Abstract
Strategy-proof, budget-balanced, and envy-free rank mechanisms assign q identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of surplus loss to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-zero valuations. The smallest efficiency loss \(\frac{n-q}{n^{2}-n}\) is uniquely achieved by the following simple allocation rule: assign one object to each of the \(q-1\) agents with the highest valuations, a large probability to the agent with the qth highest valuation, and the remaining probability to the agent with the \((q+1)\)th highest valuation.
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Notes
Worst case analysis has been applied to various settings, see the introduction of Moulin (2009) for a brief survey.
The author thanks the referee who pointed out this interesting result.
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Y. Long is grateful to Hervé Moulin for very inspiring discussions and to referees for very helpful suggestions. Seminar participants at the University of Glasgow are acknowledged. This paper is part of the second chapter of her Ph.D. thesis. The other part of that chapter is merged with a similar and independent work by Debasis Mishra and Tridib Sharma, and appears in a related paper (Long et al. 2017).
Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Lemma 2 and its proof
Lemma 2
Suppose a symmetric function \(h:\mathbb {R}_{+}^{n-1}\rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) satisfies the following functional equation : for any \(x=(x_{1},x_{2},\ldots ,x_{n})\in {\mathcal {V}},\)
where \(\lambda _{i}\ge 0\) for all i. Then there exist \((\delta _{1},\ldots ,\delta _{n-1})\in \mathbb {R}^{n-1}\) such that for any \(z\in \mathbb {R}_{+}^{n-1},\) \(h(z)=\delta _{1}z_{*1}+\delta _{2}z_{*2}+\cdots +\delta _{n-1}z_{*(n-1)}.\)
Proof
Note that the lemma states only a necessary condition of the solutions. We show it by induction. Since
taking \(x_{1}=\cdots =x_{n}=0\), we get \(h(0,0,\ldots ,0)=0\). Taking \(x_{1}\ge x_{2}=\cdots =x_{n}=0\), we get \(h(x_{1},0,\ldots ,0)=0\). Now suppose \(h(x_{1},x_{2},\ldots ,x_{k},0,\ldots ,0)=\delta _{1}^{\prime }x_{1}+\delta _{2}^{\prime }x_{2}+\cdots +\delta _{k}^{\prime }x_{k}\) for any \(x_{1}\ge x_{2}\ge \cdots \ge x_{k}\ge 0\). We show that \(h(x_{1},x_{2},\ldots ,x_{k},x_{k+1}0,\ldots ,0)=\delta _{1}^{\prime \prime }x_{1}+\delta _{2}^{\prime \prime }x_{2}+\cdots +\delta _{k}^{\prime \prime }x_{k}+\delta _{k+1}^{\prime \prime }x_{k+1}\) for any \(x_{1}\ge x_{2}\ge \cdots \ge x_{k}\ge x_{k+1}\ge 0\).
Note that
where \(\delta _{0}^{\prime }=0\).
Therefore \(h(x_{1},x_{2},\ldots ,x_{k},x_{k+1},0,\ldots ,0)=\delta _{1}^{\prime \prime }x_{1}+\delta _{2}^{\prime \prime }x_{2}+\cdots \delta _{k}^{\prime \prime }x_{k}+\delta _{k+1}^{\prime \prime }x_{k+1}\), where
and \(\lambda _{1}=0\). \(\square \)
1.2 Lemma 3 and its proof
Lemma 3
The system of linear equations (4) has a unique solution \(\{\delta _{k}\}_{k=1}^{n-1}\) if and only if Eq. (6) holds.
Proof
Note that the system of linear equations (4) have \(n-1\) unknowns and n equations. We show the “only if” part. We write out the equations:
Note that according to the first three equations, \(\delta _{1}=0\), \(\delta _{2}=\frac{a_{1}-a_{2}}{n-2}\), and
We show by induction that for each k, \(2\le k\le n-1\),
where \(\lambda _{n-1}=0\), and for each i, \(1\le i\le n-2\), \(\lambda _{i}=\frac{n-i-1}{i}\).
Let \(k<n-1\). Suppose for each l, \(2\le l\le k\), Eq. (9) holds. Then according to the \((k+1)\)th equation of the linear system (4),
Now it is easy to calculate \(\delta _{k+1}\). And Eq. (9) holds for \(k+1\), as desired.
Hence according to the first \(n-1\) equations of the system,
Note that \(\prod _{i=1}^{m}\lambda _{i}=\mathcal {C}_{m}^{n-2}=\mathcal {C}_{n-2-m}^{n-2}=\prod _{i=1}^{n-2-m}\lambda _{i}\).
According to the last equation of the system, we have
Combining (10) and (11), we have (6).
Now the “if” part is easy to see. \(\square \)
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Long, Y. Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects. Soc Choice Welf 50, 705–719 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1102-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1102-4