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Towards a theory of bicameralism: the neglected contributions of the calculus of consent

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Abstract

In The Calculus of Consent (1962: 235) Buchanan and Tullock assert: (1) ceteris paribus, while a coalition controlling less than a majority of voters may control in either chamber, the greater the difference in the bases of representation in the two houses, the less likely is any given coalition of voters to control a majority of the seats in both chambers; (2) the potential of cross-chamber logrolls (on issues of unequal intensity) increases the likelihood that a minority may effectively control policy making. We link these ideas to social theory approaches to bicameralism and for the empirical study of legislatures.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for the Study of Democracy, School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA, 92697-5100, USA

    Bernard Grofman

  2. Department of Political Science, University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, TX, USA

    Thomas Brunell

  3. Department of Sociology, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA

    Scott L. Feld

Authors
  1. Bernard Grofman
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  2. Thomas Brunell
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  3. Scott L. Feld
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Correspondence to Bernard Grofman.

Additional information

A much earlier version of this paper was presented at the Liberty Fund Conference on “The ‘Calculus of Consent’,” Santa Cruz, California, June 23–25, 1988. Partial support of this research came through SSHRCC research grant #410-2007-2153 (Stanley Winer and Stephen Ferris, co-PIs). Grofman’s work was also supported by the Jack W. Peltason (Bren Foundation) Endowed Chair, University of California, Irvine, and by the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy.

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Grofman, B., Brunell, T. & Feld, S.L. Towards a theory of bicameralism: the neglected contributions of the calculus of consent. Public Choice 152, 147–161 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9859-y

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