, Volume 80, Supplement 3, pp 433–456 | Cite as

On Probabilities in Biology and Physics

  • Joseph Berkovitz
  • Philippe Huneman
Original Article


This volume focuses on various questions concerning the interpretation of probability and probabilistic reasoning in biology and physics. It is inspired by the idea that philosophers of biology and philosophers of physics who work on the foundations of their disciplines encounter similar questions and problems concerning the role and application of probability, and that interaction between the two communities will be both interesting and fruitful. In this introduction we present the background to the main questions that the volume focuses on and summarize the highlights of the individual contributions.


Subjective Probability Classical Mechanic Objective Probability Representational Content Bohmian Mechanic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



For comments on earlier versions of this paper, we are grateful to Noah Stemeroff and Marshal Abrams.


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.IHPST, University of Toronto, Victoria CollegeTorontoCanada
  2. 2.Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques, CNRS/Université Paris I SorbonneParisFrance

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