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Path dependence without denying deliberation— a continuous transition model connecting teleology and evolution

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Abstract

Traditional game theory assumes that choices are made in view of their consequences. Evolutionary game theory, by contrast, denies deliberation by letting behavior evolve due to its past success. The two opposite approaches are not mutually exclusive but can be combined in various ways. As in Berninghaus et al. (2003), we illustrate how to connect, and thereby combine, forward looking deliberation (the shadow of the future) with evolution of behavior (the shadow of the past). In their study, this transition allows more or, respectively, fewer choices to evolve rather than to be rationally chosen and is thus discrete. To demonstrate that there can be a continuous transition, we consider a duopoly market game with a continuous behavioral threshold separating the regions where one does (not) deliberate rationally.

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Correspondence to Werner Güth.

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We gratefully accept the helpful comments by our two anonymous referees.

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Güth, W., Stadler, M. Path dependence without denying deliberation— a continuous transition model connecting teleology and evolution. J Evol Econ 17, 45–52 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-006-0043-3

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