Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 51, Issue 2, pp 297–315 | Cite as

Farsightedness in a Coalitional Great Fish War

  • Michèle Breton
  • Michel Y. Keoula


We explore the implications of the farsightedness assumption on the conjectures of players in a coalitional Great Fish War model with symmetric players, derived from the seminal model of Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ 11:649–661, 1980). The farsightedness assumption for players in a coalitional game acknowledges the fact that a deviation from a single player will lead to the formation of a new coalition structure as the result of possibly successive moves of her rivals in order to improve their payoffs. It departs from mainstream game theory in that it relies on the so-called rational conjectures, as opposed to the traditional Nash conjectures formed by players on the behavior of their rivals. For values of the biological parameter and the discount factor more plausible than the ones used in the current literature, the farsightedness assumption predicts a wide scope for cooperation in non-trivial coalitions, sustained by credible threats of successive deviations that defeat the shortsighted payoff of any prospective deviator. Compliance or deterrence of deviations may also be addressed by acknowledging that information on the fish stock or on the catch policies actually implemented may be available only with a delay (dynamic farsightedness). In that case, the requirements are stronger and the sizes and number of possible farsighted stable coalitions are different. In the sequential move version, which could mimic some characteristics of fishery models, the results are not less appealing, even if the dominant player or dominant coalition with first move advantage assumption provides a case for cooperation with the traditional Nash conjectures.


Coalition stability Fisheries Farsightedness 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.HEC MontréalMontréalCanada

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