Abstract
When groups of individuals compete in several multiple-prize contests, the performance of a group is a vector of ordered categories. As the prizes are aimed at ranking the participants, group performances are not trivially comparable. This note provides a theoretical discussion on how to rank group performances. In order to do so, I draw from the parallel that this problem has with the formally similar problem of measuring inequality. I describe three alternatives that generate partial orders for group performances. I define partial orders based on the first- and second-order dominance, two classes of performance measures, and two sets of basic transformations, and I prove equivalence theorems between them. I apply these theoretical results to discuss several sports ranking problems.
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Notes
Alternatively, a performance can be associated with one individual who competes in a number of sequential multiple-prize contests. In the last section I provide some examples of this alternative interpretation.
Admittedly, the prize values in \(V_C\) are not only convex because convexity does not necessarily requires that \((v_{n-1}-v_n)\ge v_n \ge 0\). However, I show in Sect. 3.5 that an alternative approach maps performances in \(n+1\) dimensions, with \(v_{n+1}=0\), and thus the convexity relation is recovered.
For instance, \((2,0)=(1,0)+\mathbf {t_{1}}+\mathbf {t_{2}}\). I have that \((1,0)+\mathbf {t_{1}}=(2,-1)\notin {\mathbb {N}}^2\) but \((1,0)+\mathbf {t_{1}}+\mathbf {t_{2}}=(2,0) \in {\mathbb {N}}^2\).
See footnote 1 and applications in Sect. 4.
The total number of races has been changing over time. In 2016, the world championship included 21 races.
For instance, in some years the driver with the fastest turn received an additional point in the race, or only a certain number of races were considered. This last rule generated some debate when it turned the championship from Prost to Senna in 1989.
Source: http://formula1.markwessel.com/.
Source: http://nbastats.net/. In the table, seasons are reported by their first year. The season 1964–65, and the seasons 1976–77 to 1979–80 are excluded because voting was only for the best player. The seasons 1981–1982 to 1988–1989 are excluded because I found no disaggregated data.
The current number of tournaments is 19. Regarding the 52 weeks, there are a number of exceptions related to the ATP World Tour Finals which are not important for our discussion.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Juan Pablo Torres for his valuable feedback. I acknowledge financial support from the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo.
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof Theorem 1
The proof demonstrates the following chain of implications:
(i) \(\mathbf {y} \ge _1 \mathbf {y'}\Rightarrow \mathbf {y} \ge _T \mathbf {y'}\).
Suppose \(\mathbf {y} \ge _1 \mathbf {y'}\), I show how to get \(\mathbf {y}\) from \(\mathbf {y'}\) by T-transformation. I define recursively the n-tuple \(\mathbf {y}(k)\) as
with \(\mathbf {y}(0)=\mathbf {y}'\). Notice that the n-tuple \(\mathbf {y}(k)\) is not necessarily a performance. \(\square \)
Lemma 1
The cumulative of \(\mathbf {y}(k)\), given by \(Y(k)_i=\sum _{j=1}^{i} y(k)_j, \forall i,k=1,...,n\), is
Proof
The proof is by induction. For \(k=1\), I have \(\mathbf {y}(1)=\mathbf {y}'+(Y_1-Y'_1)\mathbf {t}_1\). First, I have that \(Y_1=y_1\) and \(Y'_1=y'_1\), so \(Y(1)_1=y(1)_1=Y_1\). Second, a transformation \(\mathbf {t}_1\) has no effect on the cumulatives for \(i\ge 2\). Consequently, \(Y(1)_i=Y'_i\) for \(i>1\). In the next step of induction, I assume that the relation is true for \(k-1\) and I prove it for k. I have that \(Y(k)_i=Y(k-1)_i=Y_i\) for \(i<k\), where in the last equality I use the induction hypothesis. Given that a transformation \(\mathbf {t}_k\) has no effect on the cumulatives for \(i>k\), \(Y(k)_i=Y(k-1)_i=Y'_i\) for \(i>k\), where in the last equality I use the induction hypothesis. For k, I have that \(Y(k)_k=Y(k-1)_k+(Y_k-Y'_k)=Y'_k\), where in the last equality I use the induction hypothesis. This completes the proof. \(\square \)
From the Lemma, \(\mathbf {Y}(n)=\mathbf {Y}\), which implies that \(\mathbf {y}(n)=\mathbf {y}\). As \(\mathbf {y}(0)=\mathbf {y}'\), I use the Definition A1 to write \(\mathbf {y}=\mathbf {y}'+\sum _{k=1}^n(Y_k-Y'_k)\mathbf {t}_k\). As \(\mathbf {y} \ge _1 \mathbf {y'}\), \((Y_k-Y'_k)\ge 0,\forall k=1,..,n\). Hence \(\mathbf {y}\) is obtained from \(\mathbf {y}'\) through a T-transformation.
(ii) \(\mathbf {y} \ge _T \mathbf {y'}\Rightarrow \mathbf {y} \ge _I \mathbf {y'}\).
Assume that \(\mathbf {y}\) is obtained from \(\mathbf {y'}\) through a T-transformation. Then there exists an index set \(\mathcal {T}\) such that
As the performance measure is linear:
For any \(\mathbf {v}\in V_I\), \((v_i-v_{i+1})\ge 0,\forall i\). I conclude that \(P(\mathbf {y;v})\ge P(\mathbf {y';v}), \forall \mathbf {v}\in V_I\).
(iii) \(\mathbf {y} \ge _I \mathbf {y'}\Rightarrow \mathbf {y} \ge _1 \mathbf {y'}\).
I define \(\mathbf {v}(k)=\mathbf {e_1}+...+\mathbf {e_k} \in V_I, \forall k\). I have that \(P(\mathbf {y;v}(k))=\sum _{i=1}^k y_i=Y_k\). The implication is direct.
Proof Theorem 2
The proof demonstrates the following chain of implications:
(i) \(\mathbf {y} \ge _2 \mathbf {y'}\Rightarrow \mathbf {y} \ge _S \mathbf {y'}\).
Suppose \(\mathbf {y} \ge _2 \mathbf {y'}\), I show how to get \(\mathbf {y}\) from \(\mathbf {y'}\) by a sequence of S-transformations. For that, I notice that second-order dominance in performances is equivalent to first-order dominance in the cumulatives of the same performances, i.e., \(\mathbf {y} \ge _2 \mathbf {y'}\Longleftrightarrow \mathbf {Y} \ge _1 \mathbf {Y'}\). The proof of this equivalence is direct by definition. From Theorem 1, I know that \(\mathbf {Y}\) is obtained from \(\mathbf {Y}'\) through a T-transformation, such that \(\mathbf {Y}=\mathbf {Y'}+\sum _{i\in \mathcal {T}}\mathbf {t_{i}}\).
The proof consists in showing that a T-transformation for a cumulative performance \(\mathbf {Y}\) is equivalent to an S-transformation of the underlying performance \(\mathbf {y}\). For that, I prove the following Lemma. \(\square \)
Lemma 2
If \(\mathbf {Y(i)}=\mathbf {Y'}+\mathbf {t_i}\) then the underlying performance \(\mathbf {y(i)}\) can be written as
Proof
For \(i<n\), \(\mathbf {y'}+\mathbf {t_i}-\mathbf {t_{i+1}}\). The cumulative is thus \(Y'_j\) for \(j<i\), \(Y(i)'_i=Y'_i+1\), \(Y(i)'_{i+1}=Y'_i-1\), and \(Y'_j\) for \(j>i+1\). For \(i=n\) the proof is direct. \(\square \)
From the lemma, if \(\mathbf {Y}\) is obtained from \(\mathbf {Y}'\) through a T-transformation, then \(\mathbf {y}\) is obtained from \(\mathbf {y}'\) through an S-transformation.
(ii) \(\mathbf {y} \ge _S \mathbf {y'}\Rightarrow \mathbf {y} \ge _C \mathbf {y'}\).
Assume that \(\mathbf {y}\) is obtained from \(\mathbf {y'}\) through an S-transformation. Then there exist \(\mathcal {T}\) and \(\mathcal {S}\) index sets such that
The performance function is:
For any \(\mathbf {v}\in V_C\) I have the following inequalities. First, \((v_i-v_{i+1})\ge 0,\forall i\) since \(\mathbf {v}\in V_C\Longrightarrow \mathbf {v}\in V_I\). Second, \([(v_i-v_{i+1})-(v_j-v_{j+1})]\ge 0, \forall i<j\) since \(\mathbf {v}\in V_C\Longrightarrow (v_i-v_{i+1})\ge (v_{i+1}-v_{i+2})\ge ...\ge (v_j-v_{j+1})\). I conclude that \(P(\mathbf {y;v})\ge P(\mathbf {y';v}), \forall \mathbf {v}\in V_C\).
(iii) \(\mathbf {y} \ge _C \mathbf {y'}\Rightarrow \mathbf {y} \ge _2 \mathbf {y'}\).
I define \(\mathbf {v}(k) \in V_C, \forall k\) as
I have that \(P(\mathbf {y;v}(k))=\sum _{i=1}^k (k+1-i)y_i=\sum _{i=1}^k Y_i=Z_k\). The implication is direct.
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Corvalan, A. How to rank rankings? Group performance in multiple-prize contests. Soc Choice Welf 51, 361–380 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1120-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1120-x