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Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 62, Issue 4, pp 711–727 | Cite as

Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries

  • Hans-Peter Weikard
  • Leo Wangler
  • Andreas Freytag
Article

Abstract

Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyse a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreements. While a full participation requirement would be efficient, we find (sequential) equilibria with a minimum participation rule that allows at least one country to free ride. Free riding may occur if a country can exploit some bargaining power in the negotiation of the minimum participation rule.

Keywords

Minimum participation rules International environmental agreements Coalition formation Transboundary pollution Environmental policy coordination 

JEL Classification

D62 H41 D02 C72 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We dedicate this article to the memory of Mika Widgrén. Mika has provided stimulating comments on an earlier version this paper just a few weeks before he passed away. The paper has further benefitted from suggestions by Erik Ansink, Michael Finus and three anonymous reviewers. We thank the German Science Foundation (DFG) for supporting our research cooperation.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hans-Peter Weikard
    • 1
  • Leo Wangler
    • 2
  • Andreas Freytag
    • 3
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen School of Social SciencesWageningen UniversityWageningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Institut für Innovation und Technik (iit)BerlinGermany
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsFriedrich Schiller University JenaJenaGermany
  4. 4.Department of EconomicsStellenbosch UniversityStellenboschSouth Africa

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