Skip to main content
Log in

Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Level-1 consensus is a recently-introduced property of a preference-profile. Intuitively, it means that there exists a preference relation which induces an ordering of all other preferences such that frequent preferences are those that are more similar to it. This is a desirable property, since it enhances the stability of social choice by guaranteeing that there exists a Condorcet winner and it is elected by all scoring rules. In this paper, we present an algorithm for checking whether a given preference profile exhibits level-1 consensus. We apply this algorithm to a large number of preference profiles, both real and randomly-generated, and find that level-1 consensus is very improbable. We support these empirical findings theoretically, by showing that, under the impartial culture assumption, the probability of level-1 consensus approaches zero when the number of individuals approaches infinity. Motivated by these observations, we show that the level-1 consensus property can be weakened while retaining its stability implications. We call this weaker property Flexible Consensus. We show, both empirically and theoretically, that it is considerably more probable than the original level-1 consensus. In particular, under the impartial culture assumption, the probability for Flexible Consensus converges to a positive number when the number of individuals approaches infinity.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In fact, Mahajne et al. (2015) define a family of conditions called level-r consensus, where r is an integer between 1 and K! / 2 and K is the number of alternatives . But for the sake of simplicity, in the present paper we focus on level-1 consensus which is the strongest condition in this family.

    Note that recently Poliakov (2016) proved that level-r consensus is equivalent to level-1 consensus whenever \(r\le (K-1)!\).

  2. |T(Kj)| is also known as the Mahonian number; see OEIS sequence A008302, https://oeis.org/A008302.

  3. This calculation was done for the sake of comparison. It was implemented using Nicholas Mattei’s PrefLib tools, which are freely available at GitHub: https://github.com/nmattei/PrefLib-Tools.

  4. Our proofs below closely follow the proofs of Mahajne et al. (2015). Their proofs are stated for level-r consensus for general r, and indeed Flexible Condition 1 can also be adapted to general r, but for the sake of simplicity we prefer to focus on the case \(r=1\).

  5. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this additional condition.

  6. In fact, it is equivalent to the requirement that each member of \(F_i\) is larger than or equal to each member of \(F_j\), but as explained above, we neglect the possibility that two preferences have equal frequency.

References

  • Barberà S, Moreno B (2011) Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result. Games Econ Behav 73(2):345–359

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bennett J , Lanning S (2007) The Netflix prize. In: Proceedings of the KDD Cup Workshop 2007, 3–6. ACM, New York

  • Bredereck R, Chen J, Woeginger GJ (2013) A characterization of the single-crossing domain. Soc Choice Welf 41(4):989–998

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chan TM , Pătraşcu M (2010) Counting inversions, offline orthogonal range counting, and related problems. In: Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA ’10, 161–173, Philadelphia, PA, USA. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics

  • Elkind E, Lackner M, Peters D (2016) Preference restrictions in computational social choice: recent progress. IJCAI 16:4062–4065

    Google Scholar 

  • Escoffier B, Lang J, Öztürk M (2008) Single-peaked consistency and its complexity. ECAI 8:366–370

    Google Scholar 

  • Gehrlein WV (1981) The expected probability of Condorcet’s paradox. Econ Lett 7(1):33–37

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kemeny JG, Snell JL (1962) Mathematical models in the social sciences. Blaisdell Publishing Company, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Lackner M-L, Lackner M (2017) On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences. Soc Choice Welf 48(4):717–745

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lu T, Boutilier C (2014) Effective sampling and learning for mallows models with pairwise-preference data. J Mach Learn Res 15(1):3783–3829

    Google Scholar 

  • Mahajne M, Nitzan S, Volij O (2015) Level r consensus and stable social choice. Soc Choice Welf 45(4):805–817

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mallows CL (1957) Non-null ranking models. i. Biometrika 44(1/2):114–130

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mao A, Procaccia AD, Chen Y (2013) Better human computation through principled voting. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI’13, pp 1142–1148. AAAI Press

  • Mattei N, Walsh T (2013) Preflib: a library of preference data http://preflib.org. In: Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT 2013), Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence. Springer

  • Poliakov NL (2016) Note on level r consensus. arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.04816

  • Tsetlin I, Regenwetter M, Grofman B (2003) The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles. Soc Choice Welf 21(3):387–398

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the anonymous referees for insightful comments that led to this much improved version of the manuscript, and to Marc Timme and Yuval Benjamini for helpful and valuable discussions. We are thankful to several users of the http://math.stackexchange.com website, in particular Hernan J. Gonzalez, Vineel Kumar Reddy Kovvuri, spaceisdarkgreen and zhw., for their kind help in coping with mathematical issues. We are thankful to I. Nitzan who made this collaboration possible. M.N. is grateful to the Azrieli Foundation for the award of an Azrieli Fellowship. E.S. is grateful to the Israeli Science Foundation for the ISF Grant 1083/13.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Shmuel Nitzan.

Appendices

Appendices

Appendix A: To verify Condition 1, it is sufficient to check adjacent preferences

This section provides a formal proof to the following lemma used in Sect. 3.

Lemma 1 Suppose that the preference relations in a profile \(\pi \) are ordered by two criteria: first by frequency \(\mu _\pi (\succ _{i})\) , then by distance \(d(\succ _{i},\succ _0)\) , where \(\succ _0\) is a fixed preference. In this ordering, if Condition 1 is violated for any pair of preference relations in \(\pi \), then it is violated for an adjacent pair \(\succ _{i},\succ _{i+1}\) for some i.

Proof

Suppose that there exist indices \(i<j\) such that Condition 1 is violated for the pair \(\succ _i,\succ _j\), i.e, \(\mu _\pi (\succ _{i})>\mu _\pi (\succ _{j})\), yet \(d(\succ _{i},\succ _0)\ge d(\succ _{j},\succ _0)\). We now prove the lemma by induction on the difference of indices, \(j-i\).

Base: If \(j-i=1\), then \(\succ _i\) and \(\succ _j\) are already adjacent, so we are done.

Step: Suppose that \(j-i>1\). We prove that there exists a pair with a smaller difference that violates Condition 1. We consider several cases.

Case 1 :

i is not the largest index in its equivalence class. i.e, there exists \(i'> i\) such that \(\mu _\pi (\succ _{i'})=\mu _\pi (\succ _{i})\). Then, by the secondary ordering criterion, \(d(\succ _{i'},\succ _0)\ge d(\succ _{i},\succ _0)\), Condition 1 is violated for the pair \(\succ _{i'}\) and \(\succ _{j}\).

Case 2 :

j is not the smallest index in its equivalence class. i.e, there exists \(j'<j\) such that \(\mu _\pi (\succ _{j'})=\mu _\pi (\succ _{j})\). Then, by the secondary ordering criterion, \(d(\succ _{j},\succ _0)\ge d(\succ _{j'},\succ _0)\), Condition 1 is violated for the pair \(\succ _{i}\) and \(\succ _{j'}\). Otherwise, i is the largest index in its equivalence class, j is the smallest index in its equivalence class, but still \(i+1<j\). This means that the equivalence classes of i and j are not adjacent, i.e, \(\mu _\pi (\succ _{i})>\mu _\pi (\succ _{i+1})>\mu _\pi (\succ _{j})\). Now there are two remaining cases:

Case 3 :

\(d(\succ _{i},\succ _0)\ge d(\succ _{i+1},\succ _0)\), in which case Condition 1 is violated for the adjacent pair \(\succ _{i}\) and \(\succ _{i+1}\) and we are done.

Case 4 :

\(d(\succ _{i+1},\succ _0) > d(\succ _{i},\succ _0)\). This implies \(d(\succ _{i+1},\succ _0) > d(\succ _{j},\succ _0)\), so Condition 1 is violated for the pair \(\succ _{i+1}\) and \(\succ _{j}\) and we are done. \(\square \)

Appendix B: The effect of a switch on the inversion-distance

This section provides a formal proof to an intuitive claim made within the proof of Lemma 3. Let ab be two fixed alternatives. Let \(C(a>b)\) be the set of preferences by which \(a\succ b\) and \(C(b>a)\) the set of preferences by which \(b\succ a\). Let \(w^{ab}:C(b>a)\rightarrow C(a>b)\) be a function that takes a preference-relation and creates a new preference-relation by switching the position of a and b in the ranking.

Lemma 5

If \(a \succ _0 b\), then for every preference \(\succ _1\in C(b>a)\):

$$\begin{aligned} d(\succ _1,\succ _0) ~ > ~ d(w^{ab}(\succ _1 ),\succ _0) \end{aligned}$$

Proof

For every preference \(\succ \), define \(D(\succ ,\succ _0)\) as the set of pairs-of-alternatives \(\{i,j\}\) that are ranked differently in \(\succ \) and in \(\succ _0\). By definition, the inversion distance is the cardinality of this set, \( d(\succ ,\succ _0) = |D(\succ ,\succ _0)|\). Therefore, it is sufficient to show that there are more pairs in \(D(\succ _1,\succ _0)\) than in \(D(w^{ab}(\succ _1),\succ _0)\). To show this, we consider all possible pairs-of-alternatives; for each pair, we calculate its contribution to the difference in cardinalities \(|D(\succ _1,\succ _0)|-|D(w^{ab}(\succ _1),\succ _0)|\), and show that the net difference is positive.

  • The pair \(\{a,b\}\) is in \(D(\succ _1,\succ _0)\) but not in \(D(w^{ab}(\succ _1),\succ _0)\), so this pair contributes \(+1\) to the difference.

  • Any pair that contains neither a nor b is not affected by the switch. I.e, each pair \(\{c,e\}\) where \(c,e\ne a,b\) is in \(D(\succ _1,\succ _0)\) if-and-only-if it is in \(D(w^{ab}(\succ _1),\succ _0)\), so it contributes 0 to the difference.

  • Let c be an alternative that is ranked by \(\succ _1\) above b or below a, i.e, either \(c\succ _1 b\succ _1 a\) or \(b\succ _1 a\succ _1 c\). Then, the order between c to a or b in \(\succ _1\) is not affected by the switch, so \(\{c,a\}\) is in \(D(\succ _1,\succ _0)\) if-and-only-if it is in \(D(w^{ab}(\succ _1),\succ _0)\), so it contributes 0 to the difference. The same is true for \(\{c,b\}\).

  • Finally, let c be an alternative that is ranked by \(\succ _1\) between a and b, i.e, \(b\succ _1 c\succ _1 a\). Then, the switch \(w^{ab}\) changes the direction of both the pair \(\{c,a\}\) and the pair \(\{c,b\}\):

    • If \(c \succ _0 a \succ _0 b\), then the pair \(\{c,a\}\) is in \(D(\succ _0,w^{ab}(\succ _1))\) but not in \(D(\succ _0,\succ _1)\), and the pair \(\{c,b\}\) is in \(D(\succ _0,\succ _1)\) but not in \(D(\succ _0,w^{ab}(\succ _1))\), so these pairs contribute \(+1-1=0\) to the difference.

    • If \(a \succ _0 c \succ _0 b\), then both the pair \(\{c,a\}\) and the pair \(\{c,b\}\) are in \(D(\succ _0,\succ _1)\) but not in \(D(\succ _0,w^{ab}(\succ _1))\), so these pairs contribute \(+1+1=2\) to the difference.

    • If \(a \succ _0 b \succ _0 c\), then the pair \(\{c,a\}\) is in \(D(\succ _0,\succ _1)\) but not in \(D(\succ _0,w^{ab}(\succ _1))\), and the pair \(\{c,b\}\) is in \(D(\succ _0,w^{ab}(\succ _1))\) but not in \(D(\succ _0,\succ _1)\), so these pairs contribute \(+1-1=0\) to the difference.

We proved that the contribution of each pair of alternatives is at least 0, and the contribution of the pair \(\{a,b\}\) is \(+1\). Therefore, the difference \(|D(\succ _1,\succ _0)|-|D(w^{ab}(\succ _1),\succ _0)|\) is positive and the lemma is proved. \(\square \)

Appendix C: Probability that binomial random variables are equal

This section justifies the following approximation, used in Sect. 4.

Let \(B_1,\ldots ,B_t\) be i.i.d. random variables distributed binomially with m trials and success-probability \(p < 1/2\). Let \(q:=1-p\). Define:

$$\begin{aligned} P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,t) := \Pr [B_1 = \cdots = B_t] \end{aligned}$$

Then, for every \(t\ge 1\), when m is sufficiently large,

$$\begin{aligned} P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,t)&\approx {1 \over (\sqrt{2\pi p q m})^{t-1} } \end{aligned}$$

Proof

The value of each of the variables \(B_i\) can be any integer between 0 and m. Therefore we can present \(P^{\text {equal}}\) as a sum of probabilities of disjoint events:

$$\begin{aligned} P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,t) = \sum _{i=0}^m \Pr [B_1 = \cdots = B_t = i] \end{aligned}$$

Since the \(B_i\) are i.i.d:

$$\begin{aligned} P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,t)&= \sum _{i=0}^m \left( \Pr [B_1 = i]\right) ^t \\&= \sum _{i=0}^m \left( {m\atopwithdelims ()i} p^i q^{m-i}\right) ^t \end{aligned}$$

where \(q:=1-p\). Using Stirling’s approximation, when \(m,i,m-i\) are sufficiently large:

$$\begin{aligned} {m\atopwithdelims ()i}&\approx \sqrt{m\over 2 \pi i (m-i)}\cdot {m^m\over i^i (m-i)^{m-i}} \end{aligned}$$

Substitute this in \(P^{\text {equal}}\) and approximate the sum by an integral:

$$\begin{aligned} P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,t)&\approx \int _{y=0}^m \left( \sqrt{m\over 2 \pi y (m-y)}\cdot {m^m\over y^y (m-y)^{m-y}}\cdot p^y q^{m-y}\right) ^t dy \end{aligned}$$

Substitute \(y = m x\) and \(dy = m dx\):

$$\begin{aligned} P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,t)&\approx m\int _{x=0}^1 \left( \sqrt{1 \over 2 \pi m x (1-x)}\cdot {p^{m x} q^{m-mx}\over x^{m x} (1-x)^{m-mx}}\right) ^t dx \\&= m^{1-{t/ 2}}\int _{x=0}^1 \left( \sqrt{1 \over 2 \pi x (1-x)}\cdot {p^{m x} q^{m-mx}\over x^{m x} (1-x)^{m-mx}}\right) ^t dx \end{aligned}$$

The integral can be approximated by Laplace’s method. Define:

$$\begin{aligned} h(x)&:= \left( \sqrt{1 \over 2 \pi x (1-x)}\right) ^t \\ g(x)&:= t \cdot \bigg [ x \ln ({p\over x}) + (1-x) \ln ({q\over 1-x}) \bigg ] \end{aligned}$$

Then:

$$\begin{aligned} P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,t)&\approx m^{1-{t / 2}} \int _{x=0}^1 h(x) e^{m g(x)} dx \end{aligned}$$

The function g(x) is twice continuously differentiable on (0, 1) and has a unique maximum at \(x_0={p\over p+q} = p\); the maximum value is \(g(x_0) = 0\). Moreover, \(g''(x_0) = -{1 \over p q}< 0\). Therefore, by Laplace’s method:

$$\begin{aligned} P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,t)&\approx m^{1-t/2} \sqrt{ 2\pi \over - m g''(x_0) } \cdot h(x_0) \cdot e^{m g(x_0)} \end{aligned}$$

where the symbol \(\approx \) means that the ratio between the expressions in its two sides goes to 1 as \(m\rightarrow \infty \). Substituting the functions g and h gives:

$$\begin{aligned} P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,t)&\approx m^{1-t/2} \sqrt{ 2\pi \over m / (p q) } \cdot \left( {1\over 2\pi p q}\right) ^{t/2}\cdot e^0 \\&= m^{(1-t)/2} \cdot (2\pi p q)^{(1-t)/2} \\&= (2\pi p q m)^{(1-t)/2} \\ P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,t)&\approx {1 \over (\sqrt{2\pi p q m})^{t-1} } \end{aligned}$$

\(\square \)

Note that \(P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,1) = 1\), which is trivially true, since a single random variable always equals itself. When \(t\ge 2\), \(P^{\text {equal}}(m,p,1)\rightarrow 0\) as \(m\rightarrow \infty \).

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Nitzan, M., Nitzan, S. & Segal-Halevi, E. Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms. Soc Choice Welf 50, 457–479 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1092-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1092-2

Navigation