Abstract
Schwartz (Public Choice 136:353–377, 2008) has identified a controversy within the voting theory literature pertaining to the representation of agenda structures and the consequent definition of sincere voting. This note responds to Schwartz’s remarks by arguing that the kind of agenda tree he uses does not adequately represent some common parliamentary agendas, and that consequently his definition of sincere voting cannot always be applied.
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Miller, N.R. Agenda trees and sincere voting: a response to Schwartz. Public Choice 145, 213–221 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9562-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9562-4