Philosophical Studies

, Volume 173, Issue 5, pp 1405–1425 | Cite as

The General Truthmaker View of ontological commitment



In this paper, I articulate and argue for a new truthmaker view of ontological commitment, which I call the “General Truthmaker View”: when one affirms a sentence, one is ontologically committed to there being something (or some things) that makes (or make) true the proposition expressed by the sentence. This view comes apart from Quinean orthodoxy in that we are not ontologically committed to the things over which we quantify, and it comes apart from extant truthmaker views of ontological commitment in that we are not ontologically committed to the truthmakers of our sentences.


Truthmaking Ontological commitment Ontology 


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBaylor UniversityWacoUSA

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