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Authenticity in Political Discourse

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Abstract

Judith Shklar, David Runciman, and others argue against what they see as excessive criticism of political hypocrisy. Such arguments often assume that communicating in an authentic manner is an impossible political ideal. This article challenges the characterization of authenticity as an unrealistic ideal and makes the case that its value can be grounded in a certain political realism sensitive to the threats posed by representative democracy. First, by analyzing authenticity’s demands for political discourse, I show that authenticity has greater flexibility than many assume in accommodating practices common to politics, such as deception, concealment, and persuasion through rhetoric. Second, I argue that a concern for authenticity in political discourse represents a virtue, not a distraction, for representative democracy. Authenticity takes on heightened importance when the public seeks information on how representatives will act in contexts where the public is absent and unable to influence decisions. Furthermore, given the psychological mechanisms behind hypocrisy, public criticism is a sensible response for trying to limit political hypocrisy. From the perspective of democratic theory and psychology, the public has compelling reasons to value authenticity in political discourse.

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Notes

  1. This approach draws on that taken by Karuna Mantena (2012). Though Mantena treats a different subject (nonviolent resistance), she similarly shows from a realist perspective the value of a political ideal often dismissed as overly unrealistic.

  2. The Encyclopedia of Political Thought’s entry on authenticity ends by noting: “a question that would certainly merit careful investigation in the future would be whether authenticity is advantageous in maintaining the social bonds of a democratic society” (Varga 2014, 223). Though far from a comprehensive response to that question, this article takes a step toward addressing it by examining authenticity’s value in the relationship between the represented and their representatives.

  3. Though integrity normally has moral connotations (Babbitt 1997; Calhoun 1995; Carter 1996; Putnam 1996), some debate this point (Williams 1981, 49; Scherkoske 2012). Elizabeth Ashford (2000) distinguishes between objective and subjective integrity: the former requires commitment to the right principles, the latter commitment to whatever principles one holds.

  4. This definition of hypocrisy is broader than others. Some exclude self-deception and weakness of will as possible causes of hypocrisy, and limit it to the intentional deception of others through a false representation of oneself (Monin and Merritt 2012). Such a narrow definition results in what at times can be a caricature of the hypocrite’s motivations: she always is fully aware and intentional when deceiving others about the inconsistencies between her actions and purported values. But as Daniel Statman (1997) points out, even the worse hypocrites are not always as calculating as is assumed and can fall victim to pitfalls such as self-deception. In line with this view, experimental evidence shows that common understandings of hypocrisy include inconsistencies stemming from self-deception and weakness of will (Alicke et al. 2013)—a possibility left open by the definition of hypocrisy used here.

  5. This argument shows that distinctions between forms of first-order hypocrisy are reasonable and legitimate, but it does not develop a typology for it. Space constraints do not permit outlining such a typology here. Doing so necessarily would intersect psychology and philosophy, and involve identifying people’s intuitions concerning hypocrisy and subjecting them to ethical analysis. For initial work in this direction, see Alicke et al. (2013).

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Bryan Garsten, Mark Landau, and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback that helped improve earlier versions of this article.

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  1. Political Science Department, Yale University, 115 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT, 06520, USA

    Ben Jones

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Jones, B. Authenticity in Political Discourse. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 489–504 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9649-6

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