Skip to main content
Log in

Product Similarity and Cross-Price Elasticity

  • Published:
Review of Industrial Organization Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We use a spatial competition model to show how an increasing similarity between two products can monotonically increase, monotonically decrease, or have a non-monotonic effect on cross-price elasticity. We relate these results to prior research that links cross-price elasticity to product similarity, and the literature on market structure, merger analysis, and price discrimination.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Stegemann (1974), Werden (1992), and Sethuraman et al. (1999) highlight the scaling effect in cross-price elasticity, making it sensitive to the market share of firms.

  2. Using the equilibrium expressions, the \(y\le y_{\max }\) condition for ruling out local monopoly situation (i.e., \(s_{2}>s_{1}\) in Fig. 1) becomes \(y\le \frac{3(\alpha +1)}{14t}\), and the \(y>y_{\min }\) condition to ensure that the weaker firm survives and sells positive quantity profitably becomes \(y>\frac{3-17\alpha }{14t}\). Since \(y>0\) for the demand functions (5) and (6) to hold, overall we need \(\max \{0,\frac{3-17\alpha }{14t} \}<y\le \frac{3(\alpha +1)}{14t}.\)

  3. Comparative statics with respect to t yield qualitatively the same results as with respect to y since decreasing t,  the strength of disutility of buying a product away from ideal point, is functionally equivalent to bringing the two products closer horizontally.

  4. The \(y\le y_{\max }\) condition for ruling out local monopoly situation is now \(y\le \frac{3(1+\alpha -c\left( \alpha \right) -c\left( 1\right) )}{14t} \), and the \(y>y_{\min }\) condition to ensure that the weaker firm survives and sells a positive quantity profitably becomes \(y>\frac{3-17\alpha -3c\left( 1\right) +17c\left( a\right) }{14t}.\) Since \(y>0\) for the demand functions (5) and (6) to hold, overall we need \(\max \{0,\frac{3-17\alpha -3c\left( 1\right) +17c\left( a\right) }{14t}\}<y\le \frac{3(1+\alpha -c\left( \alpha \right) -c\left( 1\right) )}{14t}\).

  5. Note that \(c\left( \alpha \right) <\alpha \) is necessary for the condition in footnote 4 to hold. Thus, since \(\alpha =1\) for the stronger firm, its marginal cost is bound in the range \(\left( 0,1\right) \).

  6. As an alternative to cross-price elasticity, the literature has also used the diversion ratio: the share of the sales lost by one product that is captured by another when the price of the former increases (Werden 1996). In our model, we did not find a situation where bringing products closer in characteristics space would decrease diversion ratios.

  7. As earlier, at \(y>y_{\max },\) the demand function changes discontinuously to a local monopoly situation. As expected, Fig. 2 shows that if disutility t from buying away from ideal point is large, then firms become local monopolies at smaller y.

References

  • Bain, J. S. (1951). Relation of profit rate to industry concentration: American manufacturing. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65(3), 293–324.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Besanko, D., Dranove, D., & Shanley, M. (2000). Economics of strategy (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Church, J., & Ware, J. (2000). Industrial organization: A strategic approach. New York: McGraw Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, P. (2006). Spatial competition in retail markets: Movie theaters. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(4), 964–982.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • de Juan, R. (2003). The independent submarkets model: An application to the spanish retail banking market. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(10), 1461–1487.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hausman, J. A., Leonard, G. K., & Zona, J. D. (1991). A proposed method for analyzing competition among differentiated products. Antitrust Law Journal, 60, 889–900.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hausman, J. A., & Leonard, G. K. (2005). Competitive analysis using a flexible demand specification. Journal of Competition, Law, and Economics, 1(2), 279–301.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holmes, T. (1989). The effects of third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly. American Economic Review, 79(1), 244–250.

    Google Scholar 

  • Irvine, F. O, Jr. (1983). Demand equations for individual new car models estimated using transaction prices with implications for regulatory issues. Southern Economic Journal, 49(3), 764–782.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liu, Q., & Serfes, K. (2010). Third-degree price discrimination. Journal of Industrial Organization Education, 5(1), Article 5.

  • Nevo-Ilan, H. (2007). Definition of the relevant market: (Lack of) harmony between industrial economics and competition law. Erasmus University Rotterdam. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10552.

  • Pinske, J., & Slade, M. E. (2004). Mergers, brand competition, and the price of a pint. European Economic Review, 48(3), 617–643.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rubinfeld, D. L. (2000). Market definition with differentiated products: The post/nabisco cereal merger. Antitrust Law Journal, 68(1), 163–182.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sethuraman, R., Srinivasan, V., & Kim, D. (1999). Asymmetric and neighborhood cross-price effects: Some empirical generalizations. Marketing Science, 18(1), 23–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stegemann, K. (1974). Cross elasticity and the relevant market. Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts-und Sozial-wissenschaften, 94, 151–165.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stole, L. (2007). Price discrimination and competition. In M. Armstrong & R. Porter (Eds.), Handbook of industrial organization (pp. 2221–2299). North-Holland: Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • US Dept of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010). Horizontal merger guidelines. http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.

  • Werden, G. J. (1992). The history of antitrust market delineation. Marquette Law Review, 76, 122–215.

    Google Scholar 

  • Werden, G. J. (1996). A robust test for consumer welfare enhancing mergers among sellers of differentiated products. Journal of Industrial Economics, 44(4), 409–413.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Werden, G. J. (1997). Demand elasticities in antitrust analysis. Antitrust Law Journal, 66, 363–414.

    Google Scholar 

  • Werden, G. J., & Froeb, L. M. (1994). The effects of mergers in differentiated products industries: Logit demand and merger policy. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10, 407–426.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rajeev K. Tyagi.

Appendix

Appendix

Signing \(\frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{\partial y}\) in the general marginal cost case. A necessary condition for the inequalities in footnote (4) to hold is:

$$\begin{aligned} c(\alpha ) < \alpha. \end{aligned}$$
(12)

From (9), we have \(sign\left[ \frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{\partial y}\right] \lesseqqgtr 0\) if

$$\begin{aligned}&c(\alpha )+\frac{4}{3}\alpha \,\gtreqqless\, \frac{4}{3}\left( 1-c(1)\right) , \end{aligned}$$
(13a)
$$\begin{aligned}&\text {or, }4(1-c(1))-4\alpha -3c(\alpha)\, \lesseqgtr\, 0 \end{aligned}$$
(13b)

Consider the case when c(1) is sufficiently low: arbitrarily close to zero. Since c(.) is an increasing function, this implies \(c(\alpha )\) is arbitrarily close to zero as well. The LHS of (13b) reduces to \(4-4\alpha >0 \) for \(\alpha \in (0,1).\) Here, \(sign[\frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{\partial y}]>0.\)

Consider the case when c(1) is sufficiently high: arbitrarily close to 1. Then the LHS of (13b) reduces to \(-4\alpha -3c(\alpha )<0\). Here, \(sign[ \frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{\partial y}]<0.\)

For intermediate values of c(1),  the sign of LHS of (13b) depends on the value of \(\alpha \). Define the function \(f(\alpha )=4(1-c(1))-4\alpha -3c(\alpha ).\) At \(\alpha \) arbitrarily close to zero, \(f(\alpha )\) approaches \(4-4c(1)>0\) using (12). At \(\alpha \) close to 1, \(f(\alpha )\) is close to \(-7c(1)\,<\,0.\) Then, given that f(.) is continuous and decreasing in \(\alpha \), the Intermediate Value Theorem tells us that there must exist \( \alpha \)—say, \(\overline{\alpha }\)—such that \(f(\overline{\alpha } )=0,\) and for \(\alpha <\overline{\alpha },\) \(f(\alpha )>0\) and hence \(sign[ \frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{\partial y}]>0,\) and for \(\alpha >\overline{ \alpha },\) \(f(\alpha )<0\) and hence \(sign[\frac{\partial \eta _{12}}{ \partial y}]<0.\)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Kolay, S., Tyagi, R.K. Product Similarity and Cross-Price Elasticity. Rev Ind Organ 52, 85–100 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-017-9578-8

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-017-9578-8

Keywords

Navigation