Abstract
This paper will investigate the phenomenology of shame with referring to Max Scheler’s description of the phenomenon and to the tradition of Confucianism. Section I explores the conflict between spirit, life and pleasure in the experience of shame. Shame implies a hierarchy of value, and it is felt when there is a conflict among different values and when the agent intends to sacrifice a higher value for a lower one. Shame also takes place when one is treated by others as a mere object or merely as a sensuous being rather than a spiritual being possessing personal dignity. Section II clarifies the problem of destructive shame and humiliation. While genuine shame is indispensable for a person as such, wrongly felt shame is destructive to the cultivation of virtue. Differences between shame and humiliation and how one should treat humiliation will also be reexamined.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Mencius (2008), with modification. Without otherwise indicated, translations of Mencius are from this work.
Scheler (1987, p. 5).
There are differences between men and women in experiencing shame. According to Scheler, women basically displays life’s resistance to sensible pleasure, whereas the dualistic opposition between spirit and life usually can be found in men. Therefore he calls women “genius of life”, manifesting bodily shame; and men “genius of spirit,” manifesting psychic shame. See Scheler (1987, p. 85).
See Scheler (1987, pp. 15–16). There may be some cultural differences between German and Chinese regarding this case. In China, a female is usually served by a female, not a male. A female would feel shame if served by a male. This is probably because a Chinese woman tends to reject taking herself as a member of a general group in these particular circumstances.
Fingarette (1972, p. 30).
Cua (2003, p. 159).
This is my own distinction. However, I think that Scheler would agree with me, since he maintains that shame is not merely a social issue, and it has a priori ground.
Deonna and Teroni (2011, p. 201).
Dover (1974, pp. 226–228).
Sartre (2003, p. 301).
Ibid., p. 246.
Aristotle (2001, p. 1393).
Van Norden (2002, p. 69).
Scheler (1973, p. 109). Scheler clarifies several essential types of values in an objective hierarchy, but his classification seems inconsistent. The second ranking of values from the lower to the higher appears as follows: pleasure, life, spirit and holiness (104–110). The third ranking is the following: utility, pleasure, life, spirit and holiness (94).
Steinbock (2014, p. 69).
Van Norden (2002, pp. 60–61).
Ibid., p. 61.
Scheler’s idea is not identical to asceticism. Higher values do not necessarily conflict with lower values. When there is no value-conflict, it is given to one’s freedom to choose which values to fulfill. However, if there is a value-conflict, in which acquiring lower values hinders one’s higher pursuit, one should follow the objective, a prior value hierarchy and sacrifice a lower value for the actualization of a higher one. For instance, one should not harm one’s life for the sake of enjoying sensuous pleasure, and not get benefits from performing unrighteous deeds. This issue is also discussed in my article “Ressentiment and the Obscuration of Pure knowing (Liang Zhi): Max Scheler and Wang Yangming on the Disorder of the Heart,” forthcoming.
See Scheler (1987, p. 54).
Zahavi (2014, p. 223).
Ibid., p. 231.
Of cause, people could claim that one should pay attention to others’ feelings and judgments, but oughtness does not deny the possibility of feeling ashamed alone.
In the last part of his chapter on shame, Zahavi uses the example of autism to show that one cannot have a normal sense of shame if one is not able to interact with others. However, the phenomena that an immature mind cannot feel apparent shame (superficial shame), may not be able to dispute the possibility that a mature one can feel original shame (deep shame). Shame’s expression in immature minds cannot define its essential feature, which are manifested in one’s mature mind.
Zahavi argues that for shame to happen, there has to be a “distanced-self” if there is no apparent others. He writes, “In some cases, the alienating power is a different subject, and Sartre’s description of our pre-reflective feeling of shame when confronted with the evaluating gaze of the other is an example of this. In other cases, the feeling of shame occurs when we sit in judgement on ourselves. But in this case as well, there is a form of exposure and self-alienation, a kind of self-observation and self-distancing.” See Zahavi (2014, pp. 238–239).
See also Zhang (2007, pp. 124–125).
According to Scheler, the first accomplishment of the feeling of sexual shame is the following, “The role of shame of the body vis-à-vis changing sensations and drive impulses is firstly that this shame turns attention away from them and thus curbs their expression.” (45); the second is that “it consists in the curbing effects that keep the person from yielding to wellings of the sexual drive or drive of procreation without a prior resolute love and wellings of love.” (62); “The tertiary function of sexual shame is its accomplishments during sexual intercourse both after a sexual drive was present (primary function) and after a choice for a spouse has been made in love (secondary function).” (71–72).
Steinbock (2014, pp. 78–83).
Confucius (2003), with modification. Without otherwise indicated, translations of Analects are from this work. There are various meanings of 士shi. Generally, I translate shi 士 as “noble” and junzi 君子 as “noble person.” As a social class, 士 means intellectuals, or scholar-officials, which is 士大夫 shi da fu. However, in many cases, 士 also indicates what is noble in the sense of social status (originally), or morals. Zigong and Zilu, for instance asked how to become a shi, see Analects 13.20 and 13.28.
Translation from Van Norden (2002, p. 65), with modification.
Cua (2003, p. 166).
A priori emotion does not mean that it has no object. Certain emotions are fundamentally directed to (potential and actual) others, yet activities of moral emotions are essentially unceasing performances of human heart rather than merely happening in social intercourse. According to Scheler’s clarification, The a prior is not prior to experience as in Kant, but within experience and immediately manifests its essence. See Scheler (1973, p. 48).
This passage also gives an evidence to prove that Mencius’ ethics is not based upon happiness, and his idea of moral feeling is distinct from Hume’s empiricist approach.
Xun Zi (1988, p. 189).
Zhu (1983, p. 29).
Steinbock (2014, p. 249).
Ibid., p. 370.
Li (理) is an important Neo-Confucian philosophy concept, which denotes the basic cosmic structure and moral pattern. Different Confucian philosopher give it different meaning. Dai Zhen holds that this concept enables the people in power oppress the powerless people. If powerful people violate li, no person dare to question them; even if the powerless people obeys li, powerful people still could punish them for their trivial immoral behaviors. For Dai Zhen’s criticism of li, See Dai (1982, p. 10).
Berlin (1969, pp. 124–126, 163–166).
When asked by a student whether a widow should remarry, given that without remarrying she would starve to death, Cheng Yi says, “Starving to death is a small issue, whereas losing one’s integrity is a serious issue.” In Cehng, Hao and Cheng, Yi (1981, p. 301). For the debates on this statement, see Liu (2000, pp. 125–133) and Zhu (2003).
Although apparently this story tells that a wife and a concubine feel ashamed for their husband’s begging at graveyards, I follow Zhu Xi’s interpretation that it implies the phenomena that one secretly seeks high position by flattering powerful people and performing unrighteous deeds, but publicly shows pride to others.
See Lu (2018, pp. 5–18).
References
Aristotle. 2001. The basic works of Aristotle, ed., Richard Mcjeon, Intro. C. D. C. Reeve. New York: Modern Library.
Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Two concepts of liberty. In Four essays on liberty. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Cehng, Hao and Cheng, Yi 程頤,程顥. 1981. The Collected works of two Chengs 二程集, ed., Wang Xiaoyu 王孝魚. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
Confucius 孔子. 2003. Confucius Analects: with selections from traditional commentaries, trans. Edward Slingerland, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
Cua, Antonio S. 2003. The ethical significance of shame: Insights of Aristotle and Xunzi. Philosophy East and West 53 (2): 147–202.
Dai, Zhen. 1982. Commentary on the meaning of terms in the book of Mencius 孟子字義疏證, ed., He Wenguang 何文光. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
Deonna, Julien, and Fabrice Teroni. 2011. Is Shame a Social Emotion? In Self-evulation: Affective and social grounds of intentionality, ed. A. Konzelman-Ziv, K. Lehrer, and H.B. Schmid, 193–212. Dordrecht: Springer.
Dover, K.J. 1974. Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fingarette, Herbert. 1972. Confucius: The secular as sacred. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
Gong, Kangyun 龔抗雲(ed.). 2000. True Meaning of the Classic of Rites 禮記正義 (four volumes). Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe 北京大學出版社.
Legge, James (trans.). 1967. Li Chi: Book of rites (2 vols.). New York: University Books, 1967. (Translation of the Record of Ritual, originally published in 1885.).
Liu, Changyuan 劉昌元. 2000. “Lun dui ‘E'si Shixiao, Shijie Shida’ de Piping yu Bianhu 論對「餓死事小,失節事大」的批評與辯護.” Twenty-First Century 二十一世紀 no. 6: 125–133.
Lu, Yinghua. 2018. Shame and the Confucian notion of Yi (Righteousness). International Philosophical Quarterly 58 (1): 5–18.
Mencius 孟子. 2008. Mengzi: With selections from traditional commentaries, trans., Bryan. W. Van Norden. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 2003. Being and nothingness: An essay in phenomenological ontology, trans. H. E. Barnes. London: Routledge.
Scheler, Max. 1973. Formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics and values: A new attempt toward the foundation of an ethical personalism, trans., Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Scheler, Max. 1987. Person and self-value: Three essays, ed., Manfred S. Frings. Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff.
Steinbock, Anthony. 2014. Moral emotions: Reclaiming the evidence of the heart. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Van Norden, Bryan W. 2002. The emotion of shame and the virtue of righteousness in Mencius. Journal of Comparative Philosophy 2 (1): 45–77.
Xun Zi 荀子. 1988. Xunzi: A translation and study of the complete works. (3 vol.), trans., John Knoblock. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Zahavi, Dan. 2014. Self and other: Exploring subjectivity, empathy and shame. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zhang, Renzhi 张任之. 2007. “Scheler’s Phenomenology of Shame 舍勒的羞感現象學.” Journal of Nanjing University no. 3: 120-126.
Zhu, Xi 朱熹. 1983. Collective Commentaries on Four Books 四書章句集注. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.
Zhu, Xiaojuan 朱曉娟. 2003. “Chengzhu Xuepai yu Songdai Zhenjieguan zhi Yanjiu 程朱學派與宋代婦女貞節觀之硏究.” Master’s thesis, National Chengchi University 國立政治大學.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China under Grant 16CZX034.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lu, Y. The phenomenology of shame: a clarification in light of max Scheler and Confucianism. Cont Philos Rev 51, 507–525 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-018-9442-z
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-018-9442-z