Abstract
Hypocrisy is widely thought to be morally objectionable in a way that undermines the hypocrite’s moral standing to blame others. To wit, we seem to intuitively accept the “Nonhypocrisy Condition:” R has the standing to blame S for some violation of a moral norm N only if R’s blaming S is not hypocritical. This claim has been the subject of intensifying philosophical investigation in recent years. However, we can only understand why hypocrisy is morally objectionable and has an effect on standing to blame if we can correctly characterize hypocrisy itself. Unfortunately, some recent discussions fail to do this, which fatally undermines subsequent arguments concerning the effect of hypocrisy on the standing to blame. This paper’s central aim is to develop and defend a better account of hypocrisy. The hope is that with such an account in hand, we can explain and perhaps justify our moral aversion to hypocrisy in general as well as the Nonhypocrisy Condition in particular.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This conception of blame combines cognitive and emotional elements along lines similar to Fritz and Miller (2015), Bell (2013), Scanlon (2008), and Wallace (2010). Unlike Bell, I do not build into my account of blame the requirement that the blame is “overt” or communicated. For an account of blame that emphasizes conative states, see Sher (2006). For a functionalist account, see McKenna (2012).
This condition can be satisfied if R does not believe that S is excused or exempted from blame for A-ing.
Some, but not all, of these emotions are examples of what Strawson calls “reactive attitudes.”
Duff 2010, 124 calls this kind of blame second-personal.
See Wallace 2010. His argument is that hypocrisy is morally objectionable, and so undermines standing, because the hypocritical blamer shields herself from the moral criticism she directs at others. Since we all have an interest in being protected from moral criticism, hypocritical blame in effect treats the blamer’s interests as more important than the interests of others. As Fritz and Miller point out, this argument only makes sense if restricted to cases of overt hypocritical blame (Fritz and Miller 2015, 7).
See Jordan et al. 2017 for some empirical evidence of broad assent to this intuition. Note that I am not claiming genuine self-blame necessarily defeats the accusation of hypocrisy.
I borrow these labels from Bell 2013, 275–276.
Additional evidence that the clear-eyed hypocrite is, indeed, a hypocrite can be found in the etymology and dictionary definition of the word. The word “hypocrisy” is derived from the Greek hupokrisis, meaning “acting of a theatrical part”; this certainly suggests an emphasis on the intentional play-acting or pretense of a clear-eyed hypocrite rather than the self-deception of the exception-seeking hypocrite. In addition, Merriam-Webster lists as synonyms for hypocrisy “dissimulation, insincerity, dissembling.”
See Tosi and Warmke 2016 for an articulation of the notion of moral grandstanding.
Note that inclusion in the category of “hypocrites” does not force a moral equivalence between weak-willed, clear-eyed, and exception-seeking hypocrites. I am sympathetic to the intuition that many cases of weak-willed hypocrisy are not morally objectionable, or at least are not as morally objectionable as paradigm cases of exception-seeking or clear-eyed hypocrisy.
As Bell points out, not all kinds of morally objectionable blame undermine standing (Bell 2013, 275). In light of this point, Fritz and Miller understand themselves to be showing not just that hypocrisy is morally objectionable, but that it is morally objectionable in a way that undermines standing.
Cf. Fritz and Miller 2015, 8.
I include premise (6) to make explicit the argument’s dependence on the notion of standing as a right.
For example, Alan Gibbard (1990, 40–41 and 47–49) once argued that morality consists of norms governing when it makes sense to feel resentment or guilt. David Copp (1995, 84–85) claims that what makes certain standards moral is, at least in part, that they are taken to be moral standards, where this involves the tendency to have a characteristic negative response toward failures to conform to them.
Watson 1996, 231.
This revision should not be taken to suggest that standing to blame is not a moral notion. Rather, the point is that we can have or lack a moral standing to blame others for non-moral failures.
See Jordan et al. 2017 for some empirical evidence that the moral objectionableness of hypocrisy lies in its sending a “false signal” about the hypocrite’s personal moral conduct.
Note that the exception-seeking hypocrite does not intentionally create a specious appearance of virtue, but intentionality is not strictly required by the notion of ‘playing a part’ or ‘creating an appearance.’ Nevertheless, as I have noted, the connotations of the idea of ‘playing a part’ suggest that the clear-eyed hypocrite is perhaps a more prototypical example of hypocrisy than the exception-seeking hypocrite. This would further support my argument that Fritz and Miller’s account of hypocrisy fails to capture a central case of hypocrisy.
The appropriate response should not be understood in an objective sense, which would imply that the norm, good, or ideal of which the hypocrite communicates endorsement objectively warrants promotion, obtainment, and so on. Rather, we should understand “appropriate response” as the response that would be objectively warranted were the norm, good, or ideal in question objectively correct.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice for pushing me to say more about this issue.
This discussion implies that weak-willed people who are disposed to accept blame from others are not hypocrites. I think this result accords with our intuition. My claim is merely that, insofar as someone satisfies the conditions of hypocrisy due to weakness of will, he will not, by definition, be disposed to accept blame from others. If he becomes so disposed, he no longer counts as a hypocrite.
For our purposes, nothing hinges on the distinction between being not disposed to ϕ and being indisposed to ϕ, but I should point out that an agent who satisfies either description with respect to accepting blame satisfies the CAH condition.
Here it is important not to interpret “appropriate response” as the response that is objectively warranted, since the Nazi norms do not objectively warrant adherence. See note 25 for further discussion.
Thanks to Mike Zhao for bringing this objection to my attention.
References
Bell, Macalaster. (2013) “The Standing to Blame: A Critique.” In D.J. Coates and A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 263–281
Cohen G (2006) Casting the first stone: who can, and who Can’t, condemn the terrorists? R Inst Philos Suppl 58:113–136
Copp D (1995) Morality, normativity, and society. Oxford University Press, New York
Crisp R, Cowton C (1994) Hypocrisy and moral seriousness. Am Philos Q 4:343–349
Duff RA (2010) Blame, moral standing and the legitimacy of the criminal trial. Ratio 2:123–140
Fritz K, Miller D (2015) Hypocrisy and standing to blame. Pac Philos Q 97:1–22
Gibbard, Alan. (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press)
Glover J (1970) Responsibility. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Harris, Dan. (2017) “Haggard admits buying meth.” ABC News http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=2626067&page=1.
Isserow J, Klein C (2017) Hypocrisy and moral authority. J Ethics Soc Philos 12:191–222
Jordan JJ, Sommers R, Bloom P, Rand DG (2017) Why do we hate hypocrites? Psychol Sci 28:356–368
King M (2015) Manipulation arguments and the moral standing to blame. J Ethics Soc Philos 9:1–20
La Rochefoucauld, Francois. (2007) Collected Maxims and Other Reflections. E.H. Blackmore et. al. (eds.). (New York: Oxford University Press)
McKenna M (2012) Conversation and responsibility. Oxford University Press, New York
Radzik L (2011) On minding your own business. Soc Theory Pract 37:574–598
Roedevin C (2018) Hypocritical blame, fairness, and standing. Metaphilosophy 49:137–152
Scanlon TM (2008) Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Sher G (2006) In praise of blame. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Todd P (2017) A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame. Nous:1–28
Tosi J, Warmke B (2016) Moral Grandstanding. Philos Public Aff 44(3):197–217
Wallace RJ (2010) Hypocrisy, moral address, and the equal standing of persons. Philos Public Aff 38:307–341
Watson G (1996) Two faces of responsibility. Philos Top 24:227–248
Watson G (1994) Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Zimmerman M (1988) An essay on moral responsibility. Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rossi, B. The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 21, 553–567 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9917-3
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9917-3