The Journal of Ethics

, Volume 16, Issue 2, pp 117–143 | Cite as

Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals

  • John Martin Fischer


In this paper I give an overview of my “framework for moral responsibility,” and I offer some reasons that commend it. I contrast my approach with indeterministic models of moral responsibility and also other compatibilist strategies, including those of Harry Frankfurt and Gary Watson.


Asymmetric theories of moral responsibility Harry Frankfurt Guidance control Hierarchical accounts of acting freely Identification Ownership Reasons-responsiveness Regulative control Semicompatibilism Gary Watson Weakness of the will 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California, RiversideRiversideUSA

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