Abstract
Lilian Bermejo-Luque has posed these questions:
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1.
What is the relationship between presumption and presumptive inference?
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2.
What are the correctness conditions for presumptions and presumptive inferences?
Cohen’s method of relevant variables, Toulmin’s model, and Rescher’s theory of plausibility suggest answers. An inference is presumptive just in case its warrant transfers presumption from its premises to its conclusion. A warrant licencing an inference from the claim that an empirical property φ holds to the claim that some other property ψ holds is backed by observation of a constant conjunction of those properties. The stronger the backing, the stronger the warrant. Warrants may be defeated by instances of φ holding in conjunction with some property χ and ψ not holding. The method of relevant variables directs us to organize such defeating properties into relevant variables. We then test the strength of a warrant by seeing how many variables fail to have a value which defeats the warrant. The more variables with no defeater, the stronger the warrant. We may construct a canonical ordering of the relevant variables by ranking them according to the plausibility of their including defeating values. We may evaluate the strength not only of empirically backed warrants, but warrants backed by institutional rules, such as a branch of law, or by a priori intuited connections between properties. An inference rule will be presumptive just in case the plausibility of its warrant being defeated is below some specified level.
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Notes
We wish to thank a reviewer of Argumentation for raising this question.
We ignore for the moment whether there are non-analytic warrants which are conclusive.
We owe this point to David Hitchcock.
That is, although contentious, we may question whether inductive enumeration arguments are arguments. Recall that in Toulmin’s layout of arguments, there is not an arrow, but simply a line, from backing to warrant as there is an arrow from data to claim. Defending why inductive enumeration arguments may not be arguments is beyond the scope of this paper.
Here Pr(H) = Pr(~ H) only when Pr(H) = .5.
I want to thank a reviewer of Argumentation for raising this question.
We have discussed these issues in connection with discussing moral sense and moral intuition in (2005, pp, 220–226).
We are not here confining ourselves to economic value. Certainly a flower bed has aesthetic value.
I want to thank the two reviewers of Argumentation for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper.
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Acknowledgements
This paper was originally presented at the International Conference: Presumptions, Presumptive Inferences and Burden of Proof, University of Grenada, Spain, on April 28, 2016. I want to thank Prof. Lilian Bermejo-Luque for inviting me to make this presentation and the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness for supporting the conference. The paper was thoroughly revised during the Fall Semester 2017, while I was on a sabbatical leave from Hunter College of the City University of New York. I want to thank Hunter College for granting me this leave.
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Freeman, J.B. Factors for Evaluating Presumptions and Presumptive Inferences. Argumentation 33, 215–240 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-018-9468-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-018-9468-8