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The Journal of Value Inquiry

, Volume 47, Issue 4, pp 359–374 | Cite as

Ethical Anti-Archimedeanism and Moral Error Theory

  • Mark Hanin
Article

Introduction

Moral error theory has been criticized from many perspectives. Some argue that it fails to do justice to ordinary moral discourse, because its diagnosis of deep-seated error is misguided.1 Others accept the diagnosis of error but endorse an alternative theory such as moral fictionalism.2 Mackie worried that his theory might be taken to have “pernicious” moral upshots.3 But even the staunchest critics rarely dispute Mackie’s contention that the error theory is a purely second-order metaethical doctrine that does not depend on any substantive moral claims.4 That is so because most philosophers are, like Mackie, ethical Archimedeans.

In recent years, a new challenge to error theory has emerged from an anti-Archimedean perspective that disavows Mackie’s starting point. Anti-Archimedeans believe that all metaethical truths are substantive moral truths. There is nowhere to stand outside of ethics to justify metaethical theses.5If so, the new worry for error theorists is not...

Keywords

Moral Judgment Error Theorist Moral Property Moral Realism Moral Fact 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Harvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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