Abstract
There are different formulations of the doctrine of double effect (DDE), and sometimes philosophers propose “revisions” or alternatives, like the means principle, for instance. To demonstrate that such principles are needed in the first place, one would have to compare cases in which all else is equal and show that the difference in intuitions, if any, can only be explained by the one remaining difference and thus by the principle in question. This is not the methodology defenders of the DDE and of related principles use, however. I will discuss how they actually proceed, focusing on their preferred four pairs of examples. While these examples might have rhetorical force, they are nevertheless philosophically and methodologically useless (since they do not keep all else equal). As a corrective, I shall offer examples that do keep all else equal. These examples undermine the DDE and related principles. I then argue that while the Loop case and the “closeness” problem in the context of Jonathan Bennett’s Sophisticated Bomber example might once have been an embarrassment of sorts for defenders of the DDE, meanwhile their discussion serves as a convenient distraction from the many clear examples disproving the DDE and related principles. I conclude that there is simply no sufficient intuitive support for the DDE or related principles. Instead of looking for their “rationales,” they should be abandoned.
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Notes
It seems that Aquinas, who is often credited as the “inventor” of the principle, did not consider the infliction of proportionate punitive harm on wrongdoers to be evil. We can avoid such complications by focusing, as modern discussions of the DDE mostly do, on harming the innocent.
The first condition actually seems odd: if the act is “good in itself,” what else is there to say? It would therefore make more sense to formulate the condition negatively: the act is not supposed to be bad in itself. If, however, it is not possible for acts to be bad in themselves, then the condition will always be satisfied. In the following I will have nothing to say on this condition.
Even that might sometimes not even be pro tanto wrong. See Guerrero (2016).
Bruers (2016: 417) lists these notions in support of the means principle.
The formulation of these examples is taken from Nelkin and Rickless (2016: 378). These examples, in slightly different formulations, pervade the entire pro-DDE literature.
Nelkin and Rickless (2016: 378) claim: “Not unreasonably, proponents of DDE see this pair of cases as evidence that the moral distinction between terror bombing and strategic bombing hinges on the distinction between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm …” Given that things are unequal in the two examples, however, it is entirely unreasonable. Compare also Draper (2016: 140), who rightly deems the approach taken by defenders of the DDE “methodologically suspect,” and points out: “[I]f we consider cases of terror bombing and tactical bombing that are very similar to each other, I doubt that most of us do have Quinn’s intuition that the tactical bombing would be ‘much easier to justify.’” Or as a psychologist complaining about confounding factors in the typical hypotheticals employed by defenders of the DDE puts it: “[P]hilosophers may endorse the DDE at least in part because they misattribute strong intuitions to the DDE that are in part driven by other factors.” Cushman (2016: 774). Cushman’s empirical findings might also find theoretical support in the “precautionary principle” of Guerrero (2016).
I have come across the objection that it is allegedly not obvious that the inflammatory terms influence the judgments of philosophers who spend a long time considering the cases before settling on a view that is intuitively acceptable. However, my point is that given that it is obvious that there is at the very least a risk of such an influence and given that this influence could easily be avoided by using a neutral terminology, choosing a non-neutral one anyway is an expression of bias and clearly methodologically inept. Moreover, these examples are presented not only to philosophers but also to a wider audience, including undergraduate classes. The same anonymous reviewer to whom I dedicate the next paragraph in the main text states, however, that he or she “does not know of any moral philosopher who provides potentially biasing labels to students when presenting pairs of cases designed to elicit unbiased intuitions.” Given that countless undergraduate courses (this is easy to google) that deal with the DDE routinely have Quinn (1989) on their reading lists, an article that of course prominently features the terminologically biased “Strategic Bomber/Terror Bomber” comparison (as do other articles that are popular in such reading lists), and given that quite a few of the teachers of such courses defend the doctrine by relying on precisely such examples, it is not really difficult to do the math.
This objection was raised by an anonymous reviewer. All quotes in this paragraph stem from this objection.
See also note 8.
I said “almost as inadequate” three paragraphs ago because there is an additional difference in the first set of examples, namely the difference of color. However, removing this difference definitely does not keep all else equal in the second set of examples.
An anonymous reviewer objects that this difference is “irrelevant” because, allegedly, intuitions will not change if we “suppose that the Terror Bomber also intends to destroy the enemy munitions factory on which the bombs are dropped.” First, the reviewer misses the point of the present discussion: the point is that it is a difference and that it is methodologically inept to proceed by announcing its “irrelevance” and keeping it instead by simply getting rid of it, thus equalizing the examples. Moreover, the reviewer declares the “irrelevance” of the distinction by now introducing an entirely new difference and thereby displaying the very methodological ineptitude I am criticizing: the “Terror Bomber” now wants to destroy both targets, the Strategic Bomber only one (I assume, for if he also wants to destroy both targets, then we have just one kind of bomber, not two). So how does the reviewer know that it is not this new difference that plays the decisive role? Clearly, the only methodologically adequate course is to keep all else equal.
It is correct that in the original Strategic Bomber/Terror Bomber examples not even the “terror bomber” targets the civilians. But again, this is beside the point. The point is that there is still said difference between them: one bomber targets what he wants to destroy, the other not. The only way to exclude this difference without introducing a new one is by having both bombers target some neutral third target (see below for a relevant example).
I am not sure what a corollary principle is. Either the principle is implied by the DDE, then it is a part of it and cannot explain anything the DDE cannot also explain; or it is not, then it is a different principle, and thus additional. I will therefore put the talk about corollaries aside.
The reviewer in question actually admits that but then claims that “[t]he question … is whether this is a difference that makes a difference.” Actually, that is not the question we need to ask if we want to find out whether the DDE finds intuitive support. Then the question is rather why we should risk distorting factors in the first place given that we can easily avoid them. Avoiding them would clearly be the methodologically appropriate course to take. Moreover, the reviewer claims that one could “equalize” the cases by either supposing that the Tactical Bomber bombs the munitions factory knowing (but not intending) that the resulting fallout will also terrorize the enemy population into giving up the war effort or by supposing that the terror bomber does not want to terrorize but merely to “demoralize.” Yet, by simply replacing one unequal factor (“terror) with another one (“demoralization), one has certainly not achieved any equalization. Nor by having the tactical bomber foresee the terror stemming from destroying the factory. Such terror hardly equals the terror stemming from killing civilians.
For a fascinating discussion of what happens if one attributes to the “terror bomber” and to the “tactical bomber” the same causal beliefs and a demonstration that this does not end well for the DDE, see Di Nucci (2014: 163–166). I consider Di Nucci’s book to be a definite refutation of the DDE. It is therefore not surprising that recent defenses of the DDE entirely ignore it—apart from a hostile note (Gordon-Solmon 2016) that dismisses the book without argument.
Di Nucci (2014: 164–166) makes a similar point, though not in terms of ends in themselves.
If that is the reason—whether consciously or not—for the loyalty toward the irrelevant examples, then the affected authors have crossed over from the pursuit of truth about the DDE to pro-DDE propaganda.
However, while Liao complains about “confounding factors” introduced by “the context of war” when discussing a certain war-related counter-example to the claim that a permissible act can be made impermissible on grounds of intention alone, he does not mention these very same confounding factors at the beginning of the same article when offering the Terror Bomber/Tactical Bomber example in support of said claim (Liao 2012: 704–705). Moreover, while he removes the “institutional role factor” in a pair of revised bombing examples subtly labeled Neutral and Thug, he adds entirely new confounding factors in Thug (which therefore is two times longer than Neutral): namely bad character (the bomber is a thug), bad emotions (hatred of children), and bad attitudes (he does not care about winning the just war or about hiding his hatred)—and then Liao informs the nonplussed reader that the moral “key difference” between these two cases surely must be intention (Liao 2012: 719–720).
While Cushman (2016: 763) says that the influence of the intended/foreseen distinction is “Lilliputian,” he acknowledges its existence “even after the relevant confounds are eliminated” (Cushman 2016: 766), but states that it might be due to the psychological effect of “a mere statistical co-occurrence” with other factors normally present (Cushman 2016: 768), which suggests that the effect is not only Lilliputian but due to distortion. That is bad enough for the DDE, of course. However, it should also be noted that the cases used by Cushman and his colleagues do not involve such drastic uses of force as bombing or vaporization. My guess—confirmed by Di Nuccis (2014: 177–187) study—is that in such cases the effect of the distinction is not only Lilliputian but non-existent (I am, of course, open to empirical evidence to the contrary). Finally, it is worth mentioning that “[a]part from the influences of confounding factors … current models of the psychological basis of the DDE raise even more fundamental concerns about its normative status” (Cushman 2016: 774). These additional concerns are beyond the scope of this paper.
Liao (2016: 850) simply talks of “people’s judgment that Terror Bomber is a case of impermissible action while Tactical Bomber is a case of permissible action.” What people are that? All people?
Draper (2016: 141) also laments the lack of evidence in support of such claims. However, I have, remarkably enough, encountered the curious suggestion that a more “charitable” reading of the usual “most people” claim of defenders of the DDE is that they are not really meant as empirical claims. Yet, first, I do not think that it is charitable to assume that analytical philosophers, who usually praise clarity, are unable to express themselves clearly. Secondly, they do explicitly make the claims I just quoted, and it is only fair to point out that these claims are unsupported by any evidence. Third, in personal conversations I found no indication whatsoever that they do not mean them as empirical claims. Fourth, if defenders of the DDE nevertheless secretly do not “mean” them as empirical claims, although semantically that is exactly what they are, then they are misleading their readers. That is understandable, however regrettable, since admitting that their intuitions are not “widely shared” will not inspire confidence in the DDE.
Incidentally, McMahan (2009b: 346) seems to think that opponents of the DDE must deny the “relevance of intention to permissibility.” It depends what this means, though. Opponents of the DDE deny that there is a morally relevant distinction between intended harming and foreseen harming, but of course they need not deny (some do, I don’t) that there is a morally relevant distinction between intended harming and accidental or even unwitting harming. Moreover, McMahan (2009a: 43) distinguishes between “objective justification” and “subjective justification.” Intention cannot be relevant for objective justification, since objective justification is “independent of the agent’s beliefs” (ibid.)—intention, however, obviously is not.
This objection was raised by an anonymous reviewer. All quotes in this and the next paragraph refer to this reviewer’s comments.
The critic also thinks that it is a shortcoming of the case that only one person is involved. Really? Would adding a few further hermits and spiders elicit different intuitions about the two cases? I invite readers to test this for themselves.
I take the formulation from Nelkin and Rickless (2016: 380).
As sometimes even defenders of the DDE realize. See Liao (2012: 717–721).
Again I take the formulation from Nelkin and Rickless (2016: 379).
I have encountered the claim that there is a crucial difference: in Guinea Pig the doctor’s intentions would allegedly be thwarted if somebody else (like Doctors without Borders) arrived to treat the stubborn cases. However, both cases work against the background of scarce resources (and this background conditions the intentions as well), and accordingly nothing in Guinea Pig implies that the original doctors would keep the newly arriving doctor from treating the stubborn cases if she used her own resources—after all, then the original scarcity is at least mitigated. (Of course, you can just stipulate that they would, but then you have changed the example.) They might, however, (although not even that is implied by the wording of the example) keep her from using the original doctors’ resources. But so might the doctors in Direction of Resources. There simply is no difference in this respect.
This pair of examples—just like Foreseen Homicide/Intended Homicide—also undermines Ramakrishnan’s (2016: 134) principle “Utility.” Ramakrishnan himself does not compare pairs of examples at all to motivate “Utility.” He just affirms that it is “plausible” (ibid., 156.) He alludes, however, to “compelling case-based intuitions” (ibid.). It is probably fair to assume that he has exactly the kind of cases in mind that are the object of the present critique.
Again I take the formulation from Nelkin and Rickless (2016: 379).
The two elements of touching and applying kinetic energy combine to constitute “personal force.” Empirical studies “indicate that harmful actions involving personal force are judged to be less morally acceptable” Green (2016: 183). Some versions of the examples remove the two mentioned elements—that still leaves the other two confounding factors. Moreover, having the large man stand, for example, on a trap door adds the additional factor of “pulling the rug from under somebody’s feet.”
According to Quong (2009: esp. 530, 532–533), treating a person as a means comprises using (against his consent) his property or anything he has a right to. Thus, he might say that there is still a relevant difference between Trolley and Trolley II: by extending his movement into the large man’s space, the bystander uses him as a means. However, if the man on the side track in Trolley I stood exactly at the beginning of the new track, diverting the trolley would also only be possible by infringing his space. If one says that the tracks he is standing on are not his property, we can also have the fat man stand on the tracks. Do these variations make any difference to the justifiability of the respective actions? It does not seem so. For critiques of Quong’s account, see Ferzan (2011), Hanna (2012), Ross (2015), Steinhoff (2016), Draper (2016: 132–134).
There can be further complications, which need not interest us for the moment. But see Kamm (2008: ch. 5). Another principle one could consider is Walen’s (2014) “Restricting Claims Principle.” Øverland (2014) has developed a similar account. A powerful but succinct (two pages) criticism of Walen’s original “Restricting Claims Principle” has been offered by Draper (2016: 136–137). Walen (2016) has recently reformulated his “RCP.” I find the new version somewhat obscure and do not want to speculate what it implies for the Ray Gun options. For further criticism of both Walen’s and Øverland’s accounts, see Steinhoff (2018b).
Note that the vaporization of the Apache is not, unlike the shifting of the trolley in Trolley, the “noncausal flip side” of the five being saved. The saving of the five is not “constituted” by the vaporization of the Apache; it is constituted by the computer’s stopping the train. See on these concepts Kamm (2008: 141).
Of course, if he had not been there another one could have been vaporized, but that hardly means that the one who has actually been vaporized has therefore not been used or opportunistically killed.
More precisely, a Cherokee’s vaporization would be intended, not necessarily the vaporization of this one.
For an ingenious argument that all these different distinctions and principles cannot be important enough to outweigh the value of an additional saved (or spared) life, see Nye (2014). Nye’s article, like Di Nucci (2014) book, is another definite refutation of the DDE and related principles. Not surprisingly, recent defenses of the DDE or of related principles do not mention it.
See for instance Otsuka (2008), Liao et al. (2012), McMahan (2009b: 358–359). McMahan insists on his own intuitions, Otsuka (2008: 119) somewhat dramatically invites “moral philosophers to reject, as a moral illusion, the intuition that it is permissible to divert in looping cases,” Liao et al. basically claim that the unwanted intuitions are produced by distorting order effects.
Kaufman (2016: 22) actually thinks that “our uncertain intuitions in the Loop case in fact match up very well with the Double Effect principle.” While I would agree that Loop is not as detrimental to the DDE as some have thought, it is quite a stretch to claim that it matches up with it.
I actually think that “the only account of intentions which [Bennett] can make sense of” (Bennett 1981: 114) and on which he relies elsewhere does not imply the absurd conclusion at all, but this is something I need not go into here. See, however, Steinhoff (2018a).
Quinn uses the term “strictly intended” several times.
Revising the DDE seems meanwhile to be a philosophical discipline in its own right. There are several articles that announce the revision of the doctrine in their very titles, and many other articles and books offer one revision or the other in the course of their discussion.
For doubts, see Fischer et al. (1993), Liao (2016: 853–858), McMahan (1994). McMahan offers a revision of the revision, which then is criticized by Mapel (2001). For a defense of Quinn, see Smith (2007). Nelkin and Rickless (2014) support Quinn, but in the end also offer a variation. Sarch (2017: 461–462) doubts that this variation works.
If someone claims that “most people” would see a difference here, I would very much like to see empirical evidence for this astounding claim, especially given that the empirical evidence we have on the original Tactical Bomber/Terror Bomber suggests otherwise, as we saw.
So, for that matter, are the “rationales” they offer, or so I argue in a sister article to the present one, see Steinhoff (2018b).
As shown by the empirical evidence offered by Cushman (2016); Di Nucci (2014: 177–187); and Green (2016). Note that I have heard the—methodologically confused—objection that I have not done empirical testing of my own examples. Obviously, it need only be the case that there are some methodologically adequate empirical studies that undermine the claim about the “intuitiveness” of the DDE while there are no methodologically adequate empirical studies that support it to substantiate the claim I just made—and it is true. So the burden of proof is flatly on the other side now. But if DDE defenders want to empirically test my examples: be my guest. I am pretty sure, however, that they will avoid doing so at all costs.
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Acknowledgements
The research presented in this paper was supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. HKU 17612817). I am very grateful for this support.
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Steinhoff, U. The Secret to the Success of the Doctrine of Double Effect (and Related Principles): Biased Framing, Inadequate Methodology, and Clever Distractions. J Ethics 22, 235–263 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-018-9272-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-018-9272-6