Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making

, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 211–230 | Cite as

Dynamic resource allocation in fuzzy coalitions: a game theoretic model



We introduce an efficient and dynamic resource allocation mechanism within the framework of a cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions (cooperative fuzzy game). A fuzzy coalition in a resource allocation problem can be so defined that membership grades of the players in it are proportional to the fractions of their total resources. We call any distribution of the resources possessed by the players, among a prescribed number of coalitions, a fuzzy coalition structure and every membership grade (equivalently fraction of the total resources), a resource investment. It is shown that this resource investment is influenced by the satisfaction of the players in regard to better performance under a cooperative setup. Our model is based on the real life situations, where possibly one or more players compromise on their resource investments in order to help forming coalitions.


Fuzzy coalitions Rational player Exact resource allocation Cooperative game 

Mathematics Subject Classifications (2000)

91A12 91A99 03E72 



The authors gratefully thank the Associate Editor, the Managing Editor and the three anonymous reviewers for the improvement of the paper. The suggestions of the Editor-in-chief are also greatly acknowledged.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsDibrugarh UniversityDibrugarhIndia

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