Abstract
We analyze the efficiency of urbanization patterns in a stylized dynamic model of urban growth with three sectors of production. Pollution, as a force that discourages agglomeration, is caused by domestic production. We show that cities are too large and too few in number in uncoordinated equilibrium if economic growth implies increasing pollution (‘brown growth’). If, however, production becomes cleaner over time (‘green growth’) the equilibrium urbanization path reaches the efficient urbanization path after finite time without need of a coordinating mechanism. We also generalize these results by taking other forms of congestion and urban land markets into account.
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Notes
With strong migration restrictions, as they prevail in many regions in China, cities may on the other hand be inefficiently small (Au and Henderson 2006).
Thus, we neglect transport cost for the consumption good and assume that transport cost are infinite for the intermediate goods. Transport costs are important to consider if one is interested in global pollutants for example by greenhouse gases (Gaigné et al. 2012), but they are not in the core interest when studying the effects of local pollution.
Without gaining further insights, we could model this trade-off in more detail by allowing for substitution between a cheap but relatively dirty resource input and an expensive but relatively clean resource input.
In Appendix A.4 we consider an extension of the model where utility is also derived from consuming residential space. In this extension, individuals face a trade-off between commuting costs that increase, and housing prices that decrease, with the distance from the city center. We show that all our results generalize to this setting.
It is possible to endogenize the rates of human capital growth and the distribution of the two types of human capital across the two sectors. We skip this complication to focus the analysis on the question of efficiency.
Note that both issues are directly linked to the variable input in the SME sector: on the one hand, without intervention producers do not internalize the pollution effects from resource input use, on the other hand, the price of imported resource inputs might be too low relative to monopolistically supplied locally produced inputs. The government trades off these two externalities by determining the level of resource inputs that maximizes local welfare; it can implements this level by a quantity or tax/subsidy policy.
Note that the fully optimal allocation can be achieved only if population size is optimal as well.
The assumed productivity differences in the traditional sectors coordinate migration, as workers would be indifferent between regions with identical productivities.
Another type of stable equilibrium with one smaller and one larger city is also possible. In the right panel of Fig. 1, this would correspond to a situation where the two curves intersect more than three times. However, with increasing N(t), the two curves move apart and eventually the asymmetric equilibrium will disappear, while the symmetric equilibrium still exists and is stable. Thus, an asymmetric equilibrium can only exist for small N(t): as N(t) grows big enough, eventually only the symmetric equilibrium is stable.
Note that this condition implies \(2\,\overline{n}_2>3\,n^{\text {opt}}\), or equivalently, \(v(\frac{3}{2}\,n^{\text {opt}})>\beta _3\), because \(v(\frac{3}{2}\,n^{\text {opt}})>v(2\,n^{\text {opt}})>\beta _2>\beta _3\).
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A Appendix
A Appendix
1.1 A.1 Characterizing the Equilibrium for Given \(n_i\)
The first-order condition for the problem to maximize \(v_i\) with respect to \(E_i\) is
Rearranging leads to (9a). Note that (9a) has a unique solution, as the right-hand side is monotonically increasing in \(E_i\) from zero at \(E_i=0\) to infinity as \(E_i\rightarrow 1/(1+\frac{\phi }{1-\mu _i})\).
The first-order condition for the problem to maximize \(v_i\) with respect to \(e_i\) is
with equality for an interior solution and strict inequality for the corner solution \(e_i=e_i^{\max }\) (the lower corner solution \(e_i=0\) is impossible, as then \(c_i=0\)). Using \(E_i>0\), \(E_i<1\), and \(e_i>0\), this condition becomes (9b).
For an interior solution,
Combining this interior first-order condition for \(e_i\) with the first-order condition for \(E_i\), (9a), we solve for \(e_i\) and \(E_i\) in the interior equilibrium as:
and
which substituted into the utility function implies
where \(\xi _i \equiv 1/(\mu _i+(1-\mu _i)\eta _i)\). Equation (A.5) is equation (10b). Equation (A.4) gives \(e_i\) as a decreasing function of \(n_i\), so that the interior solution can apply only if the expression is below \(e_i^{\max }\). Hence, we find:
For a corner solution, the equilibrium level of \(E_i\) is given as the solution of (9a) with \(e_i=e_i^{\max }\). A similar argument as in Appendix A.2 shows that the optimal pollution level is increasing with \(e_i^{\max }\).
1.2 A.2 Proof that Efficient Pollution Level is Non-decreasing with Population
If the optimal emission intensity is in the interior, \({\hat{e}}_i<e_i^{\max }\), the efficient level of pollution is independent of \(n_i\) (cf. Appendix A.3). For the corner solution \({\hat{e}}_i=e_i^{\max }\), we take the total differential of equation (9a). This yields
For \({\hat{E}}_i<1/(1+\phi /(1-\mu _i))\), both the term in front of \(dn_i\) on the left hand side and the term in front of \(dE_i\) on the right hand side are strictly positive so that \(dE_i/dn_i>0\). For \(E_i=0\), we have \(n_i=0\); for \(E_i\rightarrow 1/(1+\phi /(1-\mu _i))\), we have \(n_i\rightarrow \infty \) from condition (9a). Hence in the corner solution, \(dE_i/dn_i>0\) for all positive values of \(n_i\) and a fortiori for the relevant range \(n_i \in (0,n_i^I)\). A similar argument leads to the conclusion that \({\hat{E}}_i\) increases if \(D_i(t)/p(t)\) increases, while \(n_i\) remains constant.
1.3 A.3 Proof of Result 1
By the envelope theorem, the total derivative of utility with respect to population equals the partial derivative of utility with respect to population. Hence,
Thus, utility has an interior maximum, if \(1-\mu _i\,(1+\psi _i)=1-\mu _i+\frac{1-\mu _i}{\sigma _i-1}=\frac{1-\mu _i}{\sigma _i-1}\,\left( \sigma _i-2\right) >0\), which is true by the above assumption \(\sigma _i>2\). Otherwise, utility would be monotonically increasing with \(n_i\) due to very strongly increasing returns to scale. The condition for an interior extremum is
Note that an interior maximum must be at a population size where optimal emission intensity is at the corner \({\hat{e}}_i=e_i^{\max }\), as utility is montonically decreasing with \(n_i\) for an interior solution of emission intensity as becomes clear from equation (10b) under our assumption \(1<(\sigma -1)\eta \Leftrightarrow \mu \psi < (1-\mu )\eta \). Combining (9a) and (A.9), we find that the pollution level at the interior extremum of utility satisfies
which can be rearranged to obtain
Plugging into (A.9), we obtain the result (11).
To show that (11) is a maximum of utility, we show that the elasticity of utility with respect to \(n_i\) is monotonically declining from a positive to a negative value when \(n_i\) increases from zero to infinity, so that utility has a single peak at \(n_i=n_i^{\text {opt}}\). First we rewrite (A.8) as an elasticity condition
with
and
Thus, the elasticity declines monotonically with \(f_i\). From (9a) we know that \(f_i\) is non-decreasing in \(E_i\) and from Appendix A.2 we know that \(E_i\) is non-decreasing in \(n_i\). Hence, the elasticity of utility with respect to \(n_i\) is non-increasing in \(n_i\). Equation (9a) shows that the lower bound for \(f_i\) is \(1/(1-\mu _i)\), which substituted in (A.12) gives that \(\psi _i>0\) is the upper bound of the elasticity of utility with respect to \(n_i\). Equation (9b) shows that for \(n_i\) critically large, an interior solution implies, so that \(f_i=1/(1-\eta _i)(1-\mu _i)\) and the elasticity of utility with respect to \(n_i\) becomes the constant \(-[(1-\mu _i)\eta _i - \psi _i \mu _i]/[\mu _i+(1-\mu _i)\eta _i]<0\), consistent with both (A.12) and (10b). Hence the elasticity is negative for all \(n_i>n_i^{\text {opt}}\) so that \(\lim \limits _{n_i\rightarrow \infty }v_i(n_i)=0\).
To determine utility for \(n_i=0\), we use the lower bounds (\(f_i=1/(1-\mu _i)\), \(E_i=0\), \(e_i=e_i^{\max }\), \(n_i=0\)) into (10a) to find
and use \(f_i=1/(1-\mu _i)\) into (A.13) to find
Combining the two displayed results we find \(\lim \limits _{n_i\rightarrow 0}v_i(n_i)=0\). We state this finding in Result 1.
Similarly we find \(\lim \limits _{n_i\rightarrow 0}v'_i(n_i) \propto \psi _i (E_i/n_i^2)\propto n_i^{\psi _i-1}\). This result implies that a sufficient condition for stability of the Malthusian urbanization pattern is \(\psi _i<1\), so that \(v'_i(0)\) is infinitely large and small new cities attract workers from large old cities.
1.4 A.4 Considering the Urban Spatial Structure
We consider the following extension where urban spatial structure is described by an Alonso-Muth-Mills monocentric city model (e.g. Fujita 1989), closely following Behrens et al. (2014, Appendix F). Production does not need space and is concentrated in the central business district (CBD) in the city center. Each worker commutes from his place of residence in a distance z from the CBD, causing transport costs \(T(z)=\tau (t)\,\frac{1+\gamma }{\gamma }\,2^\gamma \,z^\gamma \), with \(\tau (t),\gamma >0\), and \(\gamma \le (1+\psi _i)\,\mu _i-1\). We allow the transport cost parameter \(\tau (t)\) to change over time, capturing potential improvements in commuting technology. We consider a linear city with residences of unit length, such that the total extension of a city with \(n_i\) inhabitants is \(z^*=n_i/2\) to both sides of the CBD. In residential equilibrium, all households have the same income net of land rent r(z) and commuting costs T(z), i.e. \(r(z)+T(z)\) is a constant. Normalizing opportunity costs of land to zero, \(r(z^*)=0\), and thus \(r(z)=T(z^*)-T(z)\). All differential rent is taxed and redistributed in a lumb-sum fashion to current urban citizens. Aggregate differential land rent is
Disposable income of an individual living at a distance z from the CBD thus is increased by a share \(n_i\) in \(A(n_i)\) and decreased by \(r(z)+T(z)=T(z^*)\). Equation (8) is thus replaced by
where
Within the model, the following variant of Result 1 holds:
Result 7
When pollution is at a locally optimal level, utility has a unique interior maximum at a population size determined as the solution of
Furthermore, utility \(v_i(n_i)\) tends to zero for \(n_i\rightarrow 0\) and \(n_i\rightarrow \infty \).
The optimal population size decreases with the level of economic development \(D_i(t)\), and increases with the relative import price, p(t).
Proof
The proof is structured as follws. We first characterize optimal pollution and its comparative statics. Then we derive the optimal population size and show that it is a maximum. Finally we derive the comparative static results of \(n_i^{opt}\).
Optimal pollution is determined by the condition
Rearranging leads to
The derivative of the last term on the right-hand side of this condition with respect to \({\hat{E}}_i\) is
A positive level of consumption requires (cf. Eq. A.18)
Using this result in (A.22), we find that the right hand side (RHS) of (A.21) is increasing with \({\hat{E}}_i\), as
Thus, we have the following comparative static results: \(\partial {\hat{E}}_i/\partial n_i>0\)—the partial of the left-hand side (LHS) of (A.21) with respect to \(n_i\) is positive, while the partial of the RHS with respect to \(n_i\) is negative; \(\partial {\hat{E}}_i/\partial D_i>0\)—the partial of the LHS with respect to \(D_i\) is positive; \(\partial {\hat{E}}_i/\partial p(t)<0\)—the partial of the LHS with respect to p(t) is negative, while the partial of the RHS with respect to p(t) is positive; and \(\partial {\hat{E}}_i/\partial \tau (t)>0\)—the partial of the RHS with respect to \(\tau (t)\) is negative.
The properties of \(v_i(n_i)\) at the corners \(n_i=0\) and \(n_i=\infty \) follow according to exactly the same logic as for Result 1.
By the envelope theorem, the total derivative of utility with respect to population equals the partial derivative of utility with respect to population. Hence,
Using \(-{\hat{T}}_i(n_i)+n_i\,{\hat{T}}_i'(n_i)=\tau (t)\,n_i^{1+\gamma }\) from (A.19) and defining
and with \(n_i^{opt}\) to denote the optimal population size, the first-order condition for the optimal population size is \(\Psi (n_i^{opt})=0\), as stated in (A.20). This is a maximum of utility, as second derivative is negative:
\(\Psi '(n_i^{opt})>0\) is true, because in the derivative of \(\Psi (n_i)\) with respect to \(n_i\), evaluated at \(n_i^{opt}\),
The expression in the second line is larger or equal to \((1+\psi _i)\,\mu _i\,p(t)\,\frac{{\hat{E}}_i}{e_i\,n_i^{opt}}>0\) (using the above assumption \((1+\psi _i)\,\mu _i\ge 1+\gamma \)), and the expression in brackets in the last line is positive, as follows from the first-order condition for the optimal level of \({\hat{E}}_i\), and \(\partial {\hat{E}}_i/\partial n_i>0\).
The comparative statics of \(n_i^{opt}\) with respect to \(D_i(t)\) is found by differentiating (A.20) with respect to \(D_i(t)\)
The expression in brackets in the first term is negative: Using (A.23) and (A.25), we have
We thus can use the following to get the sign of \(\partial n_i^{opt}/\partial D_i(t)\),
Thus the first two terms in (A.28) are positive, as
This implies that the optimal population size is decreasing with \(D_i(t)\), as \(\Psi '(n_i^{opt})>0\). In a similar fashion it can be shown that the optimal population size is increasing in p(t). \(\square \)
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Quaas, M.F., Smulders, S. Brown Growth, Green Growth, and the Efficiency of Urbanization. Environ Resource Econ 71, 529–549 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0172-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0172-1