Abstract
Much of feminist theory takes issue with traditional, liberal theories of consent and obligation. Though none have proposed abandoning obligation outright, there has been a general shift among feminists towards a responsibility paradigm. Responsibility models acknowledge given relationships and interdependence, and so posit responsibilities as given, regardless of whether they are voluntary. But in theories that take freedom as a principal value, a move from a socially unembedded voluntarism to socially embedded responsibility leaves something missing. Constructive accounts of and prescriptions for freedom must consider the reality of social life; yet acknowledging that relations are given need not require subordinating the role of voluntarism and consent in most relationships. In this paper I offer a commitment framework that seeks to supplant obligation while also reconciling relational given-ness and voluntarism. I propose an analysis of commitment that takes relations as the starting point and then show how the concept can: 1. guide actions 2. account for responsibilities 3. enhance freedom and 4. avoid a large share of coercive forces that are believed as necessary for reinforcing obligation and responsibility fulfillment.
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Notes
I use responsibility in its technical sense, as a morally authoritative responsibility to specific others with whom one is in relations. All responsibilities are requirements but not all requirements are responsibilities.
The literature focuses on obligation as it is technically defined within liberal political philosophy as voluntarily self-assumed.
I take the majority of interests to be of this sort.
Because social freedom requires interaction, this conception cannot be reduced to a negative conception of liberty.
This models also holds for those who are dependency workers, though the special needs and restrictions of the care-giver are especially relevant to the negotiation of relationship terms and so, like issues such as addiction, etc., require special attentiveness by both parties to avoid a power imbalance and injustice in defining the terms. See: Kittay 1997.
Other sorts of relations, such as political and legal relations, are more formal and defined.
This is a normatively ideal picture of what social relation development ought to look like. An ideal construction of social relation formation is needed here to clarify the social consent concept. However, in the discussion of commitment, the non-ideal nature of actual, given social relations is emphasized.
Often, there is a tendency to use the two interchangeably with the understanding that obligation connotes a sense of non-voluntariness or a required response to the needs and vulnerabilities of others (Hirschmann 1992; O’Neil 1996) But this is true more generally in moral theory, where obligation, responsibility, and duty are used interchangeably to connote a morally required act.
O’Neil also argues that theorists should begin from obligation.
Women have been more vulnerable and more dependent than men as a result of oppression, however, this ought not be the case. Additionally, an exception must be made for those with developmental difficulties that are unable to live without assistance of some kind.
Walker rejects the possibility of normative force to dominating practices.
While freedom as non-oppression might appear to be a reformulation of Phillip Pettit’s notion of freedom as non-domination, it instead adheres to more general feminist values, see: Pettit 2001. For example, as Hirschmann rightly notes, freedom as non-domination in Pettit’s sense is too narrow for feminist accounts since Pettit requires that there must be an identifiable source of the domination, see: Hirschmann 2001. Conversely, liberation theorists address and resist both explicit and implicit forms of oppression, as well as systemic, institutional forms of oppression that have no responsible actor. All manifestations of oppression fall under the more general notion of domination.
My analysis of commitment overlaps with Cheshire Calhoun’s (2009) analysis of commitment, especially insofar as we both conceive of commitment as affect. However, we have differing objectives She provides reasons to counter the assumption that it is better in terms of well-being to live life in accordance with commitment. I, however, hold that it is better to act in accordance to commitment because it makes our acts more free. I see well-being as a function of freedom, to some extent, and so end up with the opposite conclusion. I do accept her claim that it is not pragmatically necessary since that understanding does not cohere with the intentions of this analysis.
I do not mean supererogatory here.
A relation my carry responsibilities without being of value to the one bearing the responsibilities.
While individuals may be involved in bad social relations and relationships, there is no moral obligation for them to remain. This is a generally accepted consensus across all frameworks under consideration here. Therefore, all prescriptions made presume that the relation is not a harmful or bad relation. However, relations may be difficult without being bad and so are subject to the same normative requirements as uncomplicated relations.
Being forced to produce work without a commitment to such expression does constitute a state of unfreedom in that circumstance, and less freedom overall, even if no one if forcing her to maintain her job.
Questions of “knowing” whether or not one desires X authentically is an epistemological question. This is a separate question from the normative aspect of choice and action that I address.
Weakness of will is a major worry. There is also concern of bad moral luck but this point is beyond the scope of this discussion.
For examples of commitment conflict in terms of moral dilemma, see: Gowans 1994.
E.g. Christian Children’s Fund
I continue to use “his or her” to draw attention to the fact that there are men in violent relationships.
The notion of commitment cannot make sense of an abuser’s “commitment” since the abuser’s psychology concerning what is of value and how to treat what is of value is distorted.
It may be the case that obligation is the proper sort of action guiding feature for other spheres, such as the legal and political spheres.
I take coercion to be an inherent conceptual component of obligation whereas it only operates in responsibility failure. However, one might disagree with the idea that coercion is inherent to obligation. This question of whether obligation might be fulfilled by something like the force of reasons is a very large question and would involve an intricate examination of the role and force of reason in motivation. This project is too large to be taken up in the present project.
The commitments between lovers and friends will be symmetrical and reflexive since they stand on an equal ground. This means that the contents of one partner’s commitments will largely mirror that of the other’s since such a relation is based on mutual desires for maintaining that relation. There will be some difference, though, since committed relations attend to particularity. However, the commitments between partners of asymmetrical relations will not have this mirroring affect. Because parents and bosses will have wholly distinct responsibilities to their child or employee, the two sets of commitments will rarely match up, except insofar as each partner’s commitment will involve general commitments of respecting and attending to the other in the ways their particularity requires. Even so, the commitments involved in asymmetrical relations can be as devoted or strong as those in symmetrical relations. A boss can experience a loss to self if she fails to properly regard her employee just as a parent will experience a loss of self if he fails to meets his commitments to his children (though much deeper and more extensively, since the parent/child relation constitutes more of the parent’s identity).
This does not have to be the same thing as a “true self” given Nietzsche’s focus on creation.
For an in depth discussion on the similarities/differences between Rousseau and Nietzsche see: Ansell-Pearson 1991.
While an argument is needed to support this interpretation, it is too vast a project to take up in this paper. I am currently developing such an analysis of the general will that accords with the translation “strengthen to be free” and believe that this analysis can accommodate the commitment framework. This analysis demonstrates that the general will, on this understanding, is not a coercive force as has been traditionally interpreted.
Rousseau would agree with this whereas Nietzsche would reject this.
Assuming she has no fear of retribution from friends and family.
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Welch, S. Social Freedom and Commitment. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 15, 117–134 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9259-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9259-2