Abstract
In this paper, I outline a reductio against Stanford’s “New Induction” on the History of Science, which is an inductive argument against scientific realism that is based on what Stanford (2006) calls “the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”. From the supposition that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is cogent, and the parallel New Induction on the History of Philosophy, it follows that scientific antirealism is not worthy of belief. I also show that denying a key premise in the reductio only forces antirealists who endorse Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science into a dilemma: either antirealism falls under the axe of Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science or it falls under the axe of the New Induction on the History of Philosophy.
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Notes
It is worth noting that, for this reductio to go through, there is no need to assume that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is an argument for antirealism (in particular, his own brand of antirealism, namely, “epistemic instrumentalism”). All that needs to be assumed is that, at the very least, Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is supposed to be an argument against scientific realism, where scientific realism here refers to the epistemic thesis according to which “mature and predictively successful scientific theories are well-confirmed and approximately true” (Psillos 2006, 135). On the PUA as an argument against scientific realism, see Magnus (2006, 2010), Chakravartty (2008), Godfrey-Smith (2008), Devitt (2011), Ruhmkorff (2011), Egg (2014) and Rowbottom (forthcoming).
Note that nothing here hangs on whether scientific realists want to be more selective about their realism. The epistemic thesis can be restated to accommodate this sort of selectiveness. For example, scientific realists who want to be realists about some mature and successful theories, but not others, can endorse the following version of the epistemic thesis: “Mature and predictively successful theory T is well-confirmed and approximately true.” Scientific realists who prefer the divide et impera strategy (e.g., Kitcher 2001, 18; Psillos 1999, 106) can endorse the following version of the epistemic thesis: “The theoretical claims of mature and predictively successful theory T that refer to the working (as opposed to idle) posits of T are well-confirmed and approximately true.” Cf. Cordero (2011).
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I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers of Journal for General Philosophy of Science for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Mizrahi, M. Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections. J Gen Philos Sci 47, 59–68 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-015-9295-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-015-9295-7