014		0.014		0.015
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.580)		(0.571)		(0.559)
Herfindahl Index		0.013		0.013		0.014
Herfindahl Index		(0.496)		(0.482)		(0.473)
Year 2007	0.015	0.009	0.016	0.009	0.016	0.008
Year 2007	(0.504)	(0.644)	(0.471)	(0.642)	(0.476)	(0.646)
Year 2008	0.067***	0.061***	0.066***	0.060***	0.066***	0.060***
Year 2008	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Year 2009	− 0.005	− 0.005	− 0.004	− 0.005	− 0.004	− 0.005
Year 2009	(0.813)	(0.763)	(0.848)	(0.762)	(0.854)	(0.756)
Year 2010	− 0.009	− 0.011	− 0.009	− 0.012	− 0.009	− 0.012
Year 2010	(0.718)	(0.540)	(0.697)	(0.524)	(0.709)	(0.519)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.007		− 0.007		− 0.007
Total blockholder ownership		(0.701)		(0.700)		(0.707)
Year 2007		0.005		0.007		0.007
Year 2007		(0.799)		(0.749)		(0.747)
Year 2008		0.037*		0.036*		0.037*
Year 2008		(0.090)		(0.091)		(0.090)
Year 2009		− 0.002		− 0.001		− 0.001
Year 2009		(0.910)		(0.958)		(0.973)
Year 2010		− 0.005		− 0.005		− 0.005
Year 2010		(0.834)		(0.819)		(0.840)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.128***	− 0.128***	− 0.128***	− 0.128***	− 0.128***	− 0.128***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	− 0.110***	− 0.110***	− 0.111***	− 0.111***	− 0.111***	− 0.111***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.195***	0.194***	0.195***	0.194***	0.195***	0.193***
Cash holdings	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Return on assets	0.064**	0.063**	0.064**	0.063**	0.064**	0.063**
Return on assets	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.034)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.068***	0.068***	0.067***	0.068***	0.068***	0.068***
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.011**	− 0.011**	− 0.011**	− 0.011**	− 0.011**	− 0.011**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Financial development	− 0.002	− 0.002	− 0.002	− 0.002	− 0.002	− 0.002
Financial development	(0.904)	(0.924)	(0.900)	(0.919)	(0.888)	(0.906)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.070***	− 0.101***	− 0.072***	− 0.102***	− 0.072***	− 0.102***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	8576	8576	8576	8576	8576	8576
Number of firms	2047	2047	2047	2047	2047	2047
Adjusted R-squared	0.1129	0.1136	0.1130	0.1137	0.1130	0.1137

1.16 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (1)

Other ownership concentration measures: non-widely held, gini, number of blockholders

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-widely held firm	0.015
Non-widely held firm	(0.240)
Non-zero-points duration		0.026**	0.024**
Non-zero-points duration		(0.022)	(0.040)
Maintain-stake-points duration				0.040***	0.037***
Maintain-stake-points duration				(0.002)	(0.003)
Gini coefficient		0.125***		0.123***
Gini coefficient		(0.000)		(0.000)
Number of blockholders			− 0.017***		− 0.017***
Number of blockholders			(0.000)		(0.000)
Total blockholder ownership		0.063**	0.090***	0.062**	0.088***
Total blockholder ownership		(0.038)	(0.005)	(0.041)	(0.006)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.002	− 0.005	− 0.006	− 0.005	− 0.005
Ln(total assets)	(0.640)	(0.284)	(0.268)	(0.352)	(0.336)
Leverage	− 0.104***	− 0.166***	− 0.164***	− 0.167***	− 0.165***
Leverage	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.154***	0.119*	0.120*	0.117*	0.118*
Cash holdings	(0.002)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.076)
Return on assets	0.036	− 0.033	− 0.036	− 0.035	− 0.038
Return on assets	(0.451)	(0.688)	(0.661)	(0.673)	(0.645)
Beta	− 0.018**	− 0.023***	− 0.023***	− 0.023**	− 0.023**
Beta	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.065***	− 0.094***	− 0.096***	− 0.093***	− 0.094***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	0.009	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.009
Synchronicity	(0.272)	(0.389)	(0.358)	(0.418)	(0.385)
Ln(market-to-book)	− 0.016	− 0.011	− 0.010	− 0.010	− 0.008
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.124)	(0.422)	(0.468)	(0.477)	(0.526)
Momentum	− 0.035***	− 0.026**	− 0.026**	− 0.027**	− 0.027**
Momentum	(0.000)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Stock liquidity	− 0.375***	− 0.336***	− 0.331***	− 0.331***	− 0.327***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	0.068***	0.056***	0.054***	0.059***	0.057***
Rule of law	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Financial development	− 0.039*	0.030	0.037	0.027	0.034
Financial development	(0.076)	(0.229)	(0.141)	(0.286)	(0.182)
Disclosure Index	− 0.018***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.014***	− 0.014***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2446	1700	1700	1700	1700
Adjusted R-squared	0.2042	0.2236	0.2254	0.2262	0.2279

1.17 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (2)

Other ownership concentration measures: non-widely held, gini, number of blockholders

Ownership stability and market-to-book

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-widely held firm	− 0.010
Non-widely held firm	(0.592)
Non-zero-points duration		− 0.010	− 0.009
Non-zero-points duration		(0.463)	(0.485)
Maintain-stake-points duration				− 0.017	− 0.016
Maintain-stake-points duration				(0.238)	(0.256)
Year 2007	0.006	0.019	0.019	0.010	0.010
Year 2007	(0.751)	(0.232)	(0.241)	(0.531)	(0.546)
Year 2008	0.057***	0.044***	0.042***	0.049***	0.047***
Year 2008	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Year 2009	0.022	0.043***	0.041**	0.053***	0.051***
Year 2009	(0.243)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Year 2010	− 0.004	0.006	0.005	0.016	0.015
Year 2010	(0.864)	(0.760)	(0.801)	(0.404)	(0.429)
Gini coefficient		0.049		0.047
Gini coefficient		(0.406)		(0.426)
Number of blockholders			− 0.003		− 0.003
Number of blockholders			(0.662)		(0.690)
Year 2007		0.015	− 0.002	0.019	− 0.003
Year 2007		(0.679)	(0.679)	(0.603)	(0.578)
Year 2008		0.120***	− 0.016***	0.122***	− 0.017***
Year 2008		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Year 2009		0.085**	− 0.014***	0.085**	− 0.013***
Year 2009		(0.027)	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.006)
Year 2010		0.058	− 0.008	0.057	− 0.008
Year 2010		(0.198)	(0.169)	(0.199)	(0.176)
Total blockholder ownership		0.002	0.001	− 0.002	− 0.004
Total blockholder ownership		(0.966)	(0.988)	(0.955)	(0.940)
Year 2007		0.028	0.030	0.034	0.037
Year 2007		(0.454)	(0.428)	(0.354)	(0.323)
Year 2008		0.159***	0.182***	0.159***	0.182***
Year 2008		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year 2009		0.008	0.028	0.006	0.026
Year 2009		(0.842)	(0.487)	(0.885)	(0.528)
Year 2010		− 0.044	− 0.032	− 0.047	− 0.036
Year 2010		(0.321)	(0.490)	(0.292)	(0.445)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.466***	− 0.452***	− 0.452***	− 0.452***	− 0.451***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	0.219***	0.184***	0.184***	0.185***	0.186***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.184***	0.085	0.083	0.087	0.085
Cash holdings	(0.000)	(0.153)	(0.161)	(0.145)	(0.153)
Return on assets	0.203***	0.299***	0.299***	0.300***	0.301***
Return on assets	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Asset tangibility	− 0.104*	− 0.107	− 0.107	− 0.106	− 0.107
Asset tangibility	(0.054)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.108)	(0.107)
Beta	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Beta	(0.730)	(0.812)	(0.788)	(0.846)	(0.820)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.022***	− 0.023**	− 0.023**	− 0.022**	− 0.022**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Synchronicity	− 0.017***	− 0.016***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***
Synchronicity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Stock liquidity	0.110***	0.072**	0.071*	0.071**	0.070*
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.055)
Rule of law	− 0.221***	− 0.113**	− 0.115**	− 0.109*	− 0.111*
Rule of law	(0.000)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.052)
Financial development	− 0.136***	− 0.128***	− 0.122***	− 0.126***	− 0.120***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	− 0.018*	− 0.020	− 0.019	− 0.019	− 0.019
Disclosure Index	(0.069)	(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.184)	(0.186)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.160***	− 0.354***	− 0.246***	− 0.304***	− 0.197***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	13,502	8207	8207	8207	8207
Number of firms	3601	2143	2143	2143	2143
Adjusted R-squared	0.5224	0.5329	0.5331	0.5331	0.5334

1.18 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (3)

Other ownership concentration measures: non-widely held, gini, number of blockholders

Ownership stability and investments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-widely held firm	− 0.030***
Non-widely held firm	(0.001)
Non-zero-points duration		− 0.002	− 0.002
Non-zero-points duration		(0.767)	(0.735)
Maintain-stake-points duration				0.004	0.004
Maintain-stake-points duration				(0.524)	(0.531)
Year 2007	0.014	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.003
Year 2007	(0.232)	(0.542)	(0.566)	(0.729)	(0.770)
Year 2008	0.031***	0.031***	0.031***	0.025**	0.025**
Year 2008	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Year 2009	0.032***	0.011	0.012	0.009	0.009
Year 2009	(0.004)	(0.244)	(0.227)	(0.416)	(0.406)
Year 2010	0.019*	0.017*	0.017*	0.013	0.012
Year 2010	(0.086)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.235)	(0.242)
Gini coefficient		0.045*		0.041
Gini coefficient		(0.076)		(0.105)
Number of blockholders			− 0.006*		− 0.005*
Number of blockholders			(0.067)		(0.099)
Year 2007		0.013	− 0.002	0.014	− 0.002
Year 2007		(0.579)	(0.528)	(0.527)	(0.474)
Year 2008		0.069***	− 0.007**	0.072***	− 0.007**
Year 2008		(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.001)	(0.013)
Year 2009		0.003	0.001	0.005	0.001
Year 2009		(0.891)	(0.775)	(0.836)	(0.836)
Year 2010		− 0.003	0.001	− 0.001	0.000
Year 2010		(0.904)	(0.843)	(0.979)	(0.941)
Total blockholder ownership		0.006	0.013	0.002	0.008
Total blockholder ownership		(0.774)	(0.535)	(0.930)	(0.692)
Year 2007		0.005	0.009	0.006	0.011
Year 2007		(0.813)	(0.680)	(0.774)	(0.632)
Year 2008		0.032	0.041*	0.035	0.044**
Year 2008		(0.135)	(0.066)	(0.106)	(0.046)
Year 2009		− 0.001	− 0.002	− 0.000	− 0.001
Year 2009		(0.963)	(0.939)	(0.985)	(0.976)
Year 2010		− 0.006	− 0.005	− 0.004	− 0.003
Year 2010		(0.809)	(0.819)	(0.877)	(0.906)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.147***	− 0.128***	− 0.128***	− 0.128***	− 0.128***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	− 0.111***	− 0.111***	− 0.111***	− 0.111***	− 0.111***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.223***	0.193***	0.192***	0.193***	0.193***
Cash holdings	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Return on assets	0.061***	0.064**	0.064**	0.063**	0.063**
Return on assets	(0.003)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.060***	0.067***	0.067***	0.068***	0.068***
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.008*	− 0.011**	− 0.011**	− 0.011**	− 0.011**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.067)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.038)
Financial development	0.009	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001
Financial development	(0.524)	(0.890)	(0.952)	(0.905)	(0.957)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.052***	− 0.141***	− 0.087***	− 0.102***	− 0.045***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Firm-year observations	12,708	8576	8576	8576	8576
Number of firms	3282	2047	2047	2047	2047
Adjusted R-squared	0.1226	0.1141	0.1135	0.1137	0.1131

1.19 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (4)

Herfindahl Index based on all blockholders

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)
Non-zero-points duration	0.027**
Non-zero-points duration	(0.017)
Maintain-stake-points duration		0.040***
Maintain-stake-points duration		(0.002)
Herfindahl Index	0.080***	0.078***
Herfindahl Index	(0.001)	(0.001)
Total blockholder ownership	0.060**	0.059*
Total blockholder ownership	(0.048)	(0.052)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.005	− 0.004
Ln(total assets)	(0.308)	(0.380)
Leverage	− 0.163***	− 0.163***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.125*	0.123*
Cash holdings	(0.060)	(0.065)
Return on assets	− 0.031	− 0.033
Return on assets	(0.707)	(0.694)
Beta	− 0.023**	− 0.022**
Beta	(0.011)	(0.014)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.094***	− 0.093***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	0.009	0.009
Synchronicity	(0.358)	(0.385)
Ln(market-to-book)	− 0.011	− 0.010
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.397)	(0.451)
Momentum	− 0.026**	− 0.027**
Momentum	(0.036)	(0.031)
Stock liquidity	− 0.339***	− 0.334***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	0.057***	0.060***
Rule of law	(0.000)	(0.000)
Financial development	0.023	0.019
Financial development	(0.363)	(0.441)
Disclosure Index	− 0.015***	− 0.015***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes
Observations	1700	1700
Adjusted R-squared	0.2210	0.2235

1.20 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (5)

Herfindahl Index based on all blockholders

Ownership stability and market-to-book

	(1)	(2)
Non-zero-points duration	− 0.010
Non-zero-points duration	(0.474)
Maintain-stake-points duration		− 0.017
Maintain-stake-points duration		(0.238)
Year 2007	0.020	0.011
Year 2007	(0.219)	(0.517)
Year 2008	0.045***	0.050***
Year 2008	(0.003)	(0.002)
Year 2009	0.044***	0.053***
Year 2009	(0.006)	(0.002)
Year 2010	0.005	0.015
Year 2010	(0.764)	(0.419)
Herfindahl Index	0.037	0.036
Herfindahl Index	(0.383)	(0.401)
Year 2007	0.005	0.007
Year 2007	(0.871)	(0.805)
Year 2008	0.091***	0.091***
Year 2008	(0.002)	(0.001)
Year 2009	0.065**	0.063**
Year 2009	(0.035)	(0.038)
Year 2010	0.052	0.051
Year 2010	(0.147)	(0.151)
Total blockholder ownership	0.003	− 0.002
Total blockholder ownership	(0.948)	(0.964)
Year 2007	0.026	0.033
Year 2007	(0.485)	(0.377)
Year 2008	0.160***	0.160***
Year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year 2009	0.008	0.006
Year 2009	(0.835)	(0.873)
Year 2010	− 0.043	− 0.046
Year 2010	(0.338)	(0.310)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.452***	− 0.452***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	0.185***	0.187***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.087	0.089
Cash holdings	(0.141)	(0.134)
Return on assets	0.299***	0.300***
Return on assets	(0.000)	(0.000)
Asset tangibility	− 0.111*	− 0.110*
Asset tangibility	(0.094)	(0.097)
Beta	0.001	0.001
Beta	(0.801)	(0.834)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.024**	− 0.023**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Synchronicity	− 0.016***	− 0.015***
Synchronicity	(0.000)	(0.000)
Stock liquidity	0.073**	0.072**
Stock liquidity	(0.044)	(0.049)
Rule of law	− 0.114**	− 0.111*
Rule of law	(0.045)	(0.053)
Financial development	− 0.128***	− 0.126***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	− 0.019	− 0.019
Disclosure Index	(0.184)	(0.192)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.340***	− 0.288***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	8207	8207
Number of firms	2143	2143
Adjusted R-squared	0.5329	0.5331

1.21 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (6)

Herfindahl Index based on all blockholders

Ownership stability and investments

	(1)	(2)
Non-zero-points duration	− 0.002
Non-zero-points duration	(0.777)
Maintain-stake-points duration		0.004
Maintain-stake-points duration		(0.500)
Year 2007	0.006	0.004
Year 2007	(0.518)	(0.700)
Year 2008	0.031***	0.026**
Year 2008	(0.002)	(0.018)
Year 2009	0.012	0.009
Year 2009	(0.221)	(0.379)
Year 2010	0.017*	0.013
Year 2010	(0.081)	(0.211)
Herfindahl Index	0.018	0.014
Herfindahl Index	(0.349)	(0.461)
Year 2007	0.008	0.009
Year 2007	(0.671)	(0.605)
Year 2008	0.055***	0.057***
Year 2008	(0.002)	(0.001)
Year 2009	− 0.007	− 0.006
Year 2009	(0.682)	(0.737)
Year 2010	− 0.012	− 0.011
Year 2010	(0.488)	(0.550)
Total blockholder ownership	− 0.003	− 0.007
Total blockholder ownership	(0.873)	(0.700)
Year 2007	0.006	0.007
Year 2007	(0.778)	(0.740)
Year 2008	0.034	0.036*
Year 2008	(0.121)	(0.095)
Year 2009	− 0.002	− 0.002
Year 2009	(0.918)	(0.937)
Year 2010	− 0.007	− 0.005
Year 2010	(0.752)	(0.817)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.128***	− 0.128***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	− 0.111***	− 0.111***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.193***	0.194***
Cash holdings	(0.000)	(0.000)
Return on assets	0.064**	0.063**
Return on assets	(0.032)	(0.035)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.068***	0.068***
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.011**	− 0.011**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.035)	(0.039)
Financial development	− 0.001	− 0.002
Financial development	(0.934)	(0.919)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.135***	− 0.094***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	8576	8576
Number of firms	2047	2047
Adjusted R-squared	0.1140	0.1136

1.22 Constant sample (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.031**	0.031**
Non-zero-points duration	(0.016)	(0.015)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.037***	0.037***
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.009)	(0.009)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.079**		0.080**
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.048)		(0.044)
Herfindahl Index		0.075***		0.075***
Herfindahl Index		(0.008)		(0.008)
Total blockholder ownership		0.019		0.018
Total blockholder ownership		(0.621)		(0.629)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.011*	− 0.012**	− 0.011*	− 0.012**
Ln(total assets)	(0.069)	(0.045)	(0.075)	(0.049)
Leverage	− 0.186***	− 0.187***	− 0.185***	− 0.186***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	− 0.009	− 0.007	− 0.009	− 0.007
Cash holdings	(0.897)	(0.919)	(0.893)	(0.916)
Return on assets	− 0.141	− 0.137	− 0.141	− 0.136
Return on assets	(0.227)	(0.238)	(0.230)	(0.241)
Beta	− 0.028***	− 0.028***	− 0.028***	− 0.027***
Beta	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.118***	− 0.118***	− 0.119***	− 0.118***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	− 0.005	− 0.007	− 0.006	− 0.008
Synchronicity	(0.661)	(0.536)	(0.632)	(0.508)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.381)	(0.377)	(0.382)	(0.378)
Momentum	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.008
Momentum	(0.605)	(0.574)	(0.630)	(0.598)
Stock liquidity	− 0.361***	− 0.364***	− 0.355***	− 0.358***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	0.032*	0.031*	0.036**	0.034**
Rule of law	(0.063)	(0.080)	(0.037)	(0.048)
Financial development	0.056**	0.061**	0.051*	0.056**
Financial development	(0.041)	(0.027)	(0.060)	(0.042)
Disclosure Index	− 0.016***	− 0.017***	− 0.016***	− 0.016***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1088	1088	1088	1088
Adjusted R-squared	0.2547	0.2560	0.2557	0.2568

1.23 Constant sample (2)

Ownership stability and stock returns during the pre-crisis period

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.001	0.003
Non-zero-points duration	(0.967)	(0.933)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.024	0.026
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.481)	(0.441)
Largest blockholder ownership	− 0.152*		− 0.159*
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.081)		(0.067)
Herfindahl Index		− 0.140**		− 0.145**
Herfindahl Index		(0.030)		(0.024)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.064		− 0.069
Total blockholder ownership		(0.435)		(0.399)
Ln(total assets)	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.007
Ln(total assets)	(0.713)	(0.605)	(0.705)	(0.595)
Leverage	0.098	0.099	0.102	0.102
Leverage	(0.453)	(0.450)	(0.437)	(0.434)
Cash holdings	0.196	0.194	0.199	0.197
Cash holdings	(0.420)	(0.422)	(0.414)	(0.416)
Return on assets	0.681***	0.659***	0.688***	0.666***
Return on assets	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Beta	0.041	0.042	0.041	0.042
Beta	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.114)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	0.097*	0.096*	0.100*	0.099*
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.068)	(0.072)
Synchronicity	0.049*	0.050*	0.050*	0.051*
Synchronicity	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.061)
Ln(market-to-book)	− 0.134***	− 0.132***	− 0.134***	− 0.132***
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Momentum	0.029	0.028	0.028	0.027
Momentum	(0.548)	(0.562)	(0.561)	(0.577)
Stock liquidity	− 0.161	− 0.162	− 0.147	− 0.149
Stock liquidity	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.244)	(0.245)
Rule of law	− 0.149***	− 0.147***	− 0.146***	− 0.144***
Rule of law	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Financial development	− 0.334***	− 0.340***	− 0.339***	− 0.345***
Financial development	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	− 0.006	− 0.006	− 0.006	− 0.006
Disclosure Index	(0.319)	(0.318)	(0.332)	(0.329)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1088	1088	1088	1088
Adjusted R-squared	0.1487	0.1493	0.1492	0.1498

1.24 Constant sample (3)

Ownership stability and stock returns during the post-crisis period

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.021	0.019
Non-zero-points duration	(0.631)	(0.664)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.017	0.015
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.698)	(0.719)
Largest blockholder ownership	− 0.150		− 0.148
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.179)		(0.189)
Herfindahl Index		− 0.088		− 0.088
Herfindahl Index		(0.328)		(0.334)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.046		− 0.046
Total blockholder ownership		(0.671)		(0.676)
Ln(total assets)	0.093***	0.094***	0.093***	0.094***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	− 0.152	− 0.148	− 0.150	− 0.146
Leverage	(0.302)	(0.310)	(0.310)	(0.318)
Cash holdings	0.097	0.097	0.098	0.098
Cash holdings	(0.643)	(0.643)	(0.639)	(0.640)
Return on assets	0.131	0.130	0.133	0.133
Return on assets	(0.544)	(0.546)	(0.538)	(0.540)
Beta	0.077	0.078	0.077	0.078
Beta	(0.233)	(0.225)	(0.235)	(0.227)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	0.371***	0.374***	0.371***	0.373***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	0.018	0.020	0.018	0.020
Synchronicity	(0.662)	(0.625)	(0.662)	(0.625)
Ln(Market-To-Book)	0.036	0.034	0.037	0.034
Ln(Market-To-Book)	(0.518)	(0.545)	(0.515)	(0.542)
Momentum	− 0.887***	− 0.881***	− 0.887***	− 0.881***
Momentum	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Stock liquidity	0.172	0.182	0.172	0.182
Stock liquidity	(0.203)	(0.178)	(0.202)	(0.177)
Rule of law	0.101*	0.103*	0.101*	0.103*
Rule of law	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.083)
Financial development	− 0.260***	− 0.257***	− 0.262***	− 0.259***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	0.046***	0.047***	0.046***	0.047***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1088	1088	1088	1088
Adjusted R-squared	0.2328	0.2316	0.2327	0.2316

1.25 Ownership stability measures with weighted average (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.023**	0.027**
Non-zero-points duration	(0.044)	(0.020)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.035***	0.037***
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.002)	(0.001)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.119***		0.117***
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.000)		(0.000)
Herfindahl Index		0.082***		0.079***
Herfindahl Index		(0.001)		(0.001)
Total blockholder ownership		0.055*		0.053*
Total blockholder ownership		(0.071)		(0.080)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.004	− 0.005	− 0.004	− 0.005
Ln(total assets)	(0.408)	(0.325)	(0.466)	(0.365)
Leverage	− 0.162***	− 0.163***	− 0.162***	− 0.162***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.128*	0.126*	0.124*	0.123*
Cash holdings	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.065)	(0.064)
Return on assets	− 0.029	− 0.028	− 0.029	− 0.028
Return on assets	(0.729)	(0.736)	(0.725)	(0.736)
Beta	− 0.024***	− 0.023***	− 0.023**	− 0.023**
Beta	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.092***	− 0.094***	− 0.091***	− 0.092***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.008
Synchronicity	(0.295)	(0.364)	(0.328)	(0.401)
Ln(market-to-book)	− 0.013	− 0.013	− 0.012	− 0.011
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.332)	(0.341)	(0.386)	(0.399)
Momentum	− 0.026**	− 0.026**	− 0.027**	− 0.026**
Momentum	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.033)
Stock liquidity	− 0.338***	− 0.342***	− 0.332***	− 0.336***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	0.058***	0.057***	0.061***	0.060***
Rule of law	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Financial development	0.022	0.022	0.020	0.019
Financial development	(0.372)	(0.380)	(0.424)	(0.437)
Disclosure Index	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1700	1700	1700	1700
Adjusted R-squared	0.2212	0.2204	0.2240	0.2230

1.26 Ownership stability measures with weighted average (2)

Ownership stability and market-to-book

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	− 0.001	0.000
Non-zero-points duration	(0.968)	(0.995)
Maintain-stake-points duration			− 0.011	− 0.011
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.423)	(0.413)
Year 2007	0.025	0.023	0.021	0.019
Year 2007	(0.117)	(0.146)	(0.175)	(0.220)
Year 2008	0.043***	0.040***	0.050***	0.046***
Year 2008	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Year 2009	0.034**	0.036**	0.046***	0.047***
Year 2009	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Year 2010	− 0.000	0.003	0.020	0.023
Year 2010	(0.981)	(0.864)	(0.231)	(0.175)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.020		0.011
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.719)		(0.849)
Herfindahl Index		0.041		0.034
Herfindahl Index		(0.330)		(0.424)
Year 2007	0.022	0.007	0.028	0.008
Year 2007	(0.581)	(0.816)	(0.474)	(0.794)
Year 2008	0.185***	0.098***	0.184***	0.096***
Year 2008	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Year 2009	0.051	0.070**	0.047	0.068**
Year 2009	(0.228)	(0.024)	(0.267)	(0.029)
Year 2010	− 0.003	0.053	− 0.011	0.053
Year 2010	(0.950)	(0.143)	(0.828)	(0.145)
Total blockholder ownership		0.008		0.002
Total blockholder ownership		(0.852)		(0.960)
Year 2007		0.020		0.026
Year 2007		(0.585)		(0.477)
Year 2008		0.156***		0.155***
Year 2008		(0.000)		(0.000)
Year 2009		0.007		0.003
Year 2009		(0.866)		(0.941)
Year 2010		− 0.045		− 0.054
Year 2010		(0.316)		(0.229)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.453***	− 0.453***	− 0.453***	− 0.452***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	0.185***	0.186***	0.184***	0.186***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.084	0.087	0.085	0.088
Cash holdings	(0.160)	(0.144)	(0.154)	(0.137)
Return on assets	0.299***	0.299***	0.298***	0.299***
Return on assets	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Asset tangibility	− 0.111*	− 0.114*	− 0.108	− 0.111*
Asset tangibility	(0.092)	(0.084)	(0.103)	(0.094)
Beta	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Beta	(0.884)	(0.823)	(0.911)	(0.844)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.022**	− 0.023**	− 0.021**	− 0.022**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Synchronicity	− 0.015***	− 0.016***	− 0.015***	− 0.015***
Synchronicity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Stock liquidity	0.078**	0.073**	0.077**	0.072**
Stock liquidity	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.047)
Rule of law	− 0.114**	− 0.110*	− 0.106*	− 0.103*
Rule of law	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.073)
Financial development	− 0.136***	− 0.132***	− 0.132***	− 0.129***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	− 0.021	− 0.020	− 0.021	− 0.020
Disclosure Index	(0.152)	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.176)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.272***	− 0.345***	− 0.222***	− 0.295***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	8207	8207	8207	8207
Number of firms	2143	2143	2143	2143
Adjusted R-squared	0.5313	0.5326	0.5314	0.5327

1.27 Ownership stability measures with weighted average (3)

Ownership stability and investments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	− 0.000	0.000
Non-zero-points duration	(0.970)	(0.961)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.008	0.009
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.150)	(0.135)
Year 2007	− 0.004	− 0.004	− 0.004	− 0.004
Year 2007	(0.679)	(0.643)	(0.647)	(0.650)
Year 2008	0.028***	0.029***	0.019*	0.020*
Year 2008	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.053)	(0.051)
Year 2009	0.012	0.011	0.004	0.003
Year 2009	(0.173)	(0.226)	(0.706)	(0.775)
Year 2010	0.019*	0.017*	0.010	0.009
Year 2010	(0.052)	(0.071)	(0.301)	(0.341)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.018		0.008
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.474)		(0.746)
Herfindahl Index		0.016		0.011
Herfindahl Index		(0.403)		(0.564)
Year 2007	0.022	0.009	0.023	0.011
Year 2007	(0.336)	(0.621)	(0.310)	(0.554)
Year 2008	0.064***	0.062***	0.070***	0.063***
Year 2008	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year 2009	− 0.005	− 0.005	− 0.000	− 0.004
Year 2009	(0.812)	(0.781)	(0.983)	(0.829)
Year 2010	− 0.012	− 0.011	− 0.006	− 0.010
Year 2010	(0.618)	(0.553)	(0.784)	(0.584)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.006		− 0.012
Total blockholder ownership		(0.765)		(0.512)
Year 2007		0.013		0.012
Year 2007		(0.540)		(0.564)
Year 2008		0.033		0.037*
Year 2008		(0.128)		(0.087)
Year 2009		− 0.002		0.002
Year 2009		(0.927)		(0.934)
Year 2010		− 0.008		− 0.004
Year 2010		(0.727)		(0.871)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.128***	− 0.129***	− 0.128***	− 0.128***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	− 0.111***	− 0.111***	− 0.111***	− 0.111***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.194***	0.193***	0.195***	0.193***
Cash holdings	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Return on assets	0.067**	0.067**	0.065**	0.064**
Return on assets	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.067***	0.067***	0.068***	0.068***
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.010**	− 0.011**	− 0.010**	− 0.011**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.042)
Financial development	− 0.001	− 0.000	− 0.001	− 0.001
Financial development	(0.961)	(0.991)	(0.930)	(0.954)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.111***	− 0.142***	− 0.066***	− 0.098***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	8576	8576	8576	8576
Number of firms	2047	2047	2047	2047
Adjusted R-squared	0.1137	0.1146	0.1132	0.1140

1.28 Without countries with substantial control-ownership wedge (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.017	0.018
Non-zero-points duration	(0.208)	(0.169)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.033**	0.034**
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.025)	(0.021)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.093**		0.088**
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.015)		(0.021)
Herfindahl Index		0.040		0.037
Herfindahl Index		(0.147)		(0.181)
Total blockholder ownership		0.054		0.050
Total blockholder ownership		(0.121)		(0.150)
Ln(total assets)	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
Ln(total assets)	(0.860)	(0.897)	(0.743)	(0.781)
Leverage	− 0.197***	− 0.198***	− 0.199***	− 0.200***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.083	0.085	0.080	0.082
Cash holdings	(0.240)	(0.228)	(0.257)	(0.244)
Return on assets	− 0.023	− 0.022	− 0.026	− 0.025
Return on assets	(0.800)	(0.805)	(0.776)	(0.782)
Beta	− 0.025***	− 0.025***	− 0.025**	− 0.025**
Beta	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.077***	− 0.078***	− 0.076***	− 0.076***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	0.018*	0.018	0.018	0.018
Synchronicity	(0.099)	(0.104)	(0.110)	(0.115)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.006
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.831)	(0.770)	(0.740)	(0.680)
Momentum	− 0.031**	− 0.031**	− 0.032**	− 0.032**
Momentum	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Stock liquidity	− 0.373***	− 0.379***	− 0.369***	− 0.376***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	0.077***	0.078***	0.080***	0.081***
Rule of law	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Financial development	0.021	0.016	0.017	0.012
Financial development	(0.462)	(0.571)	(0.555)	(0.675)
Disclosure Index	− 0.020***	− 0.020***	− 0.019***	− 0.019***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1356	1356	1356	1356
Adjusted R-squared	0.2187	0.2164	0.2210	0.2188

1.29 Without countries with substantial control-ownership wedge (2)

Ownership stability and market-to-book

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	− 0.012	− 0.010
Non-zero-points duration	(0.408)	(0.473)
Maintain-stake-points duration			− 0.022	− 0.021
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.148)	(0.163)
Year 2007	0.012	0.010	0.011	0.009
Year 2007	(0.505)	(0.562)	(0.567)	(0.627)
Year 2008	0.034**	0.031*	0.044**	0.040**
Year 2008	(0.050)	(0.073)	(0.014)	(0.026)
Year 2009	0.034*	0.035*	0.050***	0.052***
Year 2009	(0.065)	(0.054)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Year 2010	− 0.021	− 0.018	− 0.006	− 0.002
Year 2010	(0.316)	(0.400)	(0.788)	(0.933)
Largest blockholder ownership	− 0.002		− 0.002
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.981)		(0.978)
Herfindahl Index		0.013		0.015
Herfindahl Index		(0.785)		(0.761)
Year 2007	0.030	0.041	0.033	0.042
Year 2007	(0.501)	(0.205)	(0.459)	(0.201)
Year 2008	0.173***	0.132***	0.169***	0.130***
Year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year 2009	0.051	0.110***	0.042	0.105***
Year 2009	(0.298)	(0.002)	(0.388)	(0.002)
Year 2010	0.009	0.098**	0.002	0.095**
Year 2010	(0.870)	(0.017)	(0.971)	(0.020)
Total blockholder ownership		0.007		0.008
Total blockholder ownership		(0.884)		(0.870)
Year 2007		0.011		0.014
Year 2007		(0.797)		(0.740)
Year 2008		0.127***		0.124***
Year 2008		(0.002)		(0.002)
Year 2009		− 0.016		− 0.024
Year 2009		(0.714)		(0.598)
Year 2010		− 0.061		− 0.068
Year 2010		(0.226)		(0.184)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.431***	− 0.429***	− 0.431***	− 0.429***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	0.212***	0.214***	0.214***	0.216***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.094	0.099	0.095	0.100*
Cash holdings	(0.123)	(0.103)	(0.118)	(0.099)
Return on assets	0.288***	0.288***	0.290***	0.289***
Return on assets	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Asset tangibility	− 0.117	− 0.122*	− 0.115	− 0.121*
Asset tangibility	(0.107)	(0.092)	(0.113)	(0.097)
Beta	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
Beta	(0.190)	(0.174)	(0.200)	(0.182)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.024**	− 0.025**	− 0.023**	− 0.024**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.032)
Synchronicity	− 0.021***	− 0.022***	− 0.021***	− 0.022***
Synchronicity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Stock liquidity	0.028	0.025	0.026	0.023
Stock liquidity	(0.465)	(0.512)	(0.489)	(0.537)
Rule of law	− 0.213***	− 0.207***	− 0.206***	− 0.200***
Rule of law	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Financial development	− 0.119***	− 0.111***	− 0.117***	− 0.108***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Disclosure Index	− 0.083***	− 0.081***	− 0.082***	− 0.080***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.236***	− 0.316***	− 0.200***	− 0.282***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	6518	6518	6518	6518
Number of firms	1727	1727	1727	1727
Adjusted R-squared	0.5278	0.5299	0.5279	0.5301

1.30 Without countries with substantial control-ownership wedge (3)

Ownership stability and investments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.003	0.003
Non-zero-points duration	(0.668)	(0.670)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.009	0.009
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.178)	(0.172)
Year 2007	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.003
Year 2007	(0.817)	(0.930)	(0.707)	(0.816)
Year 2008	0.025**	0.023**	0.017	0.015
Year 2008	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.150)	(0.212)
Year 2009	0.004	0.001	0.001	− 0.002
Year 2009	(0.720)	(0.945)	(0.924)	(0.857)
Year 2010	0.012	0.010	0.009	0.006
Year 2010	(0.258)	(0.360)	(0.445)	(0.590)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.023		0.017
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.414)		(0.549)
Herfindahl Index		0.029		0.025
Herfindahl Index		(0.180)		(0.243)
Year 2007	0.038	0.009	0.037	0.009
Year 2007	(0.132)	(0.666)	(0.143)	(0.660)
Year 2008	0.092***	0.065***	0.098***	0.068***
Year 2008	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Year 2009	0.030	− 0.002	0.031	− 0.001
Year 2009	(0.203)	(0.912)	(0.183)	(0.958)
Year 2010	0.021	− 0.002	0.023	− 0.001
Year 2010	(0.412)	(0.904)	(0.364)	(0.956)
Total blockholder ownership		− 0.011		− 0.015
Total blockholder ownership		(0.601)		(0.477)
Year 2007		0.039*		0.037
Year 2007		(0.094)		(0.114)
Year 2008		0.072***		0.077***
Year 2008		(0.002)		(0.001)
Year 2009		0.045**		0.045**
Year 2009		(0.048)		(0.046)
Year 2010		0.033		0.034
Year 2010		(0.172)		(0.156)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.143***	− 0.144***	− 0.143***	− 0.143***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	− 0.099***	− 0.099***	− 0.099***	− 0.100***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.180***	0.180***	0.180***	0.180***
Cash holdings	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Return on ASSETS	0.089***	0.088***	0.087***	0.087***
Return on ASSETS	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.075***	0.075***	0.076***	0.076***
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.012**	− 0.011**	− 0.012**	− 0.011**
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.039)
Financial development	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017
Financial development	(0.334)	(0.337)	(0.343)	(0.338)
Firm and year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.108***	− 0.148***	− 0.073***	− 0.116***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	6756	6756	6756	6756
Number of Firms	1612	1612	1612	1612
Adjusted R-squared	0.1338	0.1352	0.1334	0.1348

1.31 Ln(volume per share) instead of percentage of trading days as stock liquidity measure (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.018	0.019
Non-zero-points duration	(0.134)	(0.110)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.033***	0.034***
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.009)	(0.008)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.069*		0.066*
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.059)		(0.066)
Herfindahl Index		0.055**		0.053**
Herfindahl Index		(0.032)		(0.039)
Total blockholder ownership		0.015		0.013
Total blockholder ownership		(0.652)		(0.696)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.010*	− 0.010**	− 0.009*	− 0.010*
Ln(total assets)	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.077)	(0.055)
Leverage	− 0.129***	− 0.128***	− 0.131***	− 0.130***
Leverage	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Cash holdings	0.137**	0.135**	0.134**	0.133**
Cash holdings	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Return on assets	− 0.017	− 0.016	− 0.020	− 0.019
Return on assets	(0.839)	(0.844)	(0.811)	(0.817)
Beta	− 0.022**	− 0.021**	− 0.021**	− 0.021**
Beta	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.071***	− 0.072***	− 0.070***	− 0.071***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Synchronicity	0.012	0.011	0.012	0.011
Synchronicity	(0.222)	(0.277)	(0.244)	(0.301)
Ln(market-to-book)	− 0.021	− 0.020	− 0.019	− 0.019
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.110)	(0.120)	(0.138)	(0.149)
Momentum	− 0.019	− 0.019	− 0.020	− 0.019
Momentum	(0.122)	(0.141)	(0.106)	(0.124)
Stock liquidity	− 0.040***	− 0.041***	− 0.039***	− 0.040***
Stock liquidity	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rule of law	0.045***	0.043***	0.047***	0.045***
Rule of law	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Financial development	0.042*	0.044*	0.039	0.040
Financial development	(0.084)	(0.078)	(0.112)	(0.105)
Disclosure Index	− 0.012***	− 0.012***	− 0.011***	− 0.012***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1687	1687	1687	1687
Adjusted R-squared	0.2029	0.2028	0.2054	0.2053

1.32 Ln(volume per share) instead of percentage of trading days as stock liquidity measure (2)

Ownership stability and stock returns during the pre-crisis period

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	− 0.005	− 0.004
Non-zero-points duration	(0.850)	(0.870)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.004	0.005
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.897)	(0.870)
Largest blockholder ownership	− 0.040		− 0.043
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.561)		(0.529)
Herfindahl Index		− 0.048		− 0.050
Herfindahl Index		(0.339)		(0.312)
Total blockholder ownership		0.000		− 0.002
Total blockholder ownership		(0.997)		(0.977)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.013	− 0.012	− 0.013	− 0.011
Ln(total assets)	(0.206)	(0.258)	(0.214)	(0.268)
Leverage	0.119	0.118	0.119	0.119
Leverage	(0.270)	(0.271)	(0.267)	(0.268)
Cash holdings	0.143	0.142	0.143	0.142
Cash holdings	(0.394)	(0.397)	(0.393)	(0.396)
Return on assets	0.613***	0.605***	0.615***	0.606***
Return on assets	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Beta	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026
Beta	(0.207)	(0.214)	(0.205)	(0.212)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.005
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.938)	(0.933)	(0.915)	(0.910)
Synchronicity	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
Synchronicity	(0.135)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.129)
Ln(market-to-book)	− 0.155***	− 0.154***	− 0.155***	− 0.154***
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Momentum	0.046	0.045	0.046	0.045
Momentum	(0.233)	(0.244)	(0.235)	(0.246)
Stock liquidity	0.024**	0.025**	0.024**	0.025**
Stock liquidity	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Rule of law	− 0.097***	− 0.095***	− 0.097***	− 0.094***
Rule of law	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Financial development	− 0.235***	− 0.237***	− 0.235***	− 0.238***
Financial development	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Disclosure Index	− 0.006	− 0.006	− 0.006	− 0.005
Disclosure Index	(0.288)	(0.299)	(0.295)	(0.306)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1621	1621	1621	1621
Adjusted R-squared	0.1202	0.1200	0.1202	0.1200

1.33 Ln(volume per share) instead of percentage of trading days as stock liquidity measure (3)

Ownership stability and stock returns during the post-crisis period

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	0.042	0.039
Non-zero-points duration	(0.236)	(0.278)
Maintain-stake-points duration			0.044	0.042
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.209)	(0.241)
Largest blockholder ownership	− 0.027		− 0.025
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.790)		(0.807)
Herfindahl Index		− 0.036		− 0.036
Herfindahl Index		(0.647)		(0.643)
Total blockholder ownership		0.068		0.068
Total blockholder ownership		(0.505)		(0.500)
Ln(total assets)	0.097***	0.098***	0.097***	0.098***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	− 0.279**	− 0.279**	− 0.274**	− 0.275**
Leverage	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Cash holdings	0.136	0.133	0.139	0.135
Cash holdings	(0.452)	(0.464)	(0.443)	(0.457)
Return on assets	0.170	0.165	0.174	0.169
Return on assets	(0.308)	(0.321)	(0.300)	(0.314)
Beta	0.114**	0.113**	0.114**	0.113**
Beta	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	0.243***	0.244***	0.243***	0.244***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Synchronicity	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002
Synchronicity	(0.981)	(0.955)	(0.981)	(0.955)
Ln(market-to-book)	0.040	0.038	0.041	0.039
Ln(market-to-book)	(0.383)	(0.409)	(0.376)	(0.401)
Momentum	− 0.940***	− 0.934***	− 0.940***	− 0.934***
Momentum	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Stock liquidity	0.055***	0.058***	0.055***	0.058***
Stock liquidity	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Rule of law	0.124**	0.129***	0.127***	0.132***
Rule of law	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Financial development	− 0.324***	− 0.325***	− 0.327***	− 0.328***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	0.043***	0.044***	0.043***	0.044***
Disclosure Index	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1445	1445	1445	1445
Adjusted R-squared	0.2449	0.2448	0.2449	0.2448

1.34 Ln(volume per share) instead of percentage of trading days as stock liquidity measure (4)

Ownership stability and market-to-book

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Non-zero-points duration	− 0.008	− 0.008
Non-zero-points duration	(0.574)	(0.545)
Maintain-stake-points duration			− 0.014	− 0.015
Maintain-stake-points duration			(0.318)	(0.280)
Year 2007	0.018	0.016	0.009	0.007
Year 2007	(0.268)	(0.312)	(0.600)	(0.680)
Year 2008	0.042***	0.039**	0.047***	0.043***
Year 2008	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.008)
Year 2009	0.039**	0.039**	0.048***	0.048***
Year 2009	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Year 2010	− 0.003	− 0.002	0.009	0.010
Year 2010	(0.872)	(0.930)	(0.642)	(0.583)
Largest blockholder ownership	0.022		0.017
Largest blockholder ownership	(0.693)		(0.766)
Herfindahl Index		0.044		0.043
Herfindahl Index		(0.307)		(0.321)
Year 2007	0.023	0.003	0.030	0.005
Year 2007	(0.567)	(0.920)	(0.443)	(0.856)
Year 2008	0.171***	0.085***	0.173***	0.085***
Year 2008	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Year 2009	0.034	0.057*	0.033	0.056*
Year 2009	(0.434)	(0.070)	(0.442)	(0.074)
Year 2010	− 0.038	0.036	− 0.040	0.036
Year 2010	(0.442)	(0.314)	(0.409)	(0.320)
Total blockholder ownership		0.011		0.007
Total blockholder ownership		(0.803)		(0.877)
Year 2007		0.026		0.033
Year 2007		(0.487)		(0.376)
Year 2008		0.151***		0.152***
Year 2008		(0.000)		(0.000)
Year 2009		− 0.001		− 0.002
Year 2009		(0.977)		(0.952)
Year 2010		− 0.063		− 0.067
Year 2010		(0.155)		(0.134)
Ln(total assets)	− 0.450***	− 0.449***	− 0.449***	− 0.449***
Ln(total assets)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Leverage	0.187***	0.188***	0.188***	0.189***
Leverage	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cash holdings	0.072	0.076	0.074	0.078
Cash holdings	(0.225)	(0.202)	(0.215)	(0.191)
Return on assets	0.298***	0.299***	0.299***	0.300***
Return on assets	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Asset tangibility	− 0.116*	− 0.119*	− 0.114*	− 0.117*
Asset tangibility	(0.084)	(0.076)	(0.088)	(0.080)
Beta	− 0.000	− 0.000	− 0.001	− 0.000
Beta	(0.932)	(0.995)	(0.901)	(0.967)
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	− 0.029***	− 0.030***	− 0.028***	− 0.029***
Ln(idiosyncratic risk)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Synchronicity	− 0.014***	− 0.014***	− 0.014***	− 0.014***
Synchronicity	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Stock liquidity	0.017***	0.017***	0.017***	0.017***
Stock liquidity	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rule of law	− 0.125**	− 0.120**	− 0.121**	− 0.116**
Rule of law	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.043)
Financial development	− 0.137***	− 0.133***	− 0.134***	− 0.130***
Financial development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Disclosure Index	− 0.019	− 0.019	− 0.019	− 0.018
Disclosure Index	(0.187)	(0.204)	(0.194)	(0.211)
Firm and Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
… with year 2008	− 0.255***	− 0.321***	− 0.208***	− 0.277***
… with year 2008	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm-year observations	8137	8137	8137	8137
Number of firms	2126	2126	2126	2126
Adjusted R-squared	0.5363	0.5375	0.5364	0.5376

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Lardon, A., Beuselinck, C. & Deloof, M. Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis. Rev Quant Finan Acc 52, 573–642 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-0719-4

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Published: 09 March 2018
Issue Date: 15 February 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-0719-4

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Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis

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Appendix: Robustness checks

Appendix: Robustness checks

1.1 Including total ownership (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.2 Including total ownership (2)

Ownership stability and market-to-book

1.3 Including total ownership (3)

Ownership stability and investments

1.4 Alternative crisis periods (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.5 Alternative crisis periods (2)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.6 Alternative crisis periods (3)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.7 Alternative crisis periods (4)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.8 Alternative pre-crisis periods (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.9 Alternative pre-crisis periods (2)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.10 Alternative maintain-stake-points duration measurement (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.11 Alternative maintain-sake-points duration measurement (2)

Ownership stability and market-to-book

1.12 Alternative maintain-stake-points duration measurement (3)

Ownership stability and investments

1.13 Alternative maintain-stake-points duration measurement (4)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.14 Alternative maintain-stake-points duration measurement (5)

Ownership stability and market-to-book

1.15 Alternative maintain-stake-points duration measurement (6)

Ownership stability and investments

1.16 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.17 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (2)

Ownership stability and market-to-book

1.18 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (3)

Ownership stability and investments

1.19 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (4)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.20 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (5)

Ownership stability and market-to-book

1.21 Alternative ownership concentration measurement (6)

Ownership stability and investments

1.22 Constant sample (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.23 Constant sample (2)

Ownership stability and stock returns during the pre-crisis period

1.24 Constant sample (3)

Ownership stability and stock returns during the post-crisis period

1.25 Ownership stability measures with weighted average (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.26 Ownership stability measures with weighted average (2)

Ownership stability and market-to-book

1.27 Ownership stability measures with weighted average (3)

Ownership stability and investments

1.28 Without countries with substantial control-ownership wedge (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.29 Without countries with substantial control-ownership wedge (2)

Ownership stability and market-to-book

1.30 Without countries with substantial control-ownership wedge (3)

Ownership stability and investments

1.31 Ln(volume per share) instead of percentage of trading days as stock liquidity measure (1)

Ownership stability and crisis period stock returns

1.32 Ln(volume per share) instead of percentage of trading days as stock liquidity measure (2)

Ownership stability and stock returns during the pre-crisis period

1.33 Ln(volume per share) instead of percentage of trading days as stock liquidity measure (3)