In the past three decades a number of narrative self-concepts have appeared in the philosophical literature. A central question posed in recent literature concerns the embodiment of the narrative self. Though one of the best-known narrative self-concepts is a non-embodied one, namely Dennett’s self as ‘a center of narrative gravity’, others argue that the narrative self should include a role for embodiment. Several arguments have been made in support of the latter claim, but these can be summarized in two main points. Firstly, a logical one: without taking the body into account Dennett’s theory becomes self-refuting. Secondly, a more practical/phenomenological point: a disembodied self-concept overlooks how personal the body is, and as such should be considered part of the self. In this paper I endorse these criticisms of non-embodied narrative self-concepts, but I argue that the relationship between the narrative self and the body is far from sufficiently fleshed out. I claim that the narrative self and the body are much more interwoven than the above criticisms suggest. What I aim to show in this paper is that the relationship between the body and the narrative self is interactive rather than unidirectional: not only does our body shape our narrative self, but our narrative self also shapes our body. The upshot of this is a better conception of the self is as a dynamic interaction between its various aspects.
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As for the fictional status of the self, Dennett claims that whether the narrative from a narrative self refers to factual situations does not change this status. After all, this status is based on the false suggestion that the narrative creates an existence of the self outside of this narrative (Dennett 1992, 107–108).
This point has been made, for instance, by Zahavi (2007) and Mackenzie (2008), and also by Velleman (2006), who claims that the idea of a self coming into existence through its self-constituting power is a paradox. However, Velleman believes that Dennett is the one philosopher who escapes this paradox of self-constitution by embracing it. We do invent ourselves, and thus create an illusion of an autonomous self (2006, 203–206).
Critiques that refer to the need of embodiment and/or alternative embodied narrative self-concepts come, for instance, from Kim Atkins (2008), Catriona Mackenzie (2008, 2009), and Richard Menary (2008). There are, however, exceptions to this claim of necessary embodiment. Lynne Rudder Baker, for instance, is one of the defenders of the need for an embodied, first-person self-experience that forms the basis for any narrative self; however, she wants to allow for the possibility of persons without human bodies (Baker 2000; in Atkins & Mackenzie 2008). Also Ricoeur, whose view of the narrative self is initially closely connected with the phenomenological embodied experience, eventually argues for a self-notion (self as a pure identity pole) that is neither embodied nor contextualized (Ricoeur 1992).
As Thornton conclude, the alternative would be to take the Lichtenbergian attempt to claim “It is thinking” seriously, ‘[b] ut as the history of solipsism suggests, given this starting point, there is no hope of a recovery of other subjects of experience (cf. Strawson 1959). Either way, a reductionist approach looks doomed.’ (2003, 363.)
According to Zahavi this distinction can also make more sense of what we consider to be selves in (our) daily life lives, for it is not the case that we consider an individual as a self only once a narrative is in place. For instance, very young children are not able to articulate their experiences, yet we would not deny them a self. This point is also made by Menary (2008, 66).
I understand Zahavi’s experiential dimension of the self to be intrinsically connected to our embodiment, not only because he explicitly distances his position from any Cartesian notion of an inner mental entity, but also because of the explication of his position in The phenomenological mind (2005), co-written with Shaun Gallagher. Cf., p.8; p.27; p.33: ‘…the starting point, on the phenomenological side, is with embodied, in-the-world experience, rather than with an intellectualized version of experience.’
A social-cultural dimension plays an equally constitutive role in the development of our self, but I can’t pursue that perspective within the scope of this paper.
This typifying of the self as an epiphenomenon seems to be inconsistent with Dennett’s claim that the narrative self plays an important role as a cognitive model for our biological survival, since the latter seems to logically imply that the narrative self does something for our course of actions (1991, 427–428).
This term, in turn, invites misunderstandings of its own. Most importantly, the term understanding; this may give rise to an exclusively cognitive reading. I hope to undermine some of these inappropriate connotations in the explanation that follows.
I do not cling to the term “narrative”; perhaps this kind of self-understanding can also be termed, e.g., “diachronically meaningful self-understanding” - but I do not consider that term an improvement. However, I do cling to what I aspire to capture with the term as set out in the defining characteristics. Critics have argued that, when stripped of its unrealistic interpretations (such as the idea that one could or should live one’s life as a well-structured novel), the concept of “narrative” turns out to be otiose. Critics such as Christman (2004; 2009) and Fisher (2010) suggest that, instead of the narrativity concept, we should use a more basic concept that captures our ability to interpret situations and our self in a meaningful way, such as “narratibility” (Fisher, 255) or “capacity for self-interpretation mediated by socially embedded rules of meaning” (Christman 2009, 83). However, I believe that the four characteristics that I present above make for a different and more specific notion than a more general “capacity for reflection” (Christman 2009, 78), which we also happen to use for interpreting ourselves. If all this can be more adequately captured with a different term, I would rather use that; until then, I will employ the term “narrative”.
Embedded in an intersubjective self-concept, narrative self-understanding always implies a relationship with the social world, which is why a narrative self-understanding also always involves some take on the world, thus forming an integral part of what can be referred to as one’s Weltanschaaung.
This is of course not to suggest that people with low esteem are always looking downwards, or that people with high esteem always dominantly take up space. The point is that these self-images result in bodily traits, of which these are possible outcomes.
For psychotherapeutic purposes, a subset of schemas is distinguished as “early maladaptive schemas”, which are persistent and dysfunctional to a significant degree. When maladaptive, schemas are self-defeating emotional and cognitive patterns that begin in early development and repeat throughout life (2003, 7).
Interestingly, Velleman also claims that our narrative self-identity (which he explains as a drive toward self-understanding) stems from a drive towards self-consistency. Velleman also argues that this drive toward self-consistency leads us to bring our actions into line with our self-description, thus the self-narrative is not only an output, but also a source of action. However, Velleman’s account of the self does not become truly embodied; rather it remains very cognitive and is actually in some respects close to Dennett’s. (Velleman 2006. For a critical discussion, see Mackenzie 2007).
The purported view of social cognition does not necessarily include the denial of an inner life; the point is, rather, that the mind is entangled with our embodiment and that for a sufficiently perceptive observer, someone’s attitude or emotions are visible in these bodily aspects.
Gallagher and Zahavi have also discussed narrativity as an addition to a more basic understanding of others. However, in this context they do not characterize narrative as part of one’s self-understanding, as I do, from which follows a richer understanding of other people, but rather interpret it as a tool that helps us grasp the context in which we understand others (2008, p. 194).
Cf. Fisher (2007); Christman (2004).
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Brandon, P. Body and self: an entangled narrative. Phenom Cogn Sci 15, 67–83 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9369-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9369-8