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Emergence of populism under ambiguity

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to provide a short summary of the study that obtained the ITAX Ph.D. Award in 2017 (Kishishita, in: Emergence of populism under risk and ambiguity, 2017. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006550). This study is a game-theoretic analysis of populism using a dynamic elections model with information asymmetries. The main focus is the effect of uncertainty voters face about an elite’s degree of bias on the emergence of populism. Interestingly, its effect is different depending on the source of the uncertainty. In particular, an increase in risk and that in ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) work in the opposite directions with higher ambiguity rather than risk being a significant source of populism.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Ronald B. Davies, Kimberley Scharf, and Sara LaLumia (the editors-in-chief) for their helpful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan

    Daiki Kishishita

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  1. Daiki Kishishita
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Correspondence to Daiki Kishishita.

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Kishishita, D. Emergence of populism under ambiguity. Int Tax Public Finance 25, 1559–1562 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-018-9519-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-018-9519-y

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