Abstract
The aim of this paper is to define a notion of supervenience which can adequately describe the systematic dependence of extrinsic as well as of intrinsic higher-level properties on base-level features. We argue that none of the standard notions of supervenience—the concepts of weak, strong and global supervenience—fulfil this function. The concept of regional supervenience, which is purported to improve on the standard conceptions, turns out to be problematic as well. As a new approach, we develop the notion of property-dependent supervenience. This notion is founded on a criterion of relevance adapting the supervenience base to the considered higher-level properties in a specific way, such that only features which are relevant to the instantiation of the higher-level properties under consideration are taken into account.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Throughout the argument, we assume that all sets which stand in the relation of supervenience contain only qualitative, viz., non-haecceitistic, properties (for a justification of this assumption cf. Horgan 1982, pp. 36–37). Furthermore, we suppose that there is a set of basic physical properties on which all other types of property ultimately depend and that the B-properties occurring in the presented definitions of supervenience are all members of this set.
More precisely, ΦB should be what Kim calls the B-maximal property of x, i.e., consist of the conjunction of all of x’s (non-haecceitistic) B-properties and hence represent a complete B-description of x (Kim 1984, pp. 58–59). We assume that the properties signified by the variable ‘ΦB’ in the definitions to follow are all B-maximal in this sense.
Strictly speaking, this formulation is inadequate insofar as isomorphisms are usually relations between sets, whereas possible worlds may not be equated with sets of individuals. However, as it is common practice to speak of isomorphisms between possible worlds, we employ this formulation as well.
This distinction between different notions of global supervenience is proposed by Bennett (Bennett 2004, p. 503). Shagrir also formulates a notion of intermediate global supervenience (Shagrir 2002, p. 182). The concepts of weak and strong global supervenience have also been put forward by McLaughlin (McLaughlin 1997, p. 214) and Sider (Sider 1999, pp. 915–917). Stalnaker proposes a notion which is equivalent to strong global supervenience (Stalnaker 1996, p. 227).
In contrast to Vallentyne’s original concept, our more liberal notion of contraction does not make explicit reference to times. An I-contraction of the actual world may, for instance, contain an individual living in the year 2007 as well as Beethoven. Hence, the temporal extension of contractions in our sense is implicitly determined by the temporal extension of the individuals occurring in them (for the advantage of this procedure cf. note 9 below).
Forming contractions according to this proposal presupposes a criterion of identity for individuals across possible worlds. However, this possibly controversial consequence can be avoided if the assumption that a contraction of w contains individuals which are identical to individuals occurring in w is replaced by the weaker supposition that the contracted world contains individuals which are intrinsic duplicates of individuals occurring in w—where intrinsic duplicates are defined as individuals having exactly the same intrinsic properties (Langton and Lewis 1998, p. 336). Spelling out the definition (Φ-D) and the definitions to follow along these lines would formally complicate our account, but not change it substantially. (Vallentyne’s conception, by contrast, would be circular if the definition of contractions involved the notion of duplication, as he uses contractions to define the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.)
(Φ-D) can only account for extrinsic properties whose instantiation depends on the existence of other individuals, while there are also extrinsic properties whose instantiation depends on the absence of individuals having certain features, e.g., the property of being the only red-haired person, and mixed properties, such as the property of having exactly two sons. Trying to give an account which can adequately cover these kinds of properties as well provides room for further research.
y does not have to exist any more at the time when John instantiates Φ. To take this possibility into account, our notion of contraction does not explicitly refer to a particular time (cf. note 6).
In this case, ΦB is assumed to be the conjunction of x’s intrinsic B-properties (cf. note 2).
Hofweber devises a concept called modified strong supervenience defined as follows:
(MSS) Necessarily, for every non-physical property N there is some n and an n-ary physical relation R n, and a sequence of physical objects o of length n − 1, such that, necessarily, if something has R n(o) then it has N (Hofweber 2005, p. 25).
This concept displays certain similarities to the concept of property-dependent supervenience. Yet there are at least two crucial differences between Hofweber’s conception and our approach: (i) Hofweber’s notion is purported to account for properties whose instantiation depends on the existence of particular individuals, whereas we exclude such properties from the consideration and focus on non-haecceitistic properties (cf. note 1); (ii) (MSS) specifies individuals and relations whose existence or instantiation ensures that the higher-level property N is instantiated, but it does not exclude irrelevant features from the supervenience base and hence does not contain an analogue to our minimalism condition; in contrast to our notion of property-dependent supervenience, (MSS) is therefore not able to tackle the irrelevant feature problem.
References
Beckermann, A. (1992). Supervenience, emergence, and reduction. In A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim (Eds.), Emergence or reduction? Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism (pp. 94–118). Berlin: de Gruyter.
Bennett, K. (2004). Global supervenience and dependence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68, 501–529.
Francescotti, R. M. (1999). How to define intrinsic properties. Noûs, 33, 590–609.
Hofweber, T. (2005). Supervenience and object-dependent properties. Journal of Philosophy, 102, 5–32.
Horgan, T. (1982). Supervenience and microphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63, 29–43.
Horgan, T. (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind, 102, 555–586.
Kim, J. (1984). Concepts of supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45, 153–176. (Quoted from Kim, J. (1993). Supervenience and mind (pp. 53–78). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.)
Kim, J. (1987). “Strong” and “global” supervenience revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 48, 315–326. (Quoted from Kim, J. (1993). Supervenience and mind (pp. 79–91). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.)
Langton, R., & Lewis, D. (1998). Defining “intrinsic”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58, 333–345.
McLaughlin, B. P. (1995). Varieties of supervenience. In E. E. Savellos & Ü. D. Yalçin (Eds.), Supervenience: New essays (pp. 16–59). Needham Heights: Cambridge.
McLaughlin, B. P. (1997). Supervenience, vagueness, and determination. Philosophical Perspectives, 11, 209–230.
Paull, R. C., & Sider, T. R. (1992). In defense of global supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, 833–854.
Shagrir, O. (2002). Global supervenience, coincident entities and anti-individualism. Philosophical Studies, 109, 171–196.
Sider, T. (1999). Global supervenience and identity across times and worlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49, 913–937.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1996). Varieties of supervenience. Philosophical Perspectives, 10, 221–241.
Vallentyne, P. (1997). Intrinsic properties defined. Philosophical Studies, 88, 209–219.
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank Terry Horgan, Thomas Müller and two anonymous referees for various valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We are also grateful to Jennifer Williams for linguistic corrections. Vera Hoffmann’s work on this paper was supported by the VolkswagenStiftung (Volkswagen Foundation) and by the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes (German National Scholarship Foundation).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix
Appendix
Claim: If the higher-level properties under consideration are intrinsic, the criterion of property-dependent supervenience coincides with the criterion of strong supervenience applied in the case where the supervenience base contains only intrinsic properties.
Proof: Suppose that ΦA is intrinsic and that x instantiates ΦA in w 1. Then the pair [I 1, P], with I 1 = {x} and P = ∅, meets the condition of ΦA-dependency: [I 1, P] trivially satisfies the minimalism condition. Moreover, since x has the intrinsic property ΦA in w 1, the sufficiency condition is fulfilled independently of the individuals, properties and relations included in I 1 and P: x per definitionem instantiates ΦA in any contraction of w 1 in which x has exactly the same intrinsic properties as in w 1. Now consider a world w 2 inhabited by an individual y. Since P is empty, there is a set I 2 of inhabitants of w 2, viz. I 2 = {y}, for which it is trivially the case that there is an isomorphism between I 1 and I 2 mapping x onto y and preserving all properties and relations belonging to P. Thus, if ΦA is intrinsic, the condition that there be a ΦA-dependent isomorphism between w 1 and w 2 is fulfilled in any case. Consequently, the condition can be eliminated from the criterion (P-DS) which then coincides with the criterion of strong supervenience (SS) (provided that the supervenience base comprises only intrinsic properties).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hoffmann, V., Newen, A. Supervenience of Extrinsic Properties. Erkenn 67, 305–319 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9073-y
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9073-y