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Erkenntnis

, Volume 81, Issue 2, pp 259–273 | Cite as

Extended Knowledge-How

  • J. Adam Carter
  • Bolesław Czarnecki
Original Article

Abstract

According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (e.g. Stanley and Williamson in J Philos 411–44, 2001; Stanley in Know how. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; Brogaard in Grazer Philos Stud 77(1):147–190, 2008; Philos Phenomenol Res 78(2):439–467, 2009) knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist (e.g. Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark in Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press , Oxford, 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind (e.g. the extended mind thesis and the hypothesis of extended cognition), we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, insofar as anti-intellectualist approaches to knowledge-how (e.g. Ryle in Proc Aristot Soc 46, 1945; The concept of mind. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949) are a viable option, there is an overlooked issue of how knowledge-how might be extended, via active externalism, in ways very differently from knowledge-that. This paper explores this overlooked space, and in doing so, illustrates how a novel form of extended knowledge-how emerges from a pairing of active externalism in the philosophy of mind with anti-intellectualism in the theory of knowledge. Crucial to our argument will be a new way of thinking about the extended mind thesis, as it pertains to the kinds of state one is in (on an anti-intellectualist construal) when one knows how to do something, and how this state connects with non-accidentally successful performance.

Keywords

Parity Principle Propositional Attitude Dynamical System Theory Propositional Knowledge Extended Mind 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of EdinburghEdinburghUnited Kingdom
  2. 2.Jagiellonian UniversityKrakówPoland

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