Abstract
In a recent paper in this journal, Jason Megill (2011) offers an innovative meta-argument which deploys considerations about multiple universes in an effort to block all arguments from evil. In what follows, I contend that Megill has failed to establish a key premise in his meta-argument. I also offer a rival account of the effect of multiverse models on the debate about evil.
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Kraay, K.J. Megill’s multiverse meta-argument. Int J Philos Relig 73, 235–241 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9324-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9324-3