Design of electronic payment system based on authenticated key exchange
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This paper proposes an electronic payment system based on authenticated key exchange protocol. In this scheme, an effective owner tracing mechanism is introduced to identify a malicious customer. Moreover, every participant can mutually authenticate each other. The security of the scheme is mainly based on the hardness assumption of computational Diffie–Hellman and discrete logarithm problems. Furthermore, the security of our scheme is simulated in the automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications tool and proved that the scheme is secure against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
KeywordsAnonymity revocation E-payment Mutual authentication AVISPA tool
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