Abstract
This work is best described as an endeavour to contribute to the phenomenology of intentions, the experiences of intending to do something. It finds its point of departure in the discussion of two ‘analytic philosophers’, John Searle and John McDowell, where two contrasting accounts of intentions are offered. The first task is to derive a hybrid account, according to which there are different kinds of intentions, each having the property of being a potential continuant with prior- and in-action phases. The remainder of the discussion is a phenomenological justification of the hybrid account. Through a critical engagement with work of the classical phenomenologists, descriptions are advanced towards the end of demonstrating that the genus intention splits into the species projecting and willing and that each instantiates the property of being a potential continuant with prior- and in-action phases. This work does not offer a complete justification of the hybrid account; rather, the discussion culminates with the articulation of a concrete phenomenological problem, the answer to which is a condition for the evaluation of the phenomenological merit of the hybrid account. This problem functions as an invitation for other phenomenologists to return to thing themselves and engage in concrete phenomenological work.
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Notes
See Pfänder (1967) for some phenomenological descriptions that refer to such ‘centripetal phenomena’.
Arguably, the difference between projecting and willing is set out most clearly in Sartre’s (2003 part IV.). While Sartre’s analyses are a major inspiration for the current study that does not mean that there is complete agreement between the two accounts. In particular, I suspect that Sartre would reject the description of the project as simply being another type of intentional experience; for him projecting is something like a constitutive feature of the for-itself, i.e. it is a structural part of the Being that is intentional.
This work does not pretend to be an exhaustive analysis of the genus intention, nor does it defend the claim that projecting and willing are the only types of intentions. It does, however, offer a framework within which it is possible to raise the question of whether something should count as an intention in the first place. Take for example that which Pacherie (2004) calls the ‘motor’ (or M-) intention’. If the current analysis is right, intentions are characterized in that they are potential continuants with prior- and in-action phases. So, the question would be: does the ‘M-intention’ also instantiate this property, i.e. does it have prior- and in-action phases? If it does, and if it is also an experience that makes a piece of behaviour into an action, then its inclusion in the genus alongside projecting and willing would be justified and further phenomenological investigations would be necessary to determinate how it differs from, and relates to, the other species of intentions. But if the prior- and in-action phases cannot be deciphered as moments of the M-intention, then the word ‘intention’ is being used ambiguously. Clearly, these issues can only be addressed through careful phenomenological investigations of the phenomenon, investigations that are beyond the scope of this paper, which only claims to be a contribution to the phenomenology of intentions.
McDowell (2011) also draws the distinction between ‘the action’ and ‘activities’, and Searle (1983) speaks of the difference between the action as a whole and the experience of acting, of which the bodily movements are components. While there is some overlap here, I am not convinced that there is total agreement.
Against the claim that one usually aims at the realisation of states of affairs that do not contain acts as constituents, one may point to vocational projects, such as the project of becoming a philosophy professor, and argue that such projects do aim at the realisation of states of affairs that contain acts as constituents. After all, the objection goes, what is the project of being a philosophy professor if not the project of performing certain acts, i.e. the acts that define what it is to be a philosophy professor. In response, it is necessary to note the distinction between usual and monumental projects. By ‘usual’ I mean to designate the most common projects in life, such as the projects of doing the grocery shopping, going on a vacation, drinking a cup of coffee etc. Such projects, despite what ordinary language would have us believe, aim at the realisation of states of affairs that do not contain acts as constituents, e.g. I do not aim at the realisation of the end of performing the act of doing the grocery shopping, but of the state of affairs of having enough food, say. ‘Monumental’ may be taken to designate life’s most important projects, ‘the big choices’, and the project of being a philosophy professor, and arguably all vocational choices, would certainly belong to this category. Even if it is granted that monumental projects involve the projection of states of affairs that contain acts as constituents, it still seems to be the case that the usual projects to do not. Is it true, however, that monumental projects involve the projection of acts? It is difficult to deny that some do. This is the case, for example, with the person who places a high value on the recognition, status and prestige that society, or their family, attributes to the role of being a philosophy professor or, more realistically perhaps, a lawyer. Such a person may very well project being a philosophy professor for its own sake. It is not at all evident, however, that all monumental, or vocational, projects are of this kind. It is also possible that, in choosing oneself as a philosophy professor, one aims at the realisation of states of affairs such as possessing knowledge regarding the deepest and most important things or perhaps the state of affairs in which the student’s minds are philosophically formed. What is projected here are states of affairs that do not have the act as a constituent. Given the possibility of both types of monumental projects, it is not obvious what the usual monumental projects involve. But the point stands, I think, that the usual projects involve the projection of states of affairs that do not contain acts as constituents. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
The classical study is Husserl (1991).
It is the presence of this to-be-realised experience that distinguishes the project from a mere wish. See: (Scheler 1973 p. 40).
For further descriptions, see: (Scheler 1973 p.30–38.)
Of course, it is possible that a project turn back towards consciousness, as when I project the end of thinking about a certain problem. The point is that this is not necessary.
Photograph by: Ronald C. James.
The example where the project modifies a purely factual situation was employed for the sake of illustration. I am not claiming that this is necessary or even common. It is also possible, for example, that a project arises on the ground of, and modifies, a prior practical stratum.
A more detailed analysis of these steps can be found in Scheler (1973 p. 121–159).
This section can be read as a complement to Heidegger’s (1967 §16) discussion of ‘conspicuousness’, ‘obtrusiveness’ and ‘obstinacy’, for the will can also be described as a phenomenon that makes something conspicuous. However, this is not to say that, in other aspects, the will does not differ radically from the phenomenon discussed by Heidegger.
For a phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of incompatibility, see: (Husserl 1970 Investigation VI, p.253–254)
For a detailed analysis of this neutralizing Intention, see: (Husserl 2014 p.213–216)
To say that the will is necessarily reflective is not to say that it cannot appear pre-reflectively. In fact, the will originality appears pre-reflectively, for in living through an act of willing the thematic regard is not turned to the willing itself, which includes the reflective act that constitutes it, but to the objective correlate: the volitional object.
Passivity of ends exhibits a depth. There is a law of essence here: the deeper the end, i.e. the more fundamental the project, the more passive it is. This calls for further phenomenological explorations.
Compare this to Heidegger’s (1967 p.104–105) description of how the totality of equipment is highlighted only when the ready-to-hand becomes conspicuous, obtrusive or obstinate.
Sartre (2003 p.459) appears to be aware of this difference when he states that “…this does not mean that [the cause] is to be thematically conceived and made explicit as in the case of deliberation”, which implies that it can be apprehended non-thematically.
I leave the question open of whether the deliberative phase of the will must be followed by a decision.
For a classical study of affectivity see: (Husserl 2001)
I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. Let me also add that the referee’s engagement with the descriptions, and his or her insightful comments and suggestions on how they may be furthered, reinforce my belief that phenomenology is alive and well, and that true cooperative research is not only possible, but necessary.
The two possibilities, that the willing leaves behind the affective allure and that it leaves the character of being the most or best conductive-to-the-end on the project-in-action, are not mutually exclusive.
References
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Acknowledgments
For both her unwavering support in my periods of intense self-doubt and her invaluable comments on earlier version of this manuscript, I am deeply grateful to Yuko Ishihara.
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Copelj, E. On projecting and willing: a contribution to the phenomenology of intentions. Phenom Cogn Sci 15, 385–401 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9419-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9419-x