Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 79–93 | Cite as

Common Pool Politics and Inefficient Fishery Management

  • Julia Hoffmann
  • Martin F. Quaas


Fisheries management often fails because total allowable catches (TACs) are set at inefficiently high levels. To study why decision-makers choose such high TACs, we model the annual negotiation on TACs as a dynamic game in discrete time. TACs are fixed by majority decision in a council consisting of decision-makers who are heterogeneous with respect to their discount rates. We show that the optimal feedback strategy for the less patient decision-makers will set inefficiently high TACs in Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. A binding commitment to a long-term management plan could help solving this problem and lead to a more sustainable fishery management.


Fisheries Fishery economics Environmental uncertainty  Constant escapement Political economy Dynamic game theory 

JEL Classification

Q22 Q57 D78 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of KielKielGermany

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