Public Choice

, Volume 145, Issue 1–2, pp 213–221 | Cite as

Agenda trees and sincere voting: a response to Schwartz



Schwartz (Public Choice 136:353–377, 2008) has identified a controversy within the voting theory literature pertaining to the representation of agenda structures and the consequent definition of sincere voting. This note responds to Schwartz’s remarks by arguing that the kind of agenda tree he uses does not adequately represent some common parliamentary agendas, and that consequently his definition of sincere voting cannot always be applied.

Parliamentary procedure Agenda tree Sincere voting 


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of Maryland Baltimore CountyBaltimoreUSA

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