Abstract
The paper presents a model that links the diffusion process of a technological innovation and the dissemination of a social norm. Our approach introduces a new dimension to the interaction between markets and social norms beyond the interplay of monetary and non-monetary incentives: the innovation of material goods as a catalyst of norm evolution. We analyze how the dissemination of a social norm may be affected by product innovation, which adds to the variation of products with respect to their level of norm compliance. The market is linked to the process of norm adoption via psychological forces, endogenizing the rates of adoption and abandonment. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a) a positive impact of the innovation on the level of norm adoption and b) for multiplicity of norm equilibria. In concluding, we discuss several policy implications.
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Notes
For a normative theory of social norms in market economies, see Bergsten (1985).
More than 85% of these expenditures are spent on private transportation.
Exceptions are things such as solar panels for the accommodation category or the attendance of a pro-environment concert.
For discussions of the conditions for discrete choice models generating linear aggregate demand functions, see, Jaffe and Weyl 2010, Armstrong and Vickers 2015, and the literature cited therein. We refrain from adopting a discrete choice approach as our focus is on the interaction between aggregate market demand and social norm dynamics.
We believe that profits, especially in large incorporations, are the main concerns of decision makers.
The method was introduced under this label by Haken (1977) for the synergetic approach of aggregation of dynamics of micro-data to the dynamics of macro-data. It has been introduced to economics e.g. by Weidlich and Haag (1983). The basic idea of the method may, however, already be found in Samuelson (1947).
Strictly speaking, the transition rates are the limits of the expected number of transitions per second, when we consider ever shorter time intervals (similar to the speed of a car being measured in miles per hour, but measured for a specific point in time, not for an entire hour).
For example, see Weidlich and Haag (1983).
We neglect the possibility of having a conformity bias that affects consumption directly. This allows us to concentrate on the effects of the conformity bias on norm adoption and abandonment. We conjecture that this has no qualitative effects because the conformity bias affecting consumption directly should only reinforce the effects of the norm-related conformity bias.
Note that if there are two extreme points q Low <q High, then \( \dot{q} \)(q High)>0 implies q High <1 and \( \dot{q} \)(q Low)<0 implies q Low >0 by inspection of (7), given strictly positive demand. Given \( \dot{q} \)(q High)>0 and \( \dot{q} \)(q Low)<0, the fact that \( \dot{q} \)(0)>0, \( \dot{q} \)(1)<0 implies that q Low is the minimum and q Hgih is the maximum. Hence, only the two conditions with respect to the existence of two extrema and the sign condition at the extrema points remain.
See the proof of Proposition 4 for the derivation of partial derivatives.
The only case in which an additional equilibrium may be in a continuity interval of \( \dot{q} \)(q) occurs if \( \dot{\tilde{q}} \)(q) has a minimum, this minimum is positive, a continuity interval of \( \dot{q} \)(q) embraces this minimum, has an interior minimum that is negative and has positive limits at both bounds.
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This research was financially supported by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (01UN1018C).
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The demand system (19) in vector notion is given by \( \left(\begin{array}{c}\hfill {p}^e\hfill \\ {}\hfill {p}^g\hfill \end{array}\right)= A\left(\begin{array}{c}\hfill {X}^e\hfill \\ {}\hfill {X}^g\hfill \end{array}\right)+ b \). According to Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (1990, p.34), given the linear structure of the model, negative definiteness of A + A T is sufficient for uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium. Eigenvalues of A + A T are given by \( -\frac{1}{\kappa -\lambda}\left(1\pm \sqrt{1-\frac{1}{\kappa -\lambda}}\right) \) and negative by inspection. QED
Proof of Proposition 2: \( \frac{\partial {m}^{\ast }}{\partial q}\underset{<}{\overset{>}{=}}0\iff \frac{\partial {m}^{\ast }}{\partial q}\underset{<}{\overset{>}{=}}0.\mathrm{QED} \)
Proof of Lemma 1: Claim 1 is obvious when X e and X g are strictly positive. Claim 2 follows from the fact that X e and X g are linear in q and thus solving Eq. (7) for q for any given value of \( \dot{\tilde{q}} \) is tantamount to solving a polynomial of degree three. The first implication of Claim 3 follows from the fact that the denominator of the derivative \( \frac{d\left({\tilde{X}}^e/{\tilde{X}}^g\right)}{ d q} \) is strictly positive and the numerator is given by:
The second implication of Claim 3 follows from the observation that all three terms summed up in
are negative if \( \frac{d\left({\tilde{X}}^e/{\tilde{X}}^g\right)}{ d q}\le 0.\mathrm{QED} \)
1.1 Definition of MES and Approximation
In what follows, we will derive the vertices of the MES and reformulate the two differential equations \( \dot{q}\left({q}^{Low}\right)<0 \), \( \dot{q}\left({q}^{High}\right)>0 \) as differential equation for Δe(Δg).
At q=q ex such that \( {\dot{q}}^{\prime } \)(q ex.)=0, solving for the stationary points of (7) is equivalent to solving an equation in Δe,Δg: \( \dot{q} \)(q ex.(Δe,Δg))=0. Given strictly positive demand and a strictly positive conformity bias, \( \dot{q} \)(q)=0 is equivalent to:
where \( \gamma =\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}{\sigma}_a\left(1+ CD\right),\beta =-\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\left({\sigma}_a\left(1+ CD\right)+{\sigma}_h\left(1- CD\right)\right) \).
Let \( z(q)\equiv \frac{X^e}{X^g},\sigma \equiv {\sigma}_h/{\sigma}_a \), then (21) can be written as:
Taking the total derivative of (22) with respect to Δe, Δg and applying the envelope theorem gives us:
Equation (23) amounts to \( \frac{n+1}{n}\frac{n+1}{n}+\frac{n+1}{n}=\frac{n+1}{n} \), which is equivalent to:
Together with initial conditions: (Δe,Δg)|\( \dot{q} \)(q Max(Δe,Δg))=0 and (Δe,Δg)|\( \dot{q} \)(q Min(Δe,Δg))=0 the differential eq. (24) gives rise to two boundary functions: Δe,Min(Δg), Δe,Max(Δg).
Definition: All (Δe,Δg) pairs that satisfy the following three conditions define a parameter region such that multiple equilibria exist: (1) \( {\varDelta}^e<-{\theta}^e+\frac{n}{\lambda}\left({\varDelta}^g+{\theta}^g\right) \), (2) Δe >Δe,Min(Δg), (3) Δe <Δe,Max(Δg). We will refer to this set as the multiple equilibria set (MES).
Before we continue, we will state some observations based on \( \frac{d{\varDelta}^e}{d{\varDelta}^g}=\frac{1}{\frac{n+1{X}^g}{n{ X}^e}+\frac{\lambda}{n}} \) that will be helpful in the course of our argument:
-
(1)
The slopes of Δe,Min(Δg),Δe,Max(Δg) are positive and smaller than the slope of the third constraint\( {\varDelta}^e<-{\theta}^e+\frac{n}{\lambda}\left({\varDelta}^g+{\theta}^g\right) \).
-
(2)
By corollary 4, \( \frac{d{\Delta}^g}{d{\Delta}^e}=\frac{\Delta^g q+{\theta}^g}{\Delta^e q+{\theta}^e} \) is ceteris paribus decreasing in q
-
(3)
At point A, the relevant constraints have the same slope.
We are able to determine the coordinates for points A and B (see Fig. 2) analytically. For better readability, Table 1 presents the results for α=0. Note that there exist multiple equilibria if and only if (Δe)B >(Δe)A.
Approximation for α=0:
The differential equations given by (25) cannot be solved analytically. In the following, we present our approximation strategy for α=0, such that we can state explicit sufficient conditions for multiple equilibria to exist.
Note that the values for q that corresponds to (Δe,Δg) pairs that are elements of the graph of Δe,Max(Δg) range from \( {q}^C=\frac{\left( n{\theta}^g-{\lambda \theta}^e\right)}{3\left( n{\varDelta}^g-\lambda {\varDelta}^e\right)+4\left( n{\theta}^g-{\lambda \theta}^e\right)} \) to q A=1. We can use the (Δg)B as a lower bound for Δg and by that, can give a lower bound for q independent of Δe and Δg, i.e. \( \underset{\bar{\mkern6mu}}{q}=\frac{4{\left( n+1\right)}^2{\theta}^e}{4{\left( n+1\right)}^2{\theta}^e+3\lambda \left( n{\theta}^g-{\lambda \theta}^e\right)} \). The system \( \dot{q}\left({q}^C\right)=0 \), \( {\dot{q}}^{\prime}\left({q}^C\right)=0 \) can be solved for Δe and Δg as a function of q. If we plug in \( \underset{\bar{\mkern6mu}}{q} \), we get as point D a (Δe,Δg) pair on the graph of Δe,Max(Δg) that corresponds to a maximum for the dynamics in (7) that equals \( \underset{\bar{\mkern6mu}}{q} \).
We approximate the upper and lower boundaries by linear functions intersecting point B and D, respectively. Our observation above, that the slope Δe,Min(Δg) is decreasing in q, gives us a lower bound for the slope by \( \frac{\theta^e}{\theta^g} \). Figure 3 illustrates our approximation procedure. Note that, under our approach, MES is not empty if and only if the area spanned by X g(1)>0 and the two approximating linear function is non-empty.
Proposition (sufficient conditions): If α=0 and \( 0<{\theta}^e<\frac{n}{\lambda}{\theta}^g \), \( \dot{\tilde{q}}=0 \) has three solutions if:
where \( \underset{\bar{\mkern6mu}}{q}=\frac{4{\left( n+1\right)}^2{\theta}^e}{4{\left( n+1\right)}^2{\theta}^e+3\lambda \left( n{\theta}^g-{\lambda \theta}^e\right)} \).
Approximation for α ≠ 0
Since we have an analytical solution for point A, we now focus the general solution for the tangent point D:
where
To find such a point, we apply the following approach: First, we express two of the conditions for the inflection point C, \( \dot{q} \)(q)=0, \( {\dot{q}}^{\hbox{'}} \)(q)=0 in terms of Δg(q). With these two conditions, we can solve for Δe. However, we still have to find a q that will be greater than q IP and independent of Δe and Δg.
For the general case α ≠ 0, we again choose q such that we can be sure that it will correspond to a point on the graph of Δe,Max(Δg). This can be achieved by choosing (Δg)B as a lower bound for Δg and ‑θ e as a lower bound for Δe.
This gives us a lower bound for the maxima that correspond to Δe,Max(Δg) independent of Δe and Δg. We can then calculate the slope at point D: \( \frac{d{\varDelta}^e}{d{\varDelta}^e}=\frac{d{\varDelta}^e}{d{\varDelta}^e} \).
Proof of Proposition 4: The situation where MES is empty corresponds to the case point A, B and C are equal, i.e. where q Max=q Min≡q IP=1, \( \dot{q} \)(1)=0 and X g (1)=0. The latter two conditions provide a solution for Δg as a function of α: \( {\varDelta}^g\left(\alpha \right)=\frac{{\alpha \lambda \delta}_h\left(1- CD\right)\left( n{\theta}^g-{\lambda \theta}^e\right)}{n\left( n+1\right)\left(1-\alpha \right){\delta}_a}-{\theta}^g \). The first condition amounts to a condition for α as a function of Δg:
where τ=(nθ g ‑ λθ e). Solving these two equations for α yields the critical value:
Derivation of the partial effects on the critical value α crit:
In the next step, we first rearrange the term on the left-hand side of the last inequality and, second, we distinguish two cases to establish the strict positivity of the term.
Proof of Proposition 5: Inserting equilibrium quantities given in (13) into (7) and evaluation at qº yields eq. (18). QED
Proof of Proposition 6: At the discontinuities we have m * =m eq and thus \( \dot{q}(q)=\dot{\tilde{q}}(q) \). Otherwise, m * >m eq implies \( {\tilde{X}}^e>{\widehat{X}}^e \) and \( {\tilde{X}}^g<{\widehat{X}}^g \) due to \( \frac{dX^{e\ast }}{dm}>0 \) and \( \frac{dX^{g\ast }}{dm}<0 \). Hence, \( \dot{q}(q)<\dot{\tilde{q}}(q) \) for all q in the intervals of continuity. For the second part of the claim, note that we can write \( \dot{q}=\dot{q}\left(\frac{X^e}{X^g}\left( m(q), q\right), q\right) \) and thus, \( \frac{d\dot{q}}{ d q}=\frac{\partial \dot{q}}{\partial \frac{X^e}{X^g}}\left(\frac{\partial \frac{X^e}{X^g}}{\partial m}\frac{d m}{ d q}+\frac{\partial \frac{X^e}{X^g}}{\partial q}\right)+\frac{\partial \dot{q}}{\partial q} \). Since \( \frac{dm^{\ast }}{dq}=\frac{\Delta^e}{\sqrt{k\kappa}} \) and \( \frac{dm^{eq}}{dq}=0 \) for all q in the intervals of continuity, and the other terms in \( \frac{d\dot{q}}{ d q} \) are the same for the discontinuous version of \( \dot{q} \) and its continuous approximation \( \dot{\tilde{q}} \), the observation \( \frac{\partial \dot{q}}{\partial \frac{X^e}{X^g}}=\left(1-\alpha \right)\left(\left(1- q\right){\sigma}_a+\frac{q{\sigma}_h}{{\left(\frac{X^e}{X^g}\right)}^2}\right)>0 \) implies the second claim of the Proposition. QED.
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Müller, S., von Wangenheim, G. The impact of market innovations on the dissemination of social norms: the sustainability case. J Evol Econ 27, 663–690 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-017-0509-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-017-0509-5