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Evaluating the News: (Mis)Perceptions of Objectivity and Credibility

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Abstract

The introduction and popularity of politically biased news sources represents a significant historical shift in the media environment, with important unexplored consequences. Evidence points to partisan segmentation in the contemporary news market, but while assumptions abound, the mechanism driving consumers to sort along party lines is unclear. I develop a framework for news choice based on perceptions of objectivity and credibility and report a test of its central mechanism using a nationally representative survey experiment. I find support for a congenial media effect, where news content from an unfamiliar source is seen as more credible and less biased when it is consistent with existing beliefs, while balanced news content may be dismissed as less credible and biased. Previous studies have examined how perceptions of bias in identical news content can change when it is attributed to different sources. In today’s media world however, access to more news sources generally and the ease with which content from those sources can be shared makes it increasingly likely people will be exposed to news content from either unknown or potentially fake news sources. This study contributes to the literature by identifying the unique effect of message content on perceptions of news bias and source credibility, while holding source constant. Paradoxically, my findings indicate that political selective exposure may arise out of individuals’ genuine desire for unbiased news.

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Notes

  1. This deception was helpfully reported online by actual newspaper The Denver Post (http://www.denverpost.com/2016/11/05/there-is-no-such-thing-as-the-denver-guardian/).

  2. Household completion rate for this study was 65.5%. For a comparison of the representativeness of KN data versus an RDD telephone survey see Chang and Krosnick (2009).

  3. Full text of treatment conditions presented in “Appendix”.

  4. Substantive results do not change if Leaners are included in the analysis; all results are replicated with Leaners included and presented in “Appendix”.

  5. Note estimation results Fig. 1 is based on are presented numerically in Table 2 in “Appendix”; results with Leaners included in the analysis are presented in Table 3 in “Appendix”.

  6. The results presented here are consistent across a range of alternative estimation strategies, including using partisan interaction terms in linear regression models. These models are presented in “Appendix” as Tables 4, 7, and 10.

  7. Note estimation results Fig. 2 is based on are presented numerically in Tables 5 and 8 in “Appendix”; results with Leaners included in the analysis are presented in Tables 6 and 9 in “Appendix”.

  8. Data and replication code for all analyses is publically available at Harvard Dataverse, https://doi.org/10.7910/dvn/h6dwao.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Barry C. Burden, Katherine J. Cramer, Dhavan V. Shah, Kevin Arceneaux, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. This research was funded by Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS) under National Science Foundation Grant (SES-0818839).

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Correspondence to Dimitri Kelly.

Appendix

Appendix

See Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

Table 2 Perceptions of hostile/congenial news bias
Table 3 Perceptions of hostile/congenial news bias with partisan leaners included
Table 4 Perceptions of hostile/congenial news bias—partisan interactions
Table 5 Perceived believability of information and analysis
Table 6 Perceived believability of information and analysis with partisan leaners included
Table 7 Perceived believability of information and analysis—partisan interactions
Table 8 Perceived informativeness of news program
Table 9 Perceived informativeness of news program with partisan leaners included
Table 10 Perceived informativeness of news program—partisan interactions

Experimental Conditions


[CONDITION ONE (P ro -R epublican )]


December 6, 2010 Monday

7:00 PM EST


Tax Cut Deal


HOST: Good evening everyone. Tonight, dramatic breaking news, a deal brokered by President Obama and the newly empowered Republican congressional leaders—the key points, a two-year extension of all the Bush tax cuts and an extension of unemployment benefits the White House says will benefit seven million Americans.

The deal is widely seen as a victory for Republicans, who had taken a firm stance in favor of extending the tax cuts for everyone, while President Barack Obama and many congressional Democrats wanted to extend them only for families earning less than $250,000.

Here in the studio to discuss the compromise is Senior Political Analyst for the non-partisan watchdog organization Politifact.org, Jessica Nichols.

Welcome Jessica, tell us a little bit about this deal.

NICHOLS: This is an important deal for the White House. Extending unemployment benefits for the 1.9 million Americans about to lose them at the end of the year was a top priority for the President and this deal the president has brokered extends unemployment benefits for 13-months.

HOST: Some congressional Democrats may be upset, what about the American people? Where do they stand? Here’s Senator Dan Coats, Republican of Indiana, speaking with reporters at a news conference earlier today.


(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)


SEN. DAN COATS (R), INDIANA: “The American people spoke pretty loudly during the election and I think that my colleagues across the aisle finally decided to listen. The American people want to stop all the looming tax hikes and to cut spending.”


(END VIDEO CLIP)


HOST: With more, Republican Senator Dan Coats joins us live. Good evening, sir.

SEN. DAN COATS (R), INDIANA: Good evening.

HOST: Based on the tentative agreement, is this something you could vote for?

COATS: We’ll see. The details are still emerging and evolving. And I always like to read these things before I vote on them. But the important thing here, I think, from our standpoint is that people across this country are now going to have certainty. Families, small businesses that are making decisions are not going to be stuck with higher taxes come January 1. And that’s the thing that we were trying to avoid and something that we desperately need to avoid if we want to get the economy growing again.

As I said, the American people spoke pretty loudly during the election, they want to stop all the looming tax hikes and to cut spending. It’s good that my colleagues across the aisle finally decided to listen.

HOST: You know, I thought the president looked quite somber and maybe even angry when he made the announcement.

COATS: I think this is going to be a hard sell for him in his caucus. And he’s going to have to go up and sell this to members of the House of Representatives, who really believe that these tax cuts should expire. But the votes aren’t there, and I think he is acknowledging that.

But in the end, the important thing is you have certainty for families, small business owners. Even with regard to estates, I think there’s a death tax provision there that for two years, lowers the top rate on estates to 35 percent and allows for a $5 million exemption, which is something that we’ve been advocating for, for a long time.

HOST: Thank you senator.

Up next, Democrats aren’t happy about this deal. Can the president sell the deal to his supporters? Here’s Senator Sherrod Brown, Democrat of Ohio, up for reelection next cycle, at a news conference earlier today.


(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)


SEN. SHERROD BROWN (D), OHIO: I’m very unhappy about it, you’re right, in essence, it takes 700 billion—borrows $700 billion from China, puts it on our children and grandchildren’s credit cards and gives it to the wealthiest 2 percent taxpayers. People say Washington doesn’t listen enough.


(END VIDEO CLIP)

HOST: Pretty strong words, to say what the president of the United States just agreed to would blow a seven billion—$700 billion hole in the budget to give extra tax cuts to the wealthiest two percent. Jessica?

NICHOLS: Well, first of all we in the press have a responsibility to sort of—as we say, keep them honest, and what the Senator from Ohio said is highly misleading.

The problem with using that $700 billion figure now, which is the estimated cost of extending the tax cuts for an additional 10-years, is that the Obama-GOP deal, and the resulting tax package that Congress could approve this week, calls for extending the tax breaks for only two more years. A 10-year extension is not on the table.

Plus, that $700 billion figure for ten years includes a whole lot of people who are neither millionaires nor billionaires. The figure, in fact, includes all single filers earning more than $200,000 a year and joint filers earning more than $250,000. To call a two-earner couple making $251,000 “millionaires and billionaires” is inaccurate and deceptive.

HOST: Do we know the real cost of the tax cut deal yet?

NICHOLS: The best estimate of the cost of extending these tax cuts comes from Joint Committee projections released on Dec. 10, a day after Brown spoke on CNN. They show the cost of retaining both the 33 percent tax bracket and the 35 percent bracket for two more years would come to $60.7 billion. Of course, this also covers a lot more people than millionaires and billionaires.

In short, Brown’s claim that the cost of extending the Bush tax-cuts will cost $700 billion is simply not true; Politifact.org rates Brown’s statement as “completely false”.

HOST: Thank you Jessica.

END


[CONDITION 2 (P ro -D emocratic )]

December 6, 2010 Monday

7:00 PM EST


Tax Cut Deal


HOST: Good evening everyone. Tonight, dramatic breaking news, a deal brokered by President Obama and the newly empowered Republican congressional leaders—the key points, a two-year extension of all the Bush tax cuts and an extension of unemployment benefits the White House says will benefit seven million Americans.

The deal is widely seen as a victory for Republicans, who had taken a firm stance in favor of extending the tax cuts for everyone, while President Barack Obama and many congressional Democrats wanted to extend them only for families earning less than $250,000.

Here in the studio to discuss the compromise is Senior Political Analyst for the non-partisan watchdog organization Politifact.org, Jessica Nichols.

Welcome Jessica, tell us a little bit about this deal.

NICHOLS: This is an important deal for the White House. Extending unemployment benefits for the 1.9 million Americans about to lose them at the end of the year was a top priority for the President and this deal the president has brokered extends unemployment benefits for 13-months.

HOST: We’ll look at some specifics about what this deal means in a moment, but first Democrats unhappy about this deal. Can the president sell the deal to his supporters? Here’s Senator Sherrod Brown, Democrat of Ohio, up for reelection next cycle, at a news conference earlier today.


(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)


SEN. SHERROD BROWN (D), OHIO: I’m very unhappy about it, you’re right, in essence, it takes 700 billion—borrows $700 billion from China, puts it on our children and grandchildren’s credit cards and gives it to the wealthiest 2 percent taxpayers. People say Washington doesn’t listen enough.


(END VIDEO CLIP)

HOST: With more, Democrat senator Sherrod Brown joins us live. Good evening, sir.

SEN. SHERROD BROWN (D) OHIO: Good evening.

HOST: Senator, you said on Saturday when you were voting on a plan to just have the middle class tax cuts stay in play. This is what you said after Senate Republicans voted in lock step against tax cuts for all Americans. “They would prefer to blow a $700 billion hole in the budget to give extra tax cuts to the wealthiest two percent. At a time of record deficits, they propose borrowing another $700 billion from China and passing along the tab to our grandchildren.”

Could I now fairly, in your view, read that statement back to you and say the concession that Republicans extracted from the president of the United States would blow a $700 billion hole in the budget to give extra tax cuts to the wealthiest two percent, sir?

SEN. SHERROD BROWN (D), OHIO: You could.

HOST: Will you vote for it?

BROWN: I need to look at it. I’m very unhappy about it. You’re right, in essence takes 700 billion—borrows $700 billion from China. Charges it—puts it on our children and grandchildren’s credit cards and gives it to the wealthiest two percent taxpayers. I mean you know people say Washington doesn’t listen enough. It’s clear what the public was saying is keep the tax cuts going for the middle class, maintain unemployment benefits for families that lost their unemployment benefits last week. The Republicans continue to filibuster that.

I’m not at all happy with this. I want to see all the details before I make any kind of commitment. It’s only been—I watched the president on TV 20 min ago. I already had some briefing about it prior to that of course, but this is a real concern. It doesn’t do the right thing long-term for our country.

HOST: Thank you senator.

Next, congressional Democrats may be upset, but what about the American people? Where do they stand? Here’s Senator Dan Coats, Republican of Indiana, speaking with reporters at a news conference earlier today.


(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)


SEN. DAN COATS (R), INDIANA: “The American people spoke pretty loudly during the election and I think that my colleagues across the aisle finally decided to listen. The American people want to stop all the looming tax hikes and to cut spending.”


(END VIDEO CLIP)

HOST: Pretty clear where he stands, but is it really that cut and dry? How does the public feel about extending the Bush-era tax cuts? Jessica?

NICHOLS: Well first of all, we in the press have a responsibility to sort of—as we say, keep them honest, and what the Senator from Indiana said with regards to the Bush-tax cuts is highly misleading.

The truth is that public opinion is considerably more mixed than Sen. Coats is presenting it. The percentage of people who favor extending the tax cuts for every income level—which is how Mr. Coats framed his comment—ranges from 23 to 40%. Quite a bit short of a majority.

Instead, the highest level of support for any specific course of action was actually the Obama position—extending tax cuts for those below $250,000 and not for those above that line. Across different polls between 40 and 50% of the public supported this position.

In short, Coats’ claim that the American people support extending all of the Bush tax-cuts is simply not true; Politifact.org rates Coats’ statement as “completely false”.

HOST: Thank you Jessica.

END


[CONDITION 3 (B alanced )]

December 6, 2010 Monday


7:00 PM EST


Tax Cut Deal

HOST: Good evening everyone. Tonight, dramatic breaking news, a deal brokered by President Obama and the newly empowered Republican congressional leaders—the key points, a two-year extension of all the Bush tax cuts and an extension of unemployment benefits the White House says will benefit seven million Americans.

The deal is widely seen as a victory for Republicans, who had taken a firm stance in favor of extending the tax cuts for everyone, while President Barack Obama and many congressional Democrats wanted to extend them only for families earning less than $250,000.

Here in the studio to discuss the compromise is Senior Political Analyst, Jessica Nichols.

Welcome Jessica, tell us a little bit about this deal.

NICHOLS: This is an important deal for the White House. Extending unemployment benefits for the 1.9 million Americans about to lose them at the end of the year was a top priority for the President and this deal the president has brokered extends unemployment benefits for 13-months.

HOST: We’ll look at some specifics about what this deal means in a moment, but first here to talk more about the compromise, Republican Senator Dan Coats joins us live. Good evening, sir.

SEN. DAN COATS (R), INDIANA: Good evening.

HOST: Based on the tentative agreement, is this something you could vote for?

COATS: We’ll see. The details are still emerging and evolving. And I always like to read these things before I vote on them. But the important thing here, I think, from our standpoint is that people across this country are now going to have certainty. Families, small businesses that are making decisions are not going to be stuck with higher taxes come January 1. And that’s the thing that we were trying to avoid and something that we desperately need to avoid if we want to get the economy growing again.

The American people spoke pretty loudly during the election and I think that my colleagues across the aisle finally decided to listen. The American people want to stop all the looming tax hikes and to cut spending.

HOST: You know, I thought the president looked quite somber and maybe even angry when he made the announcement.

COATS: I think this is going to be a hard sell for him in his caucus. And he’s going to have to go up and sell this to members of the House of Representatives, who really believe that these tax cuts should expire. But the votes aren’t there, and I think he is acknowledging that.

But in the end, the important thing is you have certainty for families, small business owners. Even with regard to estates, I think there’s a death tax provision there that for 2 years, lowers the top rate on estates to 35 percent and allows for a $5 million exemption, which is something that we’ve been advocating for, for a long time.

HOST: Thank you senator.

Up next, can the president sell the deal to his supporters? Some congressional Democrats are upset with the compromise. Here’s Senator Sherrod Brown, Democrat of Ohio, up for reelection next cycle. Good evening, sir.

SEN. SHERROD BROWN (D) OHIO: Good evening.

HOST: Senator, you said on Saturday when you were voting on a plan to just have the middle class tax cuts stay in play. This is what you said after Senate Republicans voted in lock step against tax cuts for all Americans. “They would prefer to blow a $700 billion hole in the budget to give extra tax cuts to the wealthiest two percent. At a time of record deficits, they propose borrowing another $700 billion from China and passing along the tab to our grandchildren.”

Could I now fairly, in your view, read that statement back to you and say the concession Republicans extracted from the president of the United States would blow a $700 billion hole in the budget to give extra tax cuts to the wealthiest two percent, sir?

SEN. SHERROD BROWN (D), OHIO: You could.

HOST: Will you vote for it?

BROWN: I need to look at it. I’m very unhappy about it. You’re right, in essence takes 700 billion—borrows $700 billion from China. Charges it—puts it on our children and grandchildren’s credit cards and gives it to the wealthiest two percent taxpayers. I mean you know people say Washington doesn’t listen enough. It’s clear what the public was saying is keep the tax cuts going for the middle class, maintain unemployment benefits for families that lost their unemployment benefits last week. The Republicans continue to filibuster that.

I’m not at all happy with this. I want to see all the details before I make any kind of commitment. It’s only been—I watched the president on TV 20 min ago. I already had some briefing about it prior to that of course, but this is a real concern. It doesn’t do the right thing long-term for our country.

HOST: Thank you senator.

END

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Kelly, D. Evaluating the News: (Mis)Perceptions of Objectivity and Credibility. Polit Behav 41, 445–471 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9458-4

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