Abstract
In the debate over what determines the reference of an indexical expression on a given occasion of use, we can distinguish between two generic positions. According to the first, the reference is determined by internal factors, such as the speaker’s intentions. According to the second, the reference is determined by external factors, like conventions or what a competent and attentive audience would take the reference to be. It has recently been argued that the first position is untenable, since there are cases of mismatch where the intuitively correct reference differs from the one that would be determined by the relevant internal factors. The aim of this paper is to show that, contrary to this line of argument, it is the proponent of the second position that should be worried, since this position yields counterintuitive consequences regarding communicative success in cases of mismatch.
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Notes
For instance, one may take the speaker’s intention to determine which context pertains to the relevant utterance. Cf. Predelli (1998, p. 403).
Charles might have succeeded in referring to Sebastian by the E-theorist’s standards if he had provided such evidence. For instance, he might have made a very good impersonation of Sebastian while he made the utterance. Under these circumstances, it would seem less counterintuitive that he could have used ‘I’ to refer to Sebastian.
Of course, if we already endorse an E-theory according to which the external evidence determines the correct reference, this distinction will not make sense to us. However, from a neutral perspective, we can assume that there is something that gets determined by the relevant inner state, and that there is something that gets determined by the relevant external factors. For instance, if the relevant inner state is an intention and the relevant external factor is what a competent and attentive audience would take the reference to be, we may distinguish between the intended reference, and what we may call the reasonable or legitimate reference. The dispute between I-theories and E-theories concerns which of these is to be identified with the actual or correct reference.
In Åkerman (Forthcoming) I present a more detailed defence of Intentionalism along these lines. I will say something more about these intuitions below.
Cf. Åkerman (Forthcoming) and Bach (1992, p. 299).
For instance, it seems clear that Predelli would accept that the audience does not have any direct access to the relevant intentions. If he did not, why would he claim that we cannot use the relevant indexical expressions to communicate in cases of mismatch?
Of course, more would be needed for successful communication of the full semantic content, and even more would be needed for successful communication of, e.g., implicatures. But recall that we are only concerned with communication of semantic content of indexicals and demonstratives, and for this to succeed, grasp of the reference as a result of the communicative act seems both necessary and sufficient.
Romdenh-Romluc (2006, p. 274) also says that the reference-determining context for an indexical or a demonstrative is the one that the audience would identify using the cues that she would reasonably take the speaker to be exploiting. It seems clear that this would yield the same problematic results in cases of mismatch.
It should be noted that communication might fail even if the audience arrives at the semantically correct interpretation, in the sense that the speaker may still fail to convey, e.g., an implicature. But again, we are only concerned with semantic content here.
Of course, the audience need not share the speaker’s attitude to this thought content.
One of the most famous proponents of this kind of idea is Quine (see for instance Quine 1992, p. 43). It should be noted, though, that Quine did not suggest that we should apply behavioural criteria on the event level. But this is exactly what would be needed in the present context, since we want to be able to decide whether or not certain individual events are instances of communicative success. Cf. Pagin (2008, pp. 100–104).
For instance, Michael Dummett invokes the knowledge requirement in his criticism of Frege (Dummett 1980, p. 132). The evidence requirement, as well as the knowledge requirement, has been defended by Evans (1982, pp. 310, 320), and more recently by Heck (1995, pp. 90–94). For discussion, see Pagin (2008, pp. 104–109).
For a more thorough defence of the classical view, and a deeper criticism of its alternatives, see Pagin (2008).
Note that the classical view is meant to support the common sense judgements about the relevant cases by fitting them into a coherent framework, rather than by providing an independent foundation for them to rest upon. Thus, appeal to this kind of mutual support is unproblematic.
Of course, they were in a position to identify the referent descriptively as the man who usually sits in that chair. However, this kind of identification is not very interesting, since any audience is always in a position to identify the referent descriptively as the x such that the speaker refers to x.
We could weaken the graspability requirement in order to accommodate cases like these, for instance by allowing that the speaker could succeed in referring if the audience can grasp the reference if they are given the required additional information. However, that would make it too weak to play the intended role in the argument against I-theories, since given that the audience gets the right kind of additional information, they will always be able to grasp the reference.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Peter Pagin, Mikael Pettersson, and an anonymous referee for useful comments on earlier drafts.
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Åkerman, J. Communication and indexical reference. Philos Stud 149, 355–366 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9347-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9347-0