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Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals

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Abstract

In this paper I give an overview of my “framework for moral responsibility,” and I offer some reasons that commend it. I contrast my approach with indeterministic models of moral responsibility and also other compatibilist strategies, including those of Harry Frankfurt and Gary Watson.

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Notes

  1. See Fischer (1994); and Fischer and Ravizza (1998). Also, see: Fischer et al. (2007); and Fischer (2006b); and Fischer (2008b).

  2. Section 1 (“A Framework for Moral Responsibility”) is a lightly revised version of pages 3–14 of “Deep Control: The Middle Way,” the introductory essay to Fischer (2012).

  3. In sketching the “resiliency desideratum” in this essay, I have simply tried to lay out my view. This is perhaps not the appropriate venue to address difficulties and objections—of which there are (lamentably) many.

  4. Strawson (1962).

  5. I take these cases from Fischer (2006b, pp. 39ff).

  6. For discussions of the relationship between God’s omniscience and human freedom, see: Fischer, Editor (1989, 1994, pp. 111–130).

  7. Frankfurt (1969).

  8. For such an example, see Fischer (1982).

  9. Although the details of the example are (obviously) out of date, what matters, for our purposes here, is the structure of the case. This structure features a signature kind of preemptive overdetermination.

  10. Kane (1985, p. 60).

  11. For a version of this sort of strategy, see Wallace (1994).

  12. Dennett (1984) and (2003). For a discussion of Dennett (2003), see: Fischer (2005a).

  13. See note 8, above.

  14. Of course, it might be that the availability of alternative possibilities is in some sense “part of the actual sequence;” I am indebted to both Carl Ginet and Patrick Todd for this point. My contention in the text relies on the intuitive notion that we can separate “actual-sequence” from “alternative-sequence” facts, but this might be too quick. In any case, my view is that moral responsibility attributions should not depend on the actual-sequence facts leaving it open that the agent in question have alternative possibilities. For a very interesting recent discussion of the contention that moral responsibility supervenes on the actual sequence, see: Sartorio (forthcoming).

  15. See Fischer and Ravizza (1998, pp. 65–69).

  16. For a further development and defense of (MRR), see Fischer and Ravizza (1998, esp. pp. 62–91).

  17. For such accounts—that explicitly build on (MRR)—see Fischer and Ravizza (1998, esp. pp. 62–91).

  18. For further reflections on various features of my account of guidance control (and thus the freedom-relevant component of moral responsibility), see: Fischer (2005b, 2006a, 2008a).

    There are certain features of my account of guidance control that a disconcerting cohort of (otherwise!) thoughtful philosophers have found rather less than irresistible, especially the subjective element and the contention that “reactivity is all of a piece.” In the trio of articles above, I argue (among other things) that (if need be) I could adjust my account so as to do without these contentious features while still maintaining all of my major claims: that moral responsibility does not require regulative control, that causal determination is compatible with moral responsibility, that moral responsibility is an essentially historical notion, and so forth. Although I of course think that much can be said for the various particularly contentious elements of the account of guidance control, it is perhaps helpful to note that they are not essential to an adequate account of guidance control that achieves the main results at which I aim; thus, it will not be sufficient for many critics to attack what they might perceive to be easier targets (the low-hanging fruit, as it were).

  19. Fischer (1999); reprinted in Fischer (2006b, pp. 106–123).

  20. Fischer (2005c); reprinted in Fischer (2008b, pp. 145–164).

  21. Fischer (2008/2009); reprinted in Fischer (2008b, pp. 165–177).

  22. Frankfurt (1971); reprinted in Fischer (1986, pp. 65–80). All references here will be to the reprinted version. In a previous paper, Frankfurt had argued that freedom to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility: Frankfurt (1969); reprinted in Fischer (1986, pp. 143–152).

  23. Frankfurt (1971, pp. 70–71).

  24. Frankfurt (1971).

  25. Watson (1975); reprinted in Fischer (1986, pp. 81–96); all references will be to the reprinted version; and Thalberg (1978).

  26. Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in Schoeman (1987, pp. 27–45); reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza (1993, pp. 170–187). (All references will be to the reprinted paper.); and Frankfurt (1992); reprinted in Fischer (2005, pp. 54–67).

  27. For discussions of what are perhaps analogous issues, and a defense of my approach in light of such considerations, see: Fischer (2006c); reprinted in Fischer (2012, pp. 163–185).

  28. Watson (1975, p. 95).

  29. Frankfurt (1971, p. 69).

  30. Watson (1975, p. 95).

  31. Bratman (2004); reprinted in Fischer (2005, pp. 68–89). (All references will be to the reprinted paper.) The quoted material is on p. 79.

  32. My sister-in-law, Professor Debra Fischer (Yale University), is one of the leading scientists discovering “exoplanets.” These planets are posited to explain data we get from telescopes—typically, the “wobbling” or perturbations of other celestial bodies.

  33. Watson (1975, p. 95).

  34. I certainly have not undertaken a thorough or careful defense of my contention that positing higher-order mental states is not necessary for certain important theoretical purposes. For a thoughtful defense of the hierarchical model—one that would need to be addressed in a more thorough consideration of these issues, see Bratman (2004).

  35. Frankfurt (1971, p. 74).

  36. For a treatment of moral responsibility for omissions, see Fischer and Ravizza (1998, pp. 123–150).

  37. Watson (1975).

  38. Watson (1975, p. 91).

  39. Watson (1975, p. 91).

  40. In contrast to Frankfurt, Watson has admitted that weakness of the will constitutes a challenge for his view, and he has grappled with this problem in numerous subsequent papers, including: Watson (1977, 1999, 2003). Because of the problem of weakness of the will, I have suggested the perhaps Watson should be interpreted as giving an account of “autonomy” rather than moral responsibility: Fischer (forthcoming).

  41. For discussions of normative competence, see Watson (1999, 2003).

  42. Watson (2001). I have also argued that Thomas Scanlon would need to adopt a framework similar to mine—one that embraces a distinction between actual-sequence and alternative-sequence mechanisms—in order to accommodate the Frankfurt cases Fischer (2008c); reprinted in Fischer (2012) at Chap. 7.

  43. For a preliminary defense of this contention, see: Fischer (2011a); reprinted in Fischer (2012, pp. 85–105).

  44. For a discussion of some of the relevant issues, see: Nelson (2011); and Fischer (2011b, esp. pp. 150–156). In various conversations, Patrick Todd has pointed to the need to articulate and defend my view more effectively.

  45. An actual-sequence theory of moral responsibility is symmetric with respect to right and wrong actions, in contrast to theories such as those developed in Wolf (1990) and Nelkin (2011). Insofar as one can construct Frankfurt-cases for right and wrong actions, it seems to me that a theory of moral responsibility should be symmetric with respect to right and wrong action: Fischer and Ravizza (1992, 1998, esp. pp. 55–61).

  46. Semicompatibilism is thus consistent with, although it does not require, a thoroughgoing naturalism. Semicompatibilism thus displays an additional felicitous resilience in that it is neutral with respect to materialism or dualism about the mind.

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    John Martin Fischer

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Fischer, J.M. Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals. J Ethics 16, 117–143 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-012-9123-9

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