Abstract
Prior research suggests that the media plays an important information intermediary role in capital markets. We investigate the role of the media in influencing firms’ engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Using a large sample of 4396 unique firms from 42 countries over the period 2003–2012, we find strong evidence that firms engage in more CSR activities if located in countries where the media has more freedom. This relation is robust to using various proxies for media freedom, an alternative source of CSR data, and to applying the instrumental variables approach to address endogeneity. In additional analyses, we find that the positive relation between media freedom and CSR engagement is stronger for better governed firms and for larger firms. Since the media have the ability to impact reputational capital, we conclude that media freedom affects firms’ incentives to engage in costly CSR activities.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
We provide a comprehensive review of these related studies on media visibility and CSR in the literature review, “Media visibility and CSR” section.
The finance literature also documents the effects of CSR on firm value (e.g., Fatemi et al. 2015), idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Lee and Faff 2009), financial distress (e.g., Goss 2009), the cost of capital and access to finance (e.g., El Ghoul et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2014), and merger performance (Deng et al. 2013). This literature further suggests that CSR activities result in higher firm valuations by mitigating information asymmetry between firms and investors (Kim et al. 2012), by inducing more analyst coverage and reducing analyst forecast errors (Dhaliwal et al. 2012), and by decreasing agency problems (Freeman 1984).
Prior finance research on whether CSR activities are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization or represent the interests of entrenched managers is mixed (see, for example, Deng et al. 2013). Our results suggest that better governed firms are more responsive to media coverage than poorly governed firms. To the extent that better corporate governance is value-enhancing, our findings suggest that CSR activities are consistent with shareholders’ interests.
Fransen (2013) contends that the firm’s social and environmental activities are driven by different national institutions. In our subsequent empirical analysis, we test that contention.
Hubbard and Lindsay (2013) and Uncles and Kwok (2013) define differentiated replication as an empirical undertaking to extend an initial study by deliberately and purposefully introducing changes in various conditions and aspects of the analysis. With a goal of verifying validity and establishing empirical generalizations, the process of differentiated replication, as documented by Uncles and Kwok (2013, p. 1399), involves “checking empirical findings from an initial study under varied conditions (validity across conditions), using multiple methods (convergent validity), by different researchers (inter-investigator validity).” As part of our empirical analysis, we apply this protocol to the study by Hartmann and Uhlenbruck (2015). Easley and Madden (2013), Easley et al. (2013), and Evanschitzky et al. (2007) note that replication, a critical component of the scientific method, is now becoming more valued in the social sciences.
Cline et al. (2016) study the consequences of allegations of CEO personal indiscretions (e.g., drug abuse, extramarital affairs, violence). They find that CEO turnover increases and CEO pay decreases after such allegations. They also find that directors overseeing indiscreet CEOs receive significantly fewer votes at the following annual meeting. Gilson (1989) further shows that more than half of the CEOs of firms in or near default are replaced and that these CEOs are not hired again at publicly listed firms, while Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) show that the CEOs of firms in or near default that are not replaced experience significant pay cuts.
Dyck and Zingales (2002) note that Sears’ directors despised Monks because they were subject to mockery in their social circles following the WSJ ad. Other shareholder activists have used a similar strategy of naming and shaming in the media. For instance, CalPers used to publish an annual Focus List of underperforming firms that was widely rebroadcast by the media, and Hermitage Capital Management used to mediatize corporate malfeasance in Russia (Dyck et al. 2008).
This example suggests that the media can play a role in disciplining managers and directors when formal means of doing so fail.
Both studies find that firms from more Collectivist (or less Individualistic) cultures engage in more CSR activities.
Kennedy (2008) similarly notes that the media is typically perceived as more independent and therefore a more credible source of information.
One might wonder whether, as significant advertisers, large firms leverage their importance to deter the media from revealing their malfeasance. We argue that this is unlikely when the media are free. Anecdotally, despite intense lobbying efforts, Enron—the seventh-largest company in the U.S. at the time—could not dissuade Fortune from publishing Bethany McLean’s article. In addition, Miller (2006) shows that U.S. corporate fraudsters that happen to be among the largest advertisers are not less likely to attract media attention. Thus, large firms are unlikely to cause a media bias in the presence of media freedom.
Indeed, Burgess (2010) observes that the indices from these three institutions comprise “an oligopoly of media ratings systems” (p. 7). The Media Sustainability index (MSI) from IREX reflects the degree to which the nation’s legal, political, social, and professional environments contribute to a sustainable and independent media. IREX works in conjunction with USAID to compile the MSI for countries throughout Africa, Europe and Eurasia, and the Middle East. Because this geographical concentration limits coverage across our sample to only two countries (Russia and South Africa), we do not include the MSI in our analysis.
The alleged deficiencies in the primary measures of media freedom (from Freedom House and RWB) are a lack of transparency, potential cultural bias, and a focus on “old media.” We mitigate concerns about these weaknesses by also measuring media freedom with the Freedom on the Net index and the State Press measures. The former focuses on freedom of the “new media”; the latter are based on objective and verifiable market-based data.
We also obtain alternative measures of CSR and press freedom, as we explain earlier. However, we do not use these alternative measures in constructing our main sample.
The sample countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
In our regressions, we include several country-level variables to better isolate the effect of media freedom on CSR. To ensure that multicollinearity is not driving our results, we replicate our analysis after excluding all country-level controls except for LOG(GDP/CAP). Our core findings persist. In addition, we compute the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables included in our main regression in Model 1 of Table 5. The results show that the VIFs are all below 10, with a mean regression VIF of 2.75, suggesting that multicollinearity is not affecting our results.
However, contrary to expectations, we find that firms located in countries that have ratified more environmental treaties and countries with more economic freedom have lower CSR scores. The negative relationship between the number of treaties and CSR is similar to the one documented in Hartmann and Uhlenbruck (2015). These authors argue that international environmental treaties might signal negative CSR sentiment rather than stronger CSR regulations. The negative association between economic freedom and CSR is consistent with firms behaving in socially irresponsible ways when their governments adopt economic laisser-faire. This result is also consistent with El Ghoul et al. (2016) who find that CSR is more valuable in low business freedom countries, consistent with firms using CSR to fill institutional voids.
As a quick check for whether reverse causality is at play, we transform our baseline model (Model 1 of Table 5) by using FOP_FH as the dependent variable and CSR_S as the independent variable. We find that the coefficient on CSR_S is positive and significant at the 1%, indicating that reverse causality could be at stake. We thank the reviewer for suggesting this test.
As described by McKay et al. (2005), after the Napoleonic Wars until 1920, approximately 60 million Europeans immigrated to North America, Latin America (primarily Argentina and Southern Brazil), Australia and New Zealand. Essentially, Europeans settled in regions that were similar in distance from the equator to their home country. Those originally from higher latitudes in Europe (e.g., Germany, Britain, Ireland, Scandinavia) were more likely to immigrate to North America, Australia and New Zealand. Those from European countries of lower latitude (e.g., Spain, Portugal) were more likely to primarily immigrate to Latin America. For further documentation of the migratory patterns of European settlers, see Chapter 26 (“The West and the World”) of McKay et al. (2005).
Providing further justification as to why media freedom may be inversely associated with oil reserves, Egorov et al. (2009) argue that governments in resource-abundant countries may attempt to reduce demand for media freedom by using resource rents to compensate citizens for censorship and to “buy off” political opposition.
From Model 1, we can obtain the derivative of CSR_S with respect to FOP_FH as \( \left( {\partial CSR\_S/\partial FOP\_FH} \right) = \beta_{FOP\_FH} + \beta_{FOP\_FH \times SIZE} \times SIZE \) where \( \beta_{FOP\_FH} \) is the coefficient on FOP_FH and \( \beta_{FOP\_FH \times SIZE} \) is the coefficient on FOP_FH × SIZE. Since the estimate of \( \beta_{FOP\_FH} \) is not significant, the derivative reduces to \( \left( {\partial CSR\_S/\partial FOP\_FH} \right) = \beta_{FOP\_FH \times SIZE} \times SIZE = 0.037 \times SIZE \). Recall that SIZE is the logarithm of sales in millions of USD, so it is positive for firms with sales greater than $1 million. In our sample, only 15 firm-years have negative SIZE. Therefore, the marginal effect of FOP_FH on CSR_S is mostly positive in our sample.
References
Aerts, W., Cormier, D., & Magnan, M. (2006). Intra-industry imitation in corporate environmental reporting: An international perspective. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 25, 299–331.
Arora, S., & Gangopadhyay, S. (1995). Toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 28, 289–309.
Atanassov, J., & Kim, E. (2009). Labor and corporate governance: International evidence from restructuring decisions. Journal of Finance, 64, 341–373.
Attig, N., Boubakri, N., El Ghoul, S., & Guedhami, O. (2015). Firm internationalization and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics (forthcoming).
Bansal, P., & Clelland, I. (2004). Talking trash: Legitimacy, impression management and unsystematic risk in the context of the natural environment. Academy of Management Journal, 47, 93–103.
Bansal, P., & Roth, K. (2000). Why companies go green: A model of ecological responsiveness. Academy of Management Journal, 43, 717–736.
Bartkus, B., Morris, S., & Siefert, B. (2002). Governance and corporate philanthropy: Restraining Robin Hood? Business and Society, 41, 319–345.
Bednar, M. K., Boivie, S., & Prince, N. R. (2013). Burr under the saddle: How media coverage influences strategic change. Organization Science, 24, 910–925.
Bertels, S., & Peloza, J. (2008). Running just to stand still? Managing CSR reputation in an era of ratcheting expectations. Corporate Reputation Review, 11, 56–72.
Borden, M. J. (2007). The role of financial journalists in corporate governance. Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, 12, 311–369.
Brunetti, A., & Weder, B. (2003). A free press is bad news for corruption. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 1801–1824.
Burgess, J. (2010). Evaluating the evaluators: Media freedom indexes and what they measure. Working paper, Center for Global Communication Studies, University of Pennsylvania.
Bushee, B. J., Core, J. E., Guay, W., & Hamm, S. J. W. (2010). The role of the business press as an information intermediary. Journal of Accounting Research, 48, 1–19.
Campbell, J. Y. (1996). Understanding risk and return. Journal of Political Economy, 104, 298–345.
Carroll, A., & Buchholtz, A. (2011). Business and society: Ethics, sustainability, and stakeholder management, 8th ed. Mason: South-Western/Cengage Learning.
Cheng, B., Ioannou, I., & Serafeim, G. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and access to finance. Strategic Management Journal, 35, 1–23.
Cline, B. N., Walkling, R. A., & Yore, A. S. (2016). The agency costs of managerial indiscretions: Sex, lies, and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics (forthcoming).
Core, J. E., Guay, W., & Larcker, D. F. (2008). The power of the pen and executive compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 88, 1–25.
Dai, L., Parwada, J. T., & Zhang, B. (2015). The governance effect of the media’s news dissemination role: Evidence from insider trading. Journal of Accounting Research, 53, 331–366.
Deng, X., Kang, J.-K., & Low, B. S. (2013). Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder value maximization: Evidence from mergers. Journal of Financial Economics, 110, 87–109.
Dhaliwal, D. S., Radhakrishnan, S., Tsang, A., & Yang, Y. G. (2012). Nonfinancial disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy: International evidence on corporate social responsibility disclosure. Accounting Review, 87, 723–759.
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., Nenova, T., & Shleifer, A. (2003). Who owns the media? Journal of Law and Economics, 46, 341–381.
Dyck, A., Morse, A., & Zingales, L. (2010). Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud? Journal of Finance, 65, 2133–2255.
Dyck, A., Volchkova, N., & Zingales, L. (2008). The corporate governance role of the media: Evidence from Russia. Journal of Finance, 63, 1093–1135.
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2002). The corporate governance role of the media. In R. Islam (Ed.), The right to tell: The role of the media in development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004). Private benefits of control: An international comparison. Journal of Finance, 59, 537–600.
Easley, R. W., & Madden, C. S. (2013). Replication revisited: Introduction to the special section on replication in business research. Journal of Business Research, 66, 1375–1376.
Easley, R. W., Madden, C. S., & Gray, V. (2013). A tale of two cultures: Revisiting journal editors’ views of replication research. Journal of Business Research, 66, 1457–1459.
Egorov, G., Guriev, S., & Sonin, K. (2009). Why resource-poor dictators allow freer media: A theory and evidence from panel data. American Political Science Review, 103, 645–668.
El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O, & Kim, Y. (2016). Country-level institutions, firm value, and the role of corporate social responsibility initiatives. Journal of International Business Studies (forthcoming).
El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Kwok, C. C. Y., & Mishra, D. R. (2011). Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of capital? Journal of Banking & Finance, 35, 2388–2406.
EPG. (2015). Business backs education report. http://www.unesco.org/education/BBE-EPG-Report2015.pdf.
Evanschitzky, H., Baumgarth, C., Hubbard, R., & Armstrong, J. S. (2007). Replication research’s disturbing trend. Journal of Business Research, 60, 411–415.
Farrell, K. A., & Whidbee, D. A. (2002). Monitoring by the financial press and forced CEO turnover. Journal of Banking & Finance, 26, 2249–2276.
Fatemi, A., Fooladi, I., & Tehranian, H. (2015). Valuation effects of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Banking & Finance, 59, 182–192.
Fransen, L. (2013). The embeddedness of responsible business practice: Exploring the interaction between national-institutional environments and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 115, 213–227.
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman.
Gilson, S. C. (1989). Management turnover and financial distress. Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 241–262.
Gilson, S. C., & Vetsuypens, M. R. (1993). CEO compensation in financially distressed firms: An empirical analysis. Journal of Finance, 48, 425–458.
Goss, A. (2009). Corporate social responsibility and financial distress. In Proceedings of the administrative sciences association of Canada annual meetings, 30.
Guedhami, O. (2012). Characteristics of government acquisitions over time: International evidence and crisis effect. Privatization Barometer Report (pp. 30–43).
Hall, R., & Jones, C. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 83–116.
Hartmann, J., & Uhlenbruck, K. (2015). National institutional antecedents to corporate environmental performance. Journal of World Business, 50, 729–741.
Hathaway, O. (2005). Between power and principle: An integrated theory of international law. University of Chicago Law Review, 72, 469–536.
Haw, I., Hu, B., Hwang, L., & Wu, W. (2004). Ultimate ownership, income management, and legal and extra-legal institutions. Journal of Accounting Research, 42, 423–462.
Ho, F., Wang, H., & Vitell, S. (2012). A global analysis of corporate social performance: The effects of cultural and geographic environments. Journal of Business Ethics, 107, 423–433.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Houston, J. F., Lin, C., & Ma, Y. (2011). Media ownership, concentration and corruption in bank lending. Journal of Financial Economics, 100, 326–350.
Hubbard, R., & Lindsay, R. M. (2013). From significant difference to significant sameness: Proposing a paradigm shift in business research. Journal of Business Research, 66, 1377–1388.
Huberman, G., & Regev, T. (2001). Contagious speculation and a cure for cancer: A nonevent that made stock prices soar. Journal of Finance, 56, 387–396.
Ioannou, I., & Serafeim, G. (2012). What drives corporate social performance? The role of nation-level institutions. Journal of International Business Studies, 43, 834–864.
Jackson, G., & Apostolakou, A. (2010). Corporate social responsibility in Western Europe: An institutional mirror or substitute? Journal of Business Ethics, 94, 371–394.
Jensen, M. (1979). Toward a theory of the press. Working paper, Harvard University.
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1978). Can the corporation survive? Financial Analysts Journal, 31, 31–37.
Jo, H., & Harjoto, M. (2011). Corporate governance and firm value: The impact of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 103, 351–383.
Joe, J. R., Louis, H., & Robinson, D. (2009). Managers’ and investors’ responses to media exposure of board ineffectiveness. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44, 579–605.
Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kennedy, M. (2008). Getting counted: Markets, media, and reality. American Sociological Review, 73, 270–295.
Kim, Y., Park, M. S., & Wier, B. (2012). Is earnings quality associated with corporate social responsibility? Accounting Review, 87, 761–796.
Kitzmueller, M., & Shimshack, J. (2012). Economic perspectives on corporate social responsibility. Journal of Economic Literature, 50, 51–84.
KPMG. (2013). The KPMG survey of corporate responsibility reporting 2013. https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/corporate-responsibility/Documents/corporate-responsibility-reporting-survey-2013-exec-summary.pdf.
Lee, D. D., & Faff, R. W. (2009). Corporate sustainability performance and idiosyncratic risk: A global perspective. Financial Review, 44, 213–237.
Liu, B., & McConnell, J. J. (2013). The role of the media in corporate governance: Do the media influence managers’ capital allocation decisions? Journal of Financial Economics, 110, 1–17.
Liu, L. X., Sherman, A. E., & Zhang, Y. (2014). The long-run role of the media: Evidence from initial public offerings. Management Science, 60, 1945–1964.
Maistriau, A., & Bonardi, J. (2014). How much does negative public exposure on environmental issues increase environmental performance? In Academy of management proceedings supplement, p. 11328.
McKay, J., Hill, B., & Buckler, J. (2005). A history of western society since 1300 (advanced placement edition). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
McKinsey & Company. (2009). Valuing corporate social responsibility: McKinsey Global Survey Results. http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/corporate_finance/valuing_corporate_social_responsibility_mckinsey_global_survey_results.
Miller, G. S. (2006). The press as a watch dog for accounting fraud. Journal of Accounting Research, 44, 1001–1033.
Minor, D., & Morgan, J. (2011). CSR as reputation insurance: Primum non nocere. California Management Review, 53, 40–59.
Nikolaeva, R., & Bicho, M. (2011). The role of institutional and reputational factors in the voluntary adoption of corporate social responsibility reporting standards. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 39, 136–157.
Price, M. (2011). Press freedom measures: An introduction. In M. Price, S. Abbott, & L. Morgan (Eds.), Measures of press freedom and media contributions to development: Evaluating the evaluators. New York: Peter Lang.
Roberts, J. T., Parks, B. C., & Vásquez, A. A. (2004). Who ratifies environmental treaties and why? Institutionalism, structuralism and participation by 192 nations in 22 treaties. Global Environmental Politics, 4, 22–64.
Roberts, M., & Whited, T. (2013). Endogeneity in empirical corporate finance. In G. M. Constantinides, M. Harris, & R. M. Stulz (Eds.), Handbook of the economics of finance. Oxford, UK: Elsevier.
Sobel, R., Dutta, N., & Roy, S. (2011). Beyond borders: Is media freedom contagious? In M. Price, S. Abbott, & L. Morgan (Eds.), Measures of press freedom and media contributions to development: Evaluating the evaluators. New York: Peter Lang.
Stahl, G., & Sully de Luque, M. (2014). Antecedents of responsible leader behavior: A research synthesis, conceptual framework, and agenda for future research. Academy of Management Journal, 28, 235–254.
Stephens, M. (1994). History of newspapers. Collier’s Encyclopedia.
Toffel, M., Short, J., & Ouellet, M. (2015). Codes in context: How states, markets, and civil society shape adherence to global labor standards. Regulation & Governance, 9, 205–223.
Udayasankar, K. (2007). Corporate social responsibility and firm size. Journal of Business Ethics, 83, 167–175.
Uncles, M. D., & Kwok, S. (2013). Designing research with in-built differentiated replication. Journal of Business Research, 66, 1398–1405.
Vogel, D. (2006). The market for virtue: The potential and limits of corporate social responsibility. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Waldman, D., Sully de Luque, M., Washburn, N., & House, R. (2006). Cultural and leadership predictors of corporate social responsibility values of top management: A GLOBE study of 15 countries. Journal of International Business Studies, 37, 823–837.
Wang, H. (2010). Corporate social performance and financial-based equity. Journal of Product and Brand Management, 19, 335–345.
Zingales, L. (2000). In search of new foundations. Journal of Finance, 55, 1623–1653.
Zyglidopoulos, S., Georgiadis, A., Carroll, C., & Siegel, D. (2012). Does media attention drive corporate social responsibility? Journal of Business Research, 65, 1622–1627.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank an anonymous reviewer, Najah Attig, Narjess Boubakri, Ruiyuan Chen, Jun-Koo Kang, Greg Shailer (Editor), Helen Wang, Ying Zheng, and participants at the 2016 FMA Asia/Pacific Conference and the 2016 Conference on the Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility for constructive comments. We appreciate generous financial support from Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the School of Business at Wake Forest University and excellent research assistance from Ruiyuan Chen.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Nash, R. et al. New Evidence on the Role of the Media in Corporate Social Responsibility. J Bus Ethics 154, 1051–1079 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3354-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3354-9