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The Structure of Character

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Abstract

In this paper, I defend a local account of character traits that posits traits like close-friend-honesty and good-mood-compassion. John Doris also defends local character traits, but his local character traits are indistinguishable from mere behavioral dispositions, they are not necessary for the purpose which allegedly justifies them, and their justification is only contingent, depending upon the prevailing empirical situation. The account of local traits I defend posits local traits that are traits of character rather than behavioral dispositions, local traits that are necessary to satisfy one of their central purposes, and local traits whose justification is dependent upon theoretical rather than empirical considerations.

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Notes

  1. For an excellent compilation of this research, see Ross and Nisbett (1991).

  2. Hereafter, I refer simply to trait-relevant behavior as a condensed way of referring to trait-relevant behavior, attitudes, and judgment.

  3. See Harman (1999, 2000), Athanassoulis (1999), Kamtekar (2004), Kupperman (2001), Miller (2003), Sreenivasan (2002), and Vranas (2005).

  4. See, for example, Annas (2003, p. 24), Anscombe (1997, pp. 40–42), Aristotle (1990, 1106a16–24, 1100b35–1101a7, 1115a26–27), Foot (2002, p. 16), Hume (1975, pp. 169, 231), Hursthouse (1999, pp. 10–11, 20), Kupperman (1991, p. 9), MacIntyre (1985, pp. 179, 185), McDowell (1979, pp. 331, 332), Plato (1992), Railton (1995, p. 93), Swanton (2003, p. 21).

  5. If courage involves overcoming fear, then fear might be one of the mental features that grounds courage. I ignore the question whether negatively-tinged struggle-producing mental features are part of a virtue’s mental grounding, that is, whether they are necessary for possessing certain virtues, since my account of character traits is consistent with either option.

  6. For a useful discussion of the content of struggle-producing mental features and their impact on the possession of virtue, see Hursthouse (1999, pp. 91–99).

  7. It is irrelevant to my defense of local traits whether traditionally-conceived traits should guarantee, or whether they should probabilify, virtuous behavior. For the sake of encouraging simplicity, I assume that a trait’s dynamism should guarantee virtuous behavior.

  8. Views about the proper understanding of how many, and which, situations constitute a broad range of situations diverge. According to Annas, virtue requires that we behave virtuously in every situation we encounter. See Annas (2003, p. 33): “It is hard to see how any situation could be excluded.” An alternative view holds that virtue requires that we behave virtuously only in most of the situations that we encounter. I ignore this discussion, as it is irrelevant to my defense of local character traits.

  9. A descriptive account of normal situations might hold that normal situations are those that are statistically commonplace. And in a particular individual’s case, severe, chronic depression might be statistically commonplace. If we accept this descriptive account of normal situations, then if someone fails to behave compassionately because of a prevailing depression, she is simply not a compassionate person. Intuitively, however, this account gets things wrong. Provided the victim of depression possesses the mental features appropriate to compassion, her depression mitigates her non-compassionate behavior.

  10. At least four specific experiments exemplify the structure and outcome of experiment that I here discuss. See Austin (1979, pp. 2110–2120), Moriarty (1975, pp. 370–376), Schwartz and Gottlieb (1980), and Shaffer et al. (1975).

  11. I do not explore in any further detail the claim that behavior is locally-dependent, as several other writers have executed this task sufficiently. See, for example, Ross and Nisbett (1991). See also Vranas (2005).

  12. See Cunningham (1979), Fried and Berkowitz (1979), Piliavin and Piliavin (1975), and Latane and Darley (1970).

  13. Doris offers no less than five distinct arguments for the conclusion that local trait attributions produce better-functioning moral agents, but none of these arguments should lead us to accept local traits. See Upton (2005).

  14. See, for example, Kamtekar (2004) and Sreenivasan (2002).

  15. If the virtues are unified, then my ability accurately to predict behavior given accurate trait attributions is compromised. If my friend is generous and the virtues are unified, then she possesses every virtue, including the virtue of justice. And it is consistent with my friend’s being generous that she only infrequently donates money since, in my friend’s case, the demands of justice might typically trump the demands of justice.

  16. Sam’s failure to behave virtuously does not stem from any grossly immoral beliefs, such as those embodied by racist, cruel, or selfish people. Hence, Sam’s meriting moral credit is consistent with Hursthouse’s claim that agents whose better moral tendencies are fragmented by grossly immoral mental states have no virtues at all. See Hursthouse (1999, pp. 146–147).

  17. See, for example, Ross and Nisbett (1991, p. 101), Wright and Mischel (1987), Shoda et al. (1994, pp. 681–683).

  18. Hursthouse appears to endorse a related strategy for appraising psychologically complex agents. Such agents “can be accommodated by suitably qualified ascriptions of virtue…” See Hursthouse (1999, p. 149).

  19. Intuitively, more than three situations must comprise the broad range of situations in which an agent should behave virtuously, since possessing the virtues is supposed to enable an agent to flourish. I construct the case of Jan, who should behave justly in three kinds of situation, solely for the purpose of argumentative simplicity.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Denver, 2000 E. Asbury Ave, Denver, CO, 80208, USA

    Candace L. Upton

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Upton, C.L. The Structure of Character. J Ethics 13, 175–193 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9047-1

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