Abstract
Schadenfreude is the emotion we experience when we obtain pleasure from others’ misfortunes. Typically, we are not proud of it and admit experiencing it only sheepishly or apologetically. Philosophers typically view it, and the disposition to experience it, as moral failings. Two recent defenders of Schadenfreude, however, argue that it is morally permissible because it stems from judgments about the just deserts of those who suffer misfortunes. I also defend Schadenfreude, but on different grounds that overcome two deficiencies of those recent defenses. First, my defense accounts for the wide range of circumstances in which we experience Schadenfreude. Those circumstances often involve feelings and judgments that are less noble and admirable than judgments regarding just deserts. Second, it accounts for the sheepish or apologetic feelings that commonly accompany Schadenfreude. The two recent defenses can account for those feelings only by holding that they are mistaken or misguided. In opposition to those who view Schadenfreude as a moral failing, I argue that it is morally permissible unless it is part of a causal chain that produces an immoral act. The moral permissibility of the emotion is necessary in order for individuals to have the emotional freedom that, in turn, is necessary for their well-being. Schadenfreude’s moral status is similar to a sexual fetish’s. Like a fetish, experiencing Schadenfreude is not immoral in itself, but sharing and discussing it with others is immoral in many contexts.
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Notes
This section’s references to German culture are not meant to imply that it is the only culture that has a concept of the emotion at issue. According to the WordSense.eu Dictionary (http://www.wordsense.eu), the Danish and Norwegian term skadefryd, the Dutch term leedvermaak, the Finnish term vahingonilo, and the Swedish term skadeglädje all denote the same emotion that Schadenfreude denotes. Undoubtedly, there are many other cultures, including many in continents other than Europe, that have concepts of the emotion and terms to denote it.
Although McNamee addresses only Portmann’s account, his claim against it also applies to Ben-Ze’ev’s account.
The studies cited earlier found resentment more closely related to Schadenfreude than envy.
Although the freedom at issue often is associated with liberalism, one need not be a liberal to hold that it is necessary for individuals to live well. Moreover, although I consider myself a liberal, whether my defense of Schadenfreude is sound is not a function of whether the entire liberal project is sound.
Here and throughout the remainder of this paper, “the freedom to conduct our lives as we choose” is intended to include the proviso that we do not harm, or significantly increase the risk of harm to, others.
It is possible that the emotional freedom to experience other often-criticized emotions, such as envy or spite, also provides individuals who experience those emotions with significant values. In order to claim that is the case regarding a specific emotion, one must provide a demonstration to that effect. Providing such a demonstration, however, does not demonstrate the further claim that we should allow, morally, individuals the emotional freedom to experience that emotion. In order to make the further claim, one also needs to provide either an argument regarding that specific emotion that demonstrates why individuals should be allowed, morally, to garner those values, or a general argument of that sort that applies to all often-criticized emotions. The intent of this subsection is to provide the former kind of argument for Schadenfreude specifically.
See Section 3.
Many argue that the value of privacy lies in the fact that it allows us to demarcate our various relationships. By sharing with person A information about oneself that one does not share with person B, one produces a more intimate relationship with A than with B. See Benn (1975), Fried (1970: Chapter IX), Gerstein (1978), Moore (2003), and Rachels (1975). Others argue that the value of privacy is the role it plays in allowing us to pursue our lives as we determine and develop our own identities or conceptions of who we are or ought to be. Without privacy, one is subject to various forms of force or coercion, often real but sometimes only perceived, that prevent one from developing an autonomous self. See Corlett (2002), Gross (1980), Kupfer (1987), Parent (1983), and Reiman (1976). Still others argue that the value of privacy is that it provides a sphere in which we can behave in various ways, share ideas, express our feelings, and comment on others without fear of judgment. It allows us to relax physically and mentally by not expending the energy that we normally expend when we are concerned with how others view us, and it allows us to try out new ideas, thoughts, and views without fear. See Johnson (1992, 1989a, b) and Nagel (1998). Elsewhere, I argue that none of those values by itself captures the true value of privacy. The true value is multifarious and contextual. See Spurgin (2006).
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Spurgin, E. An Emotional-Freedom Defense of Schadenfreude . Ethic Theory Moral Prac 18, 767–784 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9550-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9550-8