Abstract
We use a spatial competition model to show how an increasing similarity between two products can monotonically increase, monotonically decrease, or have a non-monotonic effect on cross-price elasticity. We relate these results to prior research that links cross-price elasticity to product similarity, and the literature on market structure, merger analysis, and price discrimination.
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Notes
Using the equilibrium expressions, the \(y\le y_{\max }\) condition for ruling out local monopoly situation (i.e., \(s_{2}>s_{1}\) in Fig. 1) becomes \(y\le \frac{3(\alpha +1)}{14t}\), and the \(y>y_{\min }\) condition to ensure that the weaker firm survives and sells positive quantity profitably becomes \(y>\frac{3-17\alpha }{14t}\). Since \(y>0\) for the demand functions (5) and (6) to hold, overall we need \(\max \{0,\frac{3-17\alpha }{14t} \}<y\le \frac{3(\alpha +1)}{14t}.\)
Comparative statics with respect to t yield qualitatively the same results as with respect to y since decreasing t, the strength of disutility of buying a product away from ideal point, is functionally equivalent to bringing the two products closer horizontally.
The \(y\le y_{\max }\) condition for ruling out local monopoly situation is now \(y\le \frac{3(1+\alpha -c\left( \alpha \right) -c\left( 1\right) )}{14t} \), and the \(y>y_{\min }\) condition to ensure that the weaker firm survives and sells a positive quantity profitably becomes \(y>\frac{3-17\alpha -3c\left( 1\right) +17c\left( a\right) }{14t}.\) Since \(y>0\) for the demand functions (5) and (6) to hold, overall we need \(\max \{0,\frac{3-17\alpha -3c\left( 1\right) +17c\left( a\right) }{14t}\}<y\le \frac{3(1+\alpha -c\left( \alpha \right) -c\left( 1\right) )}{14t}\).
Note that \(c\left( \alpha \right) <\alpha \) is necessary for the condition in footnote 4 to hold. Thus, since \(\alpha =1\) for the stronger firm, its marginal cost is bound in the range \(\left( 0,1\right) \).
As an alternative to cross-price elasticity, the literature has also used the diversion ratio: the share of the sales lost by one product that is captured by another when the price of the former increases (Werden 1996). In our model, we did not find a situation where bringing products closer in characteristics space would decrease diversion ratios.
As earlier, at \(y>y_{\max },\) the demand function changes discontinuously to a local monopoly situation. As expected, Fig. 2 shows that if disutility t from buying away from ideal point is large, then firms become local monopolies at smaller y.
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Appendix
Appendix
Signing \(\frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{\partial y}\) in the general marginal cost case. A necessary condition for the inequalities in footnote (4) to hold is:
From (9), we have \(sign\left[ \frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{\partial y}\right] \lesseqqgtr 0\) if
Consider the case when c(1) is sufficiently low: arbitrarily close to zero. Since c(.) is an increasing function, this implies \(c(\alpha )\) is arbitrarily close to zero as well. The LHS of (13b) reduces to \(4-4\alpha >0 \) for \(\alpha \in (0,1).\) Here, \(sign[\frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{\partial y}]>0.\)
Consider the case when c(1) is sufficiently high: arbitrarily close to 1. Then the LHS of (13b) reduces to \(-4\alpha -3c(\alpha )<0\). Here, \(sign[ \frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{\partial y}]<0.\)
For intermediate values of c(1), the sign of LHS of (13b) depends on the value of \(\alpha \). Define the function \(f(\alpha )=4(1-c(1))-4\alpha -3c(\alpha ).\) At \(\alpha \) arbitrarily close to zero, \(f(\alpha )\) approaches \(4-4c(1)>0\) using (12). At \(\alpha \) close to 1, \(f(\alpha )\) is close to \(-7c(1)\,<\,0.\) Then, given that f(.) is continuous and decreasing in \(\alpha \), the Intermediate Value Theorem tells us that there must exist \( \alpha \)—say, \(\overline{\alpha }\)—such that \(f(\overline{\alpha } )=0,\) and for \(\alpha <\overline{\alpha },\) \(f(\alpha )>0\) and hence \(sign[ \frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{\partial y}]>0,\) and for \(\alpha >\overline{ \alpha },\) \(f(\alpha )<0\) and hence \(sign[\frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{ \partial y}]<0.\)
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Kolay, S., Tyagi, R.K. Product Similarity and Cross-Price Elasticity. Rev Ind Organ 52, 85–100 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-017-9578-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-017-9578-8