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Causal Slingshots

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Abstract

Causal slingshots are formal arguments advanced by proponents of an event ontology of token-level causation which, in the end, are intended to show two things: (i) The logical form of statements expressing causal dependencies on token level features a binary predicate “… causes …” and (ii) that predicate takes events as arguments. Even though formalisms are only revealing with respect to the logical form of natural language statements, if the latter are shown to be adequately captured within a corresponding formalism, proponents of slingshots usually take the adequacy of their formalizations for granted without justifying it. The first part of this paper argues that the most discussed version of a causal slingshot, viz. the one e.g. presented by Davidson (Essays on actions and events. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), can indeed be refuted for relying on an inadequate formal apparatus. In contrast, the formal means of Gödel’s (The philosophy of Betrand Russell. New York, Tudor, 1944) often neglected slingshot are shown to stand on solid ground in the second part of the paper. Nonetheless, I contend that Gödel’s slingshot does only half the work friends of event causation would like it to do. It provides good reasons for (i) but not for (ii).

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Notes

  1. While Davidson (1980) is a typical proponent of the first analysis, Mellor (1991), for instance, prefers the second option.

  2. In consequence, authors such as Bennett (1988) or Dowe (2000) argue that both events and facts can, depending on the context, function as causes and effects.

  3. Cf. e.g. Mellor (1991) and Mellor (1995, pp. 131–135).

  4. That is not to say that discussions about non-causal variants of slingshot arguments have also centered around Davidson’s argument. Especially since the early nineties the work of Stephen Neale has shifted the focus of attention in the debates on slingshot arguments towards Gödel’s variant. Causal slingshots, however, are commonly constructed along the lines of Davidson, cf. e.g. Føllesdal (1966), Anscombe (1969), Cummins and Gottlieb (1972), Mackie (1974), Williamson (1976), Levin (1976), Dale (1978), Horgan (1978, 1982), Bennett (1988), Mellor (1995), Koons (2000). The only Gödelian causal slingshots I know of can be found in Widerker (1985) and in the work of Neale. For a comprehensive overview over the literature on all variants of slingshots cf. Neale (2001).

  5. Reichenbach (1947, § 48), for instance, proposes to use the notions of event and fact synonymously. Kim (1973) analyzes events as property exemplifications by objects at times, which is identical to Mellor’s account of facts (Mellor 1991, pp. 203–204). Comparably, Taylor (1985, Chap. 4) takes events to be a species of facts, which he essentially spells out on a par with Mellor. Or Baylis (1948) contends that facts are particulars, which coincides with Davidson’s (1967) view concerning events.

  6. Some event theorists, as e.g. Schaffer (2005), take the causal relation to involve more than just two arguments. These complications, however, are of no relevance for our current purposes.

  7. The majority of fact theorists—especially friends of fact causation—agree with this analysis. Some, however, do not. For instance, Oppy (1997, Sect. 5) blocks slingshot arguments by analyzing “the fact that…” in terms of a definite description which denotes a fact.

  8. Cf. Kanzian (2001, Chap. II.3). Notwithstanding this mutual consent with respect to the ontological categorization of events as particulars, as is well known, there is a lot of controversy in the event literature concerning identity criteria of events. This dispute can be neglected in the present context.

  9. For further details on the different fact conceptions cf. (Mulligan and Correia 2007).

  10. There also exists a version of Davidson’s slingshot that replaces class abstracts by iota-governed expressions (cf. Neale 2001, Sect. 2.6 and Chap. 8). As the discussion in the literature on event versus fact causation has focused on the version featuring class abstracts, I am going to focus on that version as well. The main findings of this section apply to either variant of Davidson’s slingshot. For details on NBG cf. e.g. Fraenkel et al. (1973, Chap. II.7).

  11. Cf. e.g. Anscombe (1969), Williamson (1976), Mellor (1991, 1995), Barwise and Perry (1996), Bennett (1988), Koons (2000).

  12. Cf. e.g. Anscombe (1969), Barwise and Perry (1996), Mellor (1995).

  13. While Mellor (1991, 1995) rejects PSST and endorses PSLE for causal statements, Koons (2000, pp. 35–36) rejects PSLE and endorses PSST. Proponents of event causation that uphold the robustness of singular causation—or, rather, the extensionality of singular causation which is the analogue of robustness for eventive causal statements—are e.g. Levin (1976), Kistler (1999), or Schaffer (2005).

  14. Cummins and Gottlieb (1972) discuss a version of Davidson’s slingshot that uses the null class instead of the universal class, but that difference is of no significance for our purposes.

  15. In contrast, e.g. Whitehead and Russell (1962) provide a contextual definition of class abstracts that allows for their elimination (cf. *20.3).

  16. For details on how to recover colloquial statements from formalizations cf. Sainsbury (2001, pp. 64–67).

  17. Cf. Quine (1960, p. 160) or Haack (1978, p. 243) or Brun (2004, p. 322).

  18. Cf. e.g. Brun (2004, Chap. 12) or Baumgartner and Lampert (2008).

  19. For details on the frequently cited misleading form thesis cf. e.g. Brun (2004, Chap. 7.1).

  20. Cf. Neale (2001, pp. 183–184). In its original form the Gödelian slingshot is not tailored to the causal connective. For the present inquiry, though, nothing more is of interest.

  21. Cf. Strawson (1950). For a detailed discussion of the Russell-Strawson debate concerning the proper logical analysis of subject-predicate statements cf. Baumgartner (forthcoming).

  22. Cf. Russell (1977, pp. 244–246, 253–254) also Neale (2001, p. 167). In view of Gödel’s slingshot, the fact that -subs is invalidated by Russell’s theory of descriptions is sometimes interpreted as additional evidence for the adequacy of the theory.

  23. For more details on scope ambiguities involving definite descriptions cf. Neale (1990, Chap. 4). The possibility of interpreting definite descriptions in factual causal statements to have wide scope is normally not considered in the literature. I owe this interpretation of causal statements to Michael Gabbay.

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Acknowledgements

My particular thanks go to Timm Lampert for countless discussions about facts and slingshots, as well as for our common work on logical formalization. Moreover, I am grateful to Michael Gabbay and to the anonymous referees of this journal for very helpful comments on earlier drafts. Finally, I thank the Swiss National Science Foundation for generous support of this work (grant PP001-114812/1).

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    Michael Baumgartner

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Baumgartner, M. Causal Slingshots. Erkenn 72, 111–133 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9190-x

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