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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 174, Issue 8, pp 1991–2007 | Cite as

Attention to mental paint and change detection

  • Assaf Weksler
Article

Abstract

According to the influential thesis of attentional transparency (AT), in having or reflecting on an ordinary visual experience, we can attend only outwards, to qualities the experience represents, never to intrinsic qualities of the experience itself, i.e., to “mental paint.” According to the competing view, attentional semitransparency (AS), although we usually attend outwards, to qualities the experience represents, we can also (perhaps with effort) attend inwards, to mental paint. So far, philosophers have debated this topic in strictly armchair means, especially phenomenological reflection. My aim in this paper is to show how to design an experiment, using the change detection paradigm for studying visual working memory that, if yielding positive results, would support AS. The structure of the argument is as follows. In standard change detection tasks, which involve attention to qualities the experience represents, there exists a known object integration effect (Luck and Vogel in Nature 390(6657):279–281, 1997). I formulate a hypothesis I call “the turn-off hypothesis,” according to which this effect does not exist in change detection tasks where subjects are instructed to attend to mental paint. I argue that, given AS, we have some reason to expect the turn-off hypothesis to be true, but given AT, we do not. Consequently, the truth of the turn-off hypothesis would support AS. I further argue that one can straightforwardly test the turn-off hypothesis, taking the standard change detection paradigm and instructing participants to attend inwards.

Keywords

Mental paint Qualia Attention Transparency Attention to mental paint Change detection Psychology of attention Neuroscience of attention Intentionalism Visual working memory 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Hilla Jacobson, Angela Mendelovici and Zohar Bronfman for providing excellent criticisms and suggestions when the core idea of the paper was in its infancy. Thanks to Ori Beck for multiple discussions of the entire manuscript. Thanks also to Amir Horowitz, Takuya Niikawa, John Schwenkler, Miguel Angel Sebastian, Ran Weksler, Wayne Wu, and an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for helpful feedback.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Open University of IsraelRa’ananaIsrael

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