Epistemological asymmetries between belief and experience
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If an experience has an etiology such that a similar belief with a relevantly similar etiology would be unjustified, then that experience fails to confer justification on any beliefs based on it.
I think this is a mistake. In what follows, I explain why I disagree with DP. I go on to suggest an explanation for why experiences typically differ from beliefs in this way, such that an experience’s ability to justify beliefs is typically not undermined by the same sort of etiology that would undermine a belief’s ability to justify further beliefs. Finally, I will suggest an alternate...
KeywordsVisual Experience Epistemic Justification Epistemic Norm Innate Tendency Phenomenal Conservatism
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