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Erkenntnis

, Volume 80, Issue 1, pp 229–237 | Cite as

Sosa on Knowledge, Assertion and Value

  • Christoph Kelp
Critical Discussion
  • 176 Downloads

Abstract

This paper takes issues with a couple of recent arguments due to Ernest Sosa according to which (i) knowledge is the norm of assertion and (ii) the thesis that knowledge is specially valuable is equivalent to the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion. It is argued that while both of these arguments fail, an argument that knowledge is the norm of belief and that the thesis that knowledge is specially valuable is equivalent to the thesis that knowledge is the norm of belief may yet be defensible.

Keywords

Epistemology Value of knowledge Norms of assertion Ernest Sosa 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Ernest Sosa and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on this paper.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Analytic PhilosophyKU LeuvenLouvainBelgium

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