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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 6, Issue 4, pp 527–546 | Cite as

Enactive appraisal

  • Giovanna Colombetti
Article

Abstract

Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.” I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective notion of personhood.

Keywords

Emotion Appraisal Embodiment Enaction Personhood 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by a Postdoctoral Fellowship in the form of funds from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada through a Canada Research Chair in “Cognitive Science and the Embodied Mind” to Evan Thompson. I am indebted to Evan Thompson and to an anonymous referee for their charitable and helpful comments to earlier drafts of this paper. Many thanks also to Steve Torrance for his suggestions and editorial assistance.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Sociology & PhilosophyUniversity of ExeterExeterUK

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