Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Classical Levels, Russellian Monism and the Implicate Order

  • Published:
Foundations of Physics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Reception of the Bohm-Hiley interpretation of quantum mechanics has a curiously Janus faced quality. On the one hand, it is frequently derided as a conservative throwback to outdated classical patterns of thought. On the other hand, it is equally often taken to task for encouraging a wild quantum mysticism, often regarded as anti-scientific. I will argue that there are reasons for this reception, but that a proper appreciation of the dual scientific and philosophical aspects of the view reveals a powerful and extremely interesting metaphysical view of the world. This view is akin to that of Russellian Monism, in which the empirical world studied by science is restricted to relational features that stand in need of some background intrinsic properties to ground their reality. This allows for a theory that can embrace a world which exhibits a reasonable and plausible sort of emergence (especially of domains that fall under classical concepts) while also making room for distinctive and scientifically intransigent properties such as consciousness.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Note that the requirement that the state of the detector and the observed position of the particle be correlated precludes such monstrosities as superluminal transmission of information, even as it strongly suggests some kind of ‘instantaneous connection’ between detector state and particle.

  2. In what follows I am assuming what might be called an ontological and absolute notion of the implicate order, which is controversial. However, a full discussion of this intricate concept would be the work of another paper (at least). In contrast to the interpretation I will use here it is defensible to consider both an epistemic and relativist understanding of the implicate order. But it is the absolute and ontological reading that leads to the thesis I want to explore here. It is easy to find passages in Bohm that support the absolute interpretation. In contrasting two examples of implicate and explicate orders, namely, Bohm’s favorite example of the ink drop and that of the hologram he makes a clear distinction between the former case where an underlying explicate order can be found and the latter case where it cannot. In such cases ‘there is no way ultimately to reduce the implicate order to a finer and more complex type of explicate order’ [6, p. 189]. Nor does it seem illegitimate to regard the implicate order as pointing to an ontological foundation of the world possessed of ‘undivided wholeness’ where ‘everything implicates everything’ [6, p. 197].

  3. I should note that, while clearly connected with my conception of classical levels, I am not concerned here with the physics problem of how QM can be reconciled with the existence of a classical world. This technical question remains a matter of controversy (see e.g. [30]). I am assuming that this problem can be successfully resolved so that what I am calling classical levels can be intelligibly understood in physical terms.

  4. There also exists the possibility of non-classical computing in which distinctively quantum properties of systems can be harnessed to radically speed up solutions to certain classes of computational problems, but not, apparently, fundamentally alter the results of classical computational theory (see [42, p. 126]).

  5. Of course, there is a long tradition in which appeals are made to quantum physics working in the brain to help explain mental efficacy and consciousness (see e.g. [16, 17, 45, 56]). We shall see that some fairly natural philosophical concepts consistent with or perhaps suggested by BI allow for a very interesting application of QM to the problem of consciousness which does not require compromising the conservative features of BI.

  6. It should be noted that as we investigate the details of how the brain operates we will inevitably reach an area which is truly quantum mechanical. If the brain forms a classical level, this area will be part of the explanation of how the classical level is sustained. If the brain is not a classical level then—rather surprisingly—the zone of non-classicality will encompass the large scale, long time, activity of the brain.

  7. Although very few scientists would endorse radical emergence, the view does have philosophical defenders. See for example [55] or [43]. For the history of radical emergence see [38]. For a discussion of the overall conceptual landscape associated with emergentist doctrines see [44].

  8. We should be liberal about what counts as prediction. As emphasized by Mark Bedau, many systems are such that the only way to predict what they will do is to simulate them (see [5]). But it seems clear that if the simulation involves only the nature and arrangement of the substrate, then the fact that the ‘prediction’ requires simulation and might not, in the real world, be made any where near as fast as the evolution of the system itself, does not count against the claim of conservative emergence.

  9. We can only say ‘could be’ because the properties of these acids are not determined solely by internal spatial arrangement. At the time, essentially nothing was known about how chemical properties depending on the nature of the internal constituents of chemical substances.

  10. An interesting philosophical discussion of the renormalization group approach to conservative emergence can be found in [4].

  11. It would not be quite right to say that the quantum potential was introduced or invented. Hiley is at pains to note that the quantum potential terms flows quite naturally out of the mathematics of standard QM. For example, in [22]: ‘Let me emphasize that what we have done above is very straightforward. Equation (3) [i.e. the real part of the Schrödinger equation in the form which makes the quantum potential explicit] is a direct result of the Schrödinger equation. Nothing mathematically new has been added’ [22, p. 148]. But prior to Bohm’s work the quantum potential was not envisioned as a fundamental element of reality.

  12. I will not put too much stress on the difference between dual aspect theory and neutral monism in this paper. Although these differences are important it is not easy to pigeon hole the Bohm-Hiley view definitively into one or the other theory. Roughly speaking, the primary difference between the theories is that neutral monism posits an underlying reality which is neither mental nor physical but to which both the physical and the mental in some sense reduce. Dual aspect accounts take the view that the fundamental reality is both mental and physical but there is no neutral ‘stuff’ underlying them. The quote above is suggestive of a dual aspect outlook. On the other hand, Hiley has been engaged in a research project which seeks to derive spacetime from some kind of radically non-spatial and non-temporal ‘pre-space’ in which ‘the space-time manifold is not a priori given. Rather it is to be abstracted from a deeper pre-space’ [14]. It is perhaps possible to regard the pre-space as playing the role of the neutral, but this is far from clear and it would take us too far afield to investigate it further.

  13. This is not to say that relational properties cannot frequently be inferred from the intrinsics. To take a different example, being a genuine Canadian twenty dollar bill is a relational property, but local investigation can of course make it very probable that a certain piece of paper in front of you is indeed legal tender (it could be, for example, that special paper is used which only the Canadian government has access to).

  14. Note that this claim does not put consciousness outside the reach of empirical science. In addition to its intrinsic nature, consciousness also figures in various relational structures. One clear example is the ‘space’ of perceived colors which forms a three dimensional structure of hue, saturation and luminance.

  15. It is worth noting the connection here with the views of Leibniz and Kant. Leibniz will be discussed below. Kant’s distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal realms is clearly closely related to the topics discussed here. An illuminating discussion of this aspect of Kant’s philosophy can be found in [33].

  16. This is of course a controversial claim. There are pure structuralists who deny that relations require any grounding in the properties of things. The most vigorous, or perhaps rabid, defense of such a pure structuralism can be found in [32].

  17. One might think that non-mental but representational properties might suffice. The problem with this suggestion is that only mental states seem to provide representational properties which are also intrinsic.

  18. A view akin to this can be found in [3].

  19. It is an interesting question whether all the classical levels themselves are mutually compatible. Recall the discussion above that suggested the quantum description of nature could count as an emergent level. If so, the set of ‘classical levels’ thus broadly construed could contain mutual incompatibilities or relations of complementarity.

References

  1. Albert, D.: Quantum Mechanics and Experience. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Anderson, P.: More is different. Science 177(4047), 393–396 (1972)

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  3. Barbour, J.: The End of Time: The Next Revolution in Physics. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2000)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Batterman, R.: The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction and Emergence. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2002)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Bedau, M.: Weak emergence. In: Tomberlin, J. (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, pp. 375–399. Blackwell, Oxford (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Bohm, D.: Wholeness and the Implicate Order. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London (1980)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Boyd, R.: Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa. In: Wilson, R. (ed.) Species: New Interdisciplinary Studies, pp. 141–185. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Brock, W.: The Norton History of Chemistry. W.H. Norton & Co., New York (1993)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Carroll, S.: The laws underlying the physics of everyday life are completely understood. http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2010/09/23/the-laws-underlying-the-physics-of-everyday-life-are-completely-understood/ (2010)

  10. Chalmers, D.: The conscious mind. In: Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  11. de Gosson, M., Hiley, B.: Zeno paradox for Bohmian trajectories: the unfolding of the metatron. arXiv:1010.2622 (2010)

  12. Eddington, A.: The Nature of the Physical World. Macmillan & Co., New York (1928)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Eliasmith, C.: Is the brain analog or digital? Cogn. Sci. Q. 1(2), 147–170 (2000)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Frescura, F., Hiley, B.: Algebras, quantum theory and pre-space. Rev. Bras. Fís. 49–86 (1984). Vol. Especial Os 70 anos de Mario Schonberg

  15. Hagan, S., Hameroff, S.R., et al.: Quantum computation in brain microtubules: decoherence and biological feasibility. Phys. Rev. E 65(6), 061901 (2002)

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  16. Hameroff, S., Penrose, R.: Conscious events as orchestrated space-time selections. J. Conscious. Stud. 3, 36–53 (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Hameroff, S., Powell, J.: The conscious connection: a psycho-physical bridge between brain and Pan-experiential quantum geometry. In: Skrbina, D. (ed.) Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium, pp. 109–127. Benjamins, Amsterdam (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Henson, S., Constantino, R., et al.: Lattice effects observed in chaotic dynamics of experimental populations. Science 294, 602–605 (2001)

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  19. Hiley, B.: Mind and matter: aspects of the implicate order described through algebra. In: Pribram, K., King, J. (eds.) Learning as Self-Organisation, pp. 569–586. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Hiley, B.: Active information and teleportation. In: Greenberger, D., Reiter, W., Zeilinger, A. (eds.) Epistemological and Experimental Perspectives on Quantum Physics. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  21. Hiley, B.: Quantum theory, the implicate order and the self. http://www.bbk.ac.uk/tpru/BasilHiley/Hiley-QT_IOandSelf.pdf

  22. Hiley, B.: From the Heisenberg picture to Bohm: a new perspective on active information and its relation to Shannon information. In: Khrennikov, A. (ed.) Quantum Theory: Reconsideration of Foundations, pp. 141–162. Växjö University Press, Växjö (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  23. Hiley, B.: Particles, fields and observers. In: Baltimore, D., Dulbecco, R., Jacob, F., Levi-Montalcini, R. (eds.) Frontiers of Life, vol. 1, pp. 89–106. Academic Press, New York (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  24. Hiley, B., Callaghan, R.E.: Delayed-choice experiments and the Bohm approach. Phys. Scr. 74(3), 336–348 (2006)

    Article  MathSciNet  ADS  Google Scholar 

  25. Hiley, B., Callaghan, R.E.: What is erased in the quantum erasure? Found. Phys. 36, 1869–1883 (2006)

    Article  MathSciNet  ADS  MATH  Google Scholar 

  26. Hiley, B., Pylkkänen, P.: Can mind affect matter via active information? Mind Matter 3(2), 7–27 (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  27. Holland, P.: The Quantum Theory of Motion: An Account of the de Broglie-Bohm Causal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1993)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  28. Holland, J.: Emergence: From Chaos to Order. Addison-Wesley, Reading (1998)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  29. Jaynes, E.T.: Quantum beats. In: Barut, A. (ed.) Foundations of Radiation Theory and Quantum Electrodynamics, pp. 37–43. Plenum, New York (1980)

    Google Scholar 

  30. Joos, E., Zeh, H.D., et al.: Decoherence and the Appearance of a Classical World in Quantum Theory, 2nd edn. Springer, Berlin (2003)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  31. Kocsis, S., et al.: Observing the average trajectories of single photons in a two-slit interferometer. Science 332, 1170–1173 (2011)

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  32. Ladyman, J., Ross, D., et al.: Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  33. Langton, R.: Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  34. Langton, R., Lewis, D.: Defining “intrinsic”. Philos. Phenomenol. Res. 58, 333–345 (2001)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  35. Laughlin, R.: A Different Universe. Basic Books, New York (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  36. Leibniz, G.W.: Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London (1710/1951). Farrer A. (ed.), Huggard, E. (trans.)

    Google Scholar 

  37. Lockwood, M.: Mind, Brain and the Quantum. Blackwell, Oxford (1989)

    Google Scholar 

  38. McLaughlin, B.: The rise and fall of British emergentism. In: Beckermann, A., Flohr, H., Kim, J. (eds.) Emergence or Reduction, pp. 49–93. De Gruyter, Berlin (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  39. Mermin, D.: What is quantum mechanics trying to tell us? Am. J. Phys. 66(9), 753–767 (1998)

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  40. Morowitz, H.: The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  41. Newman, M.: Mr. Russell’s causal theory of perception. Mind 37, 137–148 (1928)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  42. Nielsen, M., Chuang, I.: Quantum Computation and Quantum Information. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  43. O’Connor, T.: Emergent properties. Am. Philos. Q., Monogr. Ser. 31, 91–104 (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  44. O’Connor, T., Wong, H.Y.: The metaphysics of emergence. Noûs 39, 658–678 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  45. Popper, K., Eccles, J.: The Self and Its Brain. Springer, New York (1977)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  46. Pullman, B.: The Atom in the History of Human Thought. Oxford University Press, New York (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  47. Pylkännen, P.: Mind, Matter and the Implicate Order. Springer, Berlin (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  48. Rumelhart, D., McClelland, J., et al.: Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, vol. 1. MIT Press, Cambridge (1986)

    Google Scholar 

  49. Russell, B.: The Analysis of Mind. George Allen & Unwin, London (1921)

    Google Scholar 

  50. Russell, B.: An Outline of Philosophy. George Allen & Unwin, London (1927)

    Google Scholar 

  51. Russell, B.: Mind and matter. In: Portraits from Memory, pp. 145–165. Spokesman, Nottingham (1956)

    Google Scholar 

  52. Scully, M., Drühl, K.: Quantum eraser: a proposed photon correlation experiment concerning observation and “delayed choice” in quantum mechanics. Phys. Rev. A 25, 2208–2213 (1982)

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  53. Scully, M., Englert, B., et al.: Quantum optical tests of complementarity. Nature 351, 111–116 (1991)

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  54. Seager, W.: The ‘intrinsic nature’ argument for panpsychism. J. Conscious. Stud. 13, 129–145 (2006) (Reprinted in Freeman A. (ed.) Consciousness and Its Place in Nature, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006.)

    Google Scholar 

  55. Silberstein, M., McGeever, J.: The search for ontological emergence. Philos. Q. 49, 182–200 (1999)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  56. Stapp, H.: A quantum theory of the mind-brain interface. In: Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics, pp. 145–172. Springer, Berlin (1993)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  57. Stenger, V.: The myth of quantum consciousness. Humanist. 53, 13–15 (1993)

    Google Scholar 

  58. Stoljar, D.: Two conceptions of the physical. Philos. Phenomenol. Res. 62, 253–281 (2001)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  59. Stubenberg, L.: Neutral monism. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008). The Metaphysics Research Lab, fall 2008 ed. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/neutral-monism

    Google Scholar 

  60. Tegmark, M.: Importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes. Phys. Rev. E, Stat. Nonlinear Soft Matter Phys. 61(4), 4194–4206 (2000)

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  61. Vigier, J.P., Dewdney, C., et al.: Causal particle trajectories and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. In: Hiley, B., Peat, D. (eds.) Quantum Implications: Essays in Honor of David Bohm, pp. 169–204. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London (1987)

    Google Scholar 

  62. Wheeler, J.: The “past” and the “delayed choice” double-slit experiment. In: Marlow, A. (ed.) Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, pp. 9–48. Academic Press, New York (1978)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my thanks to the organizers of the Helsinki conference in honour of Basil Hiley’s 75th birthday, and indeed to Professor Hiley himself, especially for his longstanding efforts to integrate philosophical thinking into the investigation of quantum physics. My thanks also to the journal’s anonymous referees whose challenging and insightful comments helped me to clarify the views expressed here.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

    William Seager

Authors
  1. William Seager
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to William Seager.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Seager, W. Classical Levels, Russellian Monism and the Implicate Order. Found Phys 43, 548–567 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-012-9672-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-012-9672-6

Keywords

Search

Navigation