Abstract
Traditional game theory assumes that choices are made in view of their consequences. Evolutionary game theory, by contrast, denies deliberation by letting behavior evolve due to its past success. The two opposite approaches are not mutually exclusive but can be combined in various ways. As in Berninghaus et al. (2003), we illustrate how to connect, and thereby combine, forward looking deliberation (the shadow of the future) with evolution of behavior (the shadow of the past). In their study, this transition allows more or, respectively, fewer choices to evolve rather than to be rationally chosen and is thus discrete. To demonstrate that there can be a continuous transition, we consider a duopoly market game with a continuous behavioral threshold separating the regions where one does (not) deliberate rationally.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Berninghaus S, Güth W, Kliemt H (2003) From teleology to evolution: bridging the gap between rationality and adaptation in social explanation. J Evol Econ 13(4):385–410
Brenner T, Joosten R, Witt U (2002) Games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs. Int J Game Theory 31:609–620
De Waal F (1982) Chimpanzee politics. Jonathan Cape, London
Goodall J (1971) In the shadow of man. Collins, London
Güth W, Kliemt H, Napel S (2006) Population-dependent costs of detecting trustworthiness—an indirect evolutionary analysis. Discussion paper on strategic interaction #08-2006, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany
Güth W, Levati MV, von Wangenheim G (2004) Relatives versus neighbors—an experiment studying voluntary social exchange. Discussion paper on strategic interaction #33-2004, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany
Güth W, Nikiforakis N, Norman HT (2006) Vertical cross-shareholding—theory and experimental evidence. International Journal of Industrial Organization. (in press)
Güth W, Yaari M (1992) Explaining reciprocal behavior in simple strategic games: an evolutionary approach. In: Explaining process and change—approaches to evolutionary economics (Hrsg. U. Witt), The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp 23–34, (republished) In: Khalil EL (ed), “Trust,” critical studies in economic institutions—series; Hodgeson GM (ed), Edward reference collection (2003). UK and Northhampton, MA, USA, pp 659–670
Hölldobler B, Wilson EO (1990) The ants. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Trivers RL (2002) Natural selection and social theory. Selected papers of Robert Trivers. Oxford University Press, New York
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
We gratefully accept the helpful comments by our two anonymous referees.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Güth, W., Stadler, M. Path dependence without denying deliberation— a continuous transition model connecting teleology and evolution. J Evol Econ 17, 45–52 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-006-0043-3
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-006-0043-3