Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

, Volume 30, Issue 3, pp 281–296 | Cite as

Do corporate governance attributes affect adverse selection costs? Evidence from seasoned equity offerings

  • John R. Becker-Blease
  • Afshad J. Irani
Original Paper


We examine the relation between corporate governance attributes and perceived information asymmetry. In a sample of seasoned equity offerings between 1996 and 2001, we find that board independence, size of the audit committee, and officer and director ownership mitigate the negative effect of the equity offering announcement on share prices. These results are consistent with the notion that investors perceive certain governance systems to better align manager and shareholder incentives, which improves firm access to capital markets.


Corporate governance Seasoned equity issues 

JEL Classifications

G14 G32 



The authors would like to thank Donna Paul, Swami Kalpathy, Barbara Grein, Nikos Vafeas, Irene Karamanou and seminar participants at the University of Cyprus and the 2005 Northeast Business and Economics Association meeting for helpful comments and discussion. We are also grateful to the editor, Cheng F. Lee, and an anonymous referee whose comments have greatly improved the paper. All remaining errors are our own.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Washington State University VancouverVancouverUSA
  2. 2.Whittemore School of Business and EconomicsUniversity of New HampshireDurhamUSA

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