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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 144, Issue 1, pp 127–136 | Cite as

Sosa in perspective

  • Hilary Kornblith
Article

Abstract

Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology. This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.

Keywords

Sosa Animal knowledge Reflective knowledge 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Joachim Horvath and Jonathan Vogel for helpful comments on a draft of this paper.

References

  1. BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Goldman, A. (1992). Liaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  3. Sosa, E. (1991). Knowledge in perspective: Selected essays in epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Sosa, E. (1997). Reflective knowledge in the best circles. Journal of Philosophy, XCIV, 410–430.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

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