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The role of centrality and market size in a four-region asymmetric new economic geography model

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Abstract

In this paper, we put forward a four-region new economic geography footloose entrepreneur model in which regions are differentiated by their size and their geographical position along a line. There are two distinct trade blocs, each of them consisting of a pair of regions. Direct and indirect trade between all regions is allowed, whereas factor mobility can occur only between regions of the same bloc. Given this more general geographical structure, as compared to previous studies, we are able to disentangle two manifestations of the market access effect: firms can take advantage of locating both in a more central region (centrality effect) and/or in a bigger region (local market size effect). The model is able to generate a plethora of long-term outcomes, including four equilibria with full agglomeration in each trade bloc that can be ranked by factor owners. Equilibria where industry is dispersed or agglomerated in a bloc and dispersed in the other one, are also possible as well as more complex attractors. Finally, by allowing direct and indirect trade between regions, we are able to look at the effect of trade integration on transit traffic by evaluating in a preliminary analysis the consequences of policies aiming at limiting transport volumes in a model with shifting industry.

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Notes

  1. Note that at the CP fixed points, as well as at the border fixed points, the map Z is not differentiable. Thus, rigorously speaking one can only discuss their one-side stability (on the other sides they are obviously always superstable). From now on, consider that the notion of stability that applies to these fixed points is one-side stability.

  2. Centrality is mainly determined by ϕ D but it is also affected by ϕ C (by a joint effect with ϕ D ). The higher ϕ D , the closer are regions R 2 and R 3 to each other and to regions R 1 and R 4 as well. The smaller ϕ C , the more remote regions R 1 and R 4 are so that the relative centrality of regions R 2 and R 3 increases. The connection between the trade freeness and the competition effect is much less direct.

  3. Indeed, with a small ϕ D the two countries are (almost) separated, so that the standard results of the 2-R asymmetric FE model (see Baldwin et al. 2003, pp. 106–108) hold: high trade freeness within countries – a higher ϕ C – implies that all CP equilibria are locally stable. As we reduce this trade freeness parameter, market size gains relevance and the only stable CP equilibrium is the one characterized by agglomeration in the largest region.

  4. This occurs both horizontally and vertically – i.e both in the x and in the y directions, so that the basin of attraction of C P 01 is incorporated in that of C P 10: entrepreneurs move from R 1 to R 2 and from R 4 to R 3.

  5. With no size effect, C P 00 and C P 11 are symmetric and lose stability simultaneously as follows: the basins of attraction of C P 00 and C P 11 are simultaneously incorporated in the basin of attraction of C P 01 as C P 00 loses vertical stability (in the y direction) and C P 11 horizontal stability (in the x direction): entrepreneurs move from R 1 to R 2 and from R 4 to R 3.

  6. In C P 01, an increase in ϕ C has no effect on price indices in R 2 and R 3. This is the only exception.

  7. We could have checked directly the sign of the derivative \(\partial \widetilde {\phi _{D}}/\partial L_{s}\),however that was not possible to evaluate given the length of the corresponding expression.

  8. These are: L b = 400, E = 100, β = 1, μ = 0.7 and σ = 3. The value of σ = 3 implies a mark-up \(\frac {\sigma }{\sigma -1}= 1.5\). In Fig. 6 the value of ϕ C is set to 0.9 and ϕ D varies from 0.1 to 0.8. With these parameters, the trade costs are around the following values: \(T_{C}=\phi _{C}^{\frac {1}{1-\sigma }}= 1.118\) for \(\phi _{C}= 0.8, T_{D}=\phi _{D}^{\frac {1}{1-\sigma }}= 3.162\) for ϕ D = 0.1 and T D = 1.118 for ϕ D = 0.8; and in Fig. 7 the value of ϕ D is set to 0.1 and ϕ C varies from 0.2 to 0.8. With these parameters the trade costs are: T D = 3.162 for ϕ D = 0.1, T C = 2.236 for ϕ C = 0.2 and T C = 1.118 for ϕ C = 0.8. These values appear reasonable to us.

  9. The size effect, via a change in the trade freeness within integrated blocs (ϕ C ), could still play a role by affecting the local stability properties of the C P 01 equilibrium. Indeed, a sufficient reduction of ϕ C , if ϕ D is not too high, could determine a loss of stability of C P 01 in the vertical direction, i.e. in the direction of the share y (see Figs. 2a and 5a), and a relocation of the industrial sector from R3 to R4, as C P 00 becomes the only stable equilibrium.

  10. These simulations, not presented here, are used in substitution of analytical results that cannot be obtained for these cases.

  11. Regarding the effect of ϕ C , we found some numerical simulations where trade liberalization within trade blocs induce nominal and real profits to move in the same direction notwithstanding the counterbalancing of the price index effect.

  12. A possible explanation is that as ϕ D becomes smaller, competition from the central region in the other bloc reduces in intensity; whereas as ϕ C becomes larger, the competition from the larger region in the other bloc increases in intensity.

  13. More precisely, an attracting set A of a map f is a closed invariant set for which a neighborhood U(A) exists such that f(U(A)) ⊂ U(A) and f n(x) → A as n for any xU(A). An attractor A is an attracting set with a dense orbit.

  14. More precisely, a Milnor attractor is a closed invariant set AJ such that the set ρ(A), consisting of all the points xJ for which ω-limit set ω(x) ⊂ A, has strictly positive measure, and there is no strictly smaller closed subset A of A such that ρ(A ) coincides with ρ(A) up to a set of measure zero.

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Acknowledgments

This work has been prepared within the activities of the EU project COST Action IS1104 “The EU in the new complex geography of economic systems: models, tools and policy evaluation”. The authors are grateful for financial support.

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Correspondence to Iryna Sushko.

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Appendices

Appendix A

In Eq. 15 profits π i for \(i=\overline {1,4},\) are defined as follows:

$$\pi_{1}=\frac{A_{1}(1-C_{2})+A_{2}C_{1}}{(1-B_{1})(1-C_{2})-B_{2}C_{1}},\ \ \pi_{2}=\frac{A_{2}(1-B_{1})+A_{1}B_{2}}{(1-B_{1})(1-C_{2})-B_{2}C_{1}}, $$
$$\pi_{3}=\frac{A_{3}(1-B_{4})+A_{4}B_{3}}{(1-C_{3})(1-B_{4})-B_{3}C_{4}},\ \ \pi_{4}=\frac{A_{4}(1-C_{3})+A_{3}C_{4}}{(1-C_{3})(1-B_{4})-B_{3}C_{4}}, $$

where

$$A_{1}=\left( {\Theta}_{1}+\phi_{C}\phi_{D}h_{b}\beta_{3}Q_{3}{\Theta}_{3}\right) Q_{1},\ A_{2}=\left( {\Theta}_{2}+\phi_{D}h_{b}\beta_{3}Q_{3}{\Theta}_{3}\right) Q_{2}, $$
$$A_{3}=\left( {\Omega}_{3}+\phi_{D}\widetilde{h}_{b}\beta_{2}M_{2}{\Omega}_{2}\right) M_{3},\ \ A_{4}=\left( {\Omega}_{4}+\phi_{C}\phi_{D}\widetilde{h }_{b}\beta_{2}M_{2}{\Omega}_{2}\right) M_{4}, $$
$$B_{1}=\left( {\phi_{C}^{2}}{\phi_{D}^{2}}{h_{b}^{2}}\beta_{1}\beta_{3}Q_{3}\right) Q_{1},\ \ B_{2}=\phi_{C}\beta_{1}(h_{a}+\phi_{D}^{2}{h_{b}^{2}}\beta_{3}Q_{3})Q_{2}, $$
$$B_{3}=\phi_{C}\beta_{4}(\widetilde{h}_{a}+{\phi_{D}^{2}}\widetilde{h} _{b}^{2}\beta_{2}M_{2})M_{3},\ \ B_{4}=\left( {\phi_{C}^{2}}{\phi_{D}^{2}} \widetilde{h}_{b}^{2}\beta_{2}\beta_{4}M_{2}\right) M_{4}, $$
$$C_{1}=\phi_{C}\beta_{2}(h_{a}+{\phi_{D}^{2}}{h_{b}^{2}}\beta_{3}Q_{3})Q_{1},\ \ C_{2}={\phi_{D}^{2}}{h_{b}^{2}}\beta_{2}\beta_{3}Q_{2}Q_{3}, $$
$$C_{3}={\phi_{D}^{2}}\widetilde{h}_{b}^{2}\beta_{2}\beta_{3}M_{2}M_{3},\ \ C_{4}=\phi_{C}\beta_{3}(\widetilde{h}_{a}+{\phi_{D}^{2}}\widetilde{h} _{b}^{2}\beta_{2}M_{3})M_{4}, $$
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} {\Theta}_{1} &=&\alpha_{1}z_{1}+\phi_{C}\alpha_{2}z_{2}+\phi_{C}\phi_{D}\alpha_{3}z_{3}+{\phi_{C}^{2}}\phi_{D}\alpha_{4}z_{4}, \\ {\Theta}_{2} &=&(\phi_{C}\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{2})z_{2}+\phi_{D}\alpha_{3}z_{3}+\phi_{C}\phi_{D}\alpha_{4}z_{4}, \\ {\Theta}_{3} &=&(\phi_{C}\phi_{D}\alpha_{1}+\phi_{D}\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3})z_{3}+\phi_{C}\alpha_{4}z_{4}, \end{array} $$
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} {\Omega}_{2} &=&\phi_{C}\alpha_{1}\widetilde{z}_{1}+(\phi_{C}\phi_{D}\alpha_{4}+\phi_{D}\alpha_{3}+\alpha_{2})\widetilde{z}_{2}, \\ {\Omega}_{3} &=&\phi_{C}\phi_{D}\alpha_{1}\widetilde{z}_{1}+\phi_{D}\alpha_{2}\widetilde{z}_{2}+(\alpha_{3}+\phi_{C}\alpha_{4}) \widetilde{z}_{3}, \\ {\Omega}_{4} &=&{\phi_{C}^{2}}\phi_{D}\alpha_{1}\widetilde{z}_{1}+\phi_{C}\phi_{D}\alpha_{2}\widetilde{z}_{2}+\phi_{C}\alpha_{3}\widetilde{z} _{3}+\alpha_{4}\widetilde{z}_{4}, \end{array} $$
$$Q_{1}=\frac{1}{\frac{1}{\kappa }-\beta_{1}\left( 1+{\phi_{C}^{4}}\phi_{D}^{2}z_{4}\kappa \beta_{4}\right) },\ \ Q_{2}=\frac{1}{\frac{1}{\kappa } -\beta_{2}h_{a}},\ \ Q_{3}=\frac{1}{\frac{1}{\kappa }-\beta_{3}h_{b}}, $$
$$M_{2}=\frac{1}{\frac{1}{\kappa }-\beta_{2}\widetilde{h}_{b}},\ \ M_{3}=\frac{1}{\frac{1}{\kappa }-\beta_{3}\widetilde{h}_{a}},\ \ M_{4}=\frac{1}{\frac{1}{\kappa }-\beta_{4}\left( 1+{\phi_{C}^{4}}{\phi_{D}^{2}}\widetilde{z}_{1}\kappa \beta_{1}\right) }, $$
$$\alpha_{1}=\frac{L_{s}}{{\Delta}_{1}},\ \ \ \alpha_{2}=\frac{L_{b}}{{\Delta}_{2}},\ \alpha_{3}=\frac{L_{s}}{{\Delta}_{3}},\ \ \ \alpha_{4}=\frac{L_{b}}{{\Delta}_{4}}, $$
$$\beta_{1}=\frac{x}{{\Delta}_{1}}\frac{E}{2},\ \beta_{2}=\frac{1-x}{{\Delta}_{2}}\frac{E}{2},\ \beta_{3}=\frac{y}{{\Delta}_{3}}\frac{E}{2},\ \beta_{4}=\frac{1-y}{{\Delta}_{4}}\frac{E}{2}, $$
$$\kappa =\frac{2\mu }{\sigma E}, $$
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} z_{1} &=&z_{4}\left( 1-\kappa \beta_{4}(1-{\phi_{C}^{4}}\phi_{D}^{2})\right) ,\ \ z_{2}=z_{4}\left( 1-\kappa \beta_{4}(1-\phi _{C}^{2}{\phi_{D}^{2}})\right) , \\ z_{3} &=&z_{4}\left( 1-\kappa \beta_{4}(1-{\phi_{C}^{2}})\right) ,\ \ z_{4}= \frac{1}{1-\kappa \beta_{4}}, \end{array} $$
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \widetilde{z}_{1} &=&\frac{1}{1-\kappa \beta_{1}},\ \widetilde{z}_{2}= \widetilde{z}_{1}\left( 1-\kappa \beta_{1}(1-{\phi_{C}^{2}})\right) , \\ \widetilde{z}_{3} &=&\widetilde{z}_{1}\left( 1-\kappa \beta_{1}(1-\phi_{C}^{2}{\phi_{D}^{2}})\right) ,\ \ \widetilde{z}_{4}=\widetilde{z}_{1}\left( 1-\kappa \beta_{1}(1-{\phi_{C}^{4}}{\phi_{D}^{2}})\right) , \end{array} $$
$$h_{a}= 1+{\phi_{C}^{2}}{\phi_{D}^{2}}z_{4}\kappa \beta_{4},\ \ h_{b}= 1+\phi_{C}^{2}z_{4}\kappa \beta_{4}, $$
$$\widetilde{h}_{a}= 1+{\phi_{C}^{2}}{\phi_{D}^{2}}\widetilde{z}_{1}\kappa \beta_{1},\ \ \widetilde{h}_{b}= 1+{\phi_{C}^{2}}\widetilde{z}_{1}\kappa \beta_{1}. $$

Appendix B

The borders of the unit square I 2 are denoted as follows:

$$I_{x0}=\left\{ (x,y):y = 0\right\} ,\ \ I_{x1}=\left\{ (x,y):y = 1\right\},$$
$$I_{0y}=\left\{ (x,y):x = 0\right\} ,\ \ I_{1y}=\left\{ (x,y):x = 1\right\} . $$

It is easy to see that these borders are invariant under map Z. Moreover, on each of these borders 2D map Z is reduced to the corresponding 1D map. Namely,

- on border I x0 map Z is reduced to a 1D map, denoted z x0, which is defined as

$$z_{x0}:x\mapsto z_{x0}(x)=\left\{ \begin{array}{lll} 0 & if & Z_{h0}(x)<0, \\ Z_{h0}(x) & if & 0\leq Z_{h0}(x)\leq 1, \\ 1 & if & Z_{h0}(x)>1, \end{array} \right. $$

where

$$ Z_{h0}(x)=x\left[ 1+\gamma (1-x)\frac{{\Omega}_{h}(x,0)-1}{1+x({\Omega}_{h}(x,0)-1)}\right] ; $$
(28)

- on border I x1 map Z is reduced to a 1D map, denoted z x1, which is defined as

$$z_{x1}:x\mapsto z_{x1}(x)=\left\{ \begin{array}{lll} 0 & if & Z_{h1}(x)<0, \\ Z_{h1}(x) & if & 0\leq Z_{h1}(x)\leq 1, \\ 1 & if & Z_{h1}(x)>1, \end{array} \right. $$

where

$$ Z_{h1}(x)=x\left[ 1+\gamma (1-x)\frac{{\Omega}_{h}(x,1)-1}{1+x({\Omega}_{h}(x,1)-1)}\right] ; $$
(29)

- on border I 0y map Z is reduced to a 1D map

$$z_{0y}:y\mapsto z_{0y}(y)=\left\{ \begin{array}{lll} 0 & if & Z_{f0}(y)<0, \\ Z_{f0}(y) & if & 0\leq Z_{f0}(y)\leq 1, \\ 1 & if & Z_{f0}(y)>1, \end{array} \right. $$

where

$$ Z_{f0}(y)=y\left[ 1+\gamma (1-y)\frac{{\Omega}_{f}(0,y)-1}{1+y({\Omega}_{f}(0,y)-1)}\right] ; $$
(30)

- and, finally, on border I 1y the map Z is reduced to a 1D map

$$z_{1y}:y\mapsto z_{1y}(y)=\left\{ \begin{array}{lll} 0 & if & Z_{f1}(y)<0, \\ Z_{f1}(y) & if & 0\leq Z_{f1}(y)\leq 1, \\ 1 & if & Z_{f1}(y)>1, \end{array} \right. $$

where

$$ Z_{f1}(y)=y\left[ 1+\gamma (1-y)\frac{{\Omega}_{f}(1,y)-1}{1+y({\Omega}_{f}(1,y)-1)}\right] . $$
(31)

Appendix C

Jacobian matrix of map Z (in its central part, without constraints) is given by

$$DZ=\left( \begin{array}{cc} Z_{h}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(x,y) & Z_{h}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(x,y) \\ Z_{f}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(x,y) & Z_{f}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(x,y) \end{array} \right) , $$

where

$$Z_{h}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(x,y)= 1+\gamma \left( (1-2x)\frac{{\Omega}_{h}(x,y)-1}{ 1+x({\Omega}_{h}(x,y)-1)}+x(1-x)\frac{{\Omega}_{h}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(x,y)-({\Omega}_{h}(x,y)-1)^{2}}{\left( 1+x({\Omega}_{h}(x,y)-1)\right)^{2}} \right) , $$
$$Z_{h}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(x,y)=\gamma x(1-x)\frac{{\Omega}_{h}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(x,y)}{\left( 1+x({\Omega}_{h}(x,y)-1)\right)^{2}}, $$
$$Z_{f}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(x,y)=\gamma y(1-y)\frac{{\Omega}_{f}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(x,y)}{\left( 1+y({\Omega}_{f}(x,y)-1)\right)^{2}}, $$
$$Z_{f}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(x,y)= 1+\gamma \left( (1-2y)\frac{{\Omega}_{f}(x,y)-1}{ 1+y({\Omega}_{f}(x,y)-1)}+y(1-y)\frac{{\Omega}_{f}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(x,y)-({\Omega}_{f}(x,y)-1)^{2}}{\left( 1+y({\Omega}_{f}(x,y)-1)\right)^{2}} \right)\!. $$

The eigenvalues are

$$\lambda_{1,2}(x,y)= 0.5\left( Z_{h}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(x,y)+Z_{f}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(x,y)\pm \sqrt{(Z_{h}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(x,y)-Z_{f}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(x,y))^{2}+ 4Z_{h}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(x,y)Z_{f}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(x,y)}\right) . $$

We use the following notations: λ 1(x, y) = λ h (x, y) and λ 2(x, y) = λ v (x, y). Eigenvalues of the fixed points of map Z are as follows:

$$C{}P_{00}:\ \ \ \lambda_{h}(0,0)= 1+\gamma ({\Omega}_{h}(0,0)-1),\ \ \lambda_{v}(0,0)= 1+\gamma ({\Omega}_{f}(0,0)-1), $$
$$C{}P_{11}:\ \ \ \lambda_{h}(1,1)= 1-\gamma \left( 1-\frac{1}{{\Omega}_{h}(0,0)} \right) ,\ \ \lambda_{v}(1,1)= 1-\gamma \left( 1-\frac{1}{{\Omega}_{f}(0,0)} \right) , $$
$$C{}P_{01}:\ \ \ \lambda_{h}(0,1)= 1+\gamma ({\Omega}_{h}(0,1)-1),\ \ \lambda_{v}(0,1)= 1-\gamma \left( 1-\frac{1}{{\Omega}_{f}(0,1)}\right) , $$
$$C{}P_{10}:\ \ \ \lambda_{h}(1,0)= 1-\gamma \left( 1-\frac{1}{{\Omega}_{h}(1,0)} \right) ,\ \ \lambda_{v}(1,0)= 1+\gamma ({\Omega}_{f}(1,0)-1), $$
$$B{}P_{0a}: \ \lambda_{h}(0,a)= 1+\gamma ({\Omega}_{h}(0,a)-1),\ \ \lambda_{v}(0,a)= 1+\gamma a(1-a){\Omega}_{f}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(0,a), $$
$$B{}P_{1a}:\ \lambda_{h}(1,a)= 1-\gamma \left( 1-\frac{1}{{\Omega}_{h}(1,a)} \right) ,\ \lambda_{v}(1,a)= 1+\gamma a(1-a){\Omega}_{f}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(1,a), $$
$$B{}P_{a0}:\ \lambda_{h}(a,0)= 1+\gamma a(1-a){\Omega}_{h}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(a,0),\ \lambda_{v}(a,0)= 1+\gamma ({\Omega}_{f}(a,0)-1), $$
$$B{}P_{a1}: \ \lambda_{h}(a,1)= 1+\gamma a(1-a){\Omega}_{h}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(a,1),\ \lambda_{v}(a,1)= 1-\gamma \left( 1-\frac{1}{{\Omega}_{f}(a,1)} \right) , $$
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} I{}P_{ab}: \lambda_{h,v}(a,b)= 1 + 0.5\gamma (a(1-a){\Omega}_{h}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(a,b)+b(1-b){\Omega}_{f}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(a,b)\pm \\ \sqrt{(a(1-a){\Omega}_{h}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(a,b)-b(1-b){\Omega}_{f}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(a,b))^{2}+ 4a(1-a)b(1-b){\Omega}_{h}{~}_{y}^{\prime }(a,b){\Omega}_{f}{~}_{x}^{\prime }(a,b)}). \end{array} $$

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Commendatore, P., Kubin, I., Mossay, P. et al. The role of centrality and market size in a four-region asymmetric new economic geography model. J Evol Econ 27, 1095–1131 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-017-0540-6

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