Experimental Economics

, Volume 21, Issue 1, pp 27–49 | Cite as

Third-party manipulation of conflict: an experiment

Original Paper

Abstract

We design a laboratory experiment in which an interested third party endowed with private information sends a public message to two conflicting players, who then make their choices. We find that third-party communication is not strategic. Nevertheless, a hawkish message by a third party makes hawkish behavior more likely while a dovish message makes it less likely. Moreover, how subjects respond to the message is largely unaffected by the third party’s incentives. We argue that our results are consistent with a focal point interpretation in the spirit of Schelling.

Keywords

Third-party communication Experiment Conflict game 

JEL Classification

C72 C92 D82 

Supplementary material

10683_2017_9523_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (3 mb)
Supplementary material 1 (pdf 3108 KB)

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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ITAMMexico CityMexico
  2. 2.University of SurreyGuildfordEngland

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